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Introducción
Introducción y objetivos
La transmisión cuántica de clave (QKD del inglés Quantum Key Distribution)
[Bennett et al., 1984], más conocida como criptografía cuántica, se ha conver-
tido en un nuevo paradigma en la protección de datos. La seguridad de las
comunicaciones de datos cifradas con claves intercambiadas con QKD recae
en las leyes de la Mecánica Cuántica, en lugar de en una capacidad com-
putacional limitada asumida para un posible atacante. QKD permite que dos
partes compartan una clave criptográfica teniendo al Principio de Incertidum-
bre de Heisenberg y al teorema de No Cloning [Wootters et al., 1982] como
principales aliados. La novedad de esta estrategia es que los usuarios legítimos
pueden detectar la presencia de un intruso en el canal y por tanto certificar la
seguridad de la transmisión.
Los principales trabajos sobre QKD en espacio libre se centraron inicial-
mente en conseguir largas distancias de transmisión con el objetivo de probar
la viabilidad de las comunicaciones QKD vía satélite [Schmitt-Manderbach
et al., 2007]. Sin embargo a cortas distancias (rango interurbano) los enlaces
de QKD en espacio libre también encuentran una aplicación importante, ya
que pueden en parte aliviar el problema del ‘cuello de botella’ que afecta a
la conectividad de las redes metropolitanas. Además, en general, la óptica en
espacio libre (FSO del inglés Free Space Optics) tiene una ventaja considerable
sobre la fibra óptica que radica en su flexibilidad de instalación y portabili-
dad. A diferencia de la fibra óptica, que se convierte en un coste irrecuperable
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cuando el cliente abandona su ubicación, los enlaces FSO pueden ser traslada-
dos como se requiera. QKD aplicada a enlaces aéreos cortos en zonas urbanas
se convierte así en una alternativa interesante a la criptografía de clave pública
actual, la cual está amenazada por la llegada del ordenador cuántico. En este
contexto la QKD está orientada principalmente para su uso en instituciones
de carácter financiero, gubernamental o militar situadas en una misma ciudad.
Sin embargo, para que la QKD pueda ser una alternativa realista necesita im-
plementarse a alta velocidad de forma que las claves secretas sean generadas
a altas velocidades y puedan ser utilizadas en tándem con el cifrado one-time
pad [Vernam, 1926], que es el único cifrado ‘irrompible’ que se ha propuesto
hasta la fecha.
Por lo tanto, los principales objetivos de esta tesis han sido el diseño y
la implementación de un sistema de QKD a alta velocidad en espacio libre.
Para conseguir QKD a alta velocidad hay que tener en cuenta diversas cues-
tiones. La selección de la longitud de onda y los detectores es crítica, así como
el diseño del transmisor y del receptor o el método de sincronizado. En co-
municaciones ópticas en espacio libre se utilizan normalmente dos ventanas
espectrales con baja absorción en las regiones de infrarrojo cercano, concreta-
mente en las longitudes de onda de 850 nm y 1550 nm. Aunque la segunda tiene
asociada una mayor transmisión y se ve menos afectada por las turbulencias y
el backscattering, la tecnología de detección de fotones también debe ser con-
siderada. De hecho, aunque los detectores de fotones individuales de InGaAs
han mejorado considerablemente su rendimiento mediante el incremento de
su máxima frecuencia de operación (de MHz a GHz), todavía son superados
por los diodos de avalancha de único fotón de Silicio (Si-SPADs) en paráme-
tros críticos tales como cuentas oscuras, eficiencia de detección y probabilidad
de afterpulsing. De la misma manera, los detectores de fotones individuales
superconductores, aunque exhiben bajos jitters temporales y pocas cuentas os-
curas a λ∼850 nm [Clarke et al., 2011], presentan menores eficiencias que los
Si-SPADs, además de tener que ser enfriados a temperaturas tan bajas como
3 K. Tras analizar los factores mencionados se optó por seleccionar una fuente
de fotones a una longitud de onda de 850 nm y Si-SPADs como detectores de
fotones individuales, por considerar esta combinación la opción más práctica
para conseguir velocidades de GHz.
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En general, para el diseño de un transmisor y un receptor capaces de ope-
rar a altas velocidades de transmisión de datos es necesario considerar varios
factores clave: una fuente de fotones que permita velocidades de GHz y muy
alta precisión temporal, un receptor capaz de procesar grandes cantidades de
datos a alta velocidad, y un mecanismo de sincronización que no disminuya la
velocidad del protocolo QKD. Además, abordando factores críticos tales como
una alta linealidad de los estados cuánticos de polarización y una eficiente
reducción de la radiación ambiental que se cuela en el sistema, se consiguen
tasas de error bajas, y por lo tanto altas velocidades de transmisión de clave
segura. A continuación se proporciona un breve resumen de los contenidos de
cada capítulo de esta tesis.
Contenido
Los contenidos de esta tesis se han organizado de la siguiente manera.
En el Capítulo 2 se introduce el concepto de QKD. En primer lugar se
describen los principales logros conseguidos en el campo de la criptografía a lo
largo de la historia. A continuación se presenta el contexto de la criptografía
previo al nacimiento de la QKD, señalando las vulnerabilidades de los algo-
ritmos de cifrado clásicos que se utilizan actualmente. La QKD se presenta
entonces como una posible solución frente a estas vulnerabilidades. También
se describen los protocolos más representativos que implementan QKD y los
componentes necesarios en un sistema de QKD. Finalmente se resumen los
principales ataques a la QKD y se presenta una revisión de los sistemas expe-
rimentales de QKD en espacio libre implementados hasta la fecha.
El Capítulo 3 está dedicado a la descripción del módulo transmisor, dise-
ñado e implementado para el sistema de QKD que se describe en esta tesis. Se
describen además varios experimentos realizados para caracterizar el compor-
tamiento del transmisor en función de las corrientes de control de los láseres
(bias y modulación), así como el comportamiento espectral de éstos. Asimismo
se describe la caracterización de la linealidad de los estados de polarización que
codifican la secuencia binaria enviada por Alice, el método de sincronización
temporal y las técnicas usadas para aislar el emisor de la radiación ambiental,
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entre otros. Este capítulo concluye con una descripción del equipo donde se
montó el emisor.
El Capítulo 4 trata sobre el canal de transmisión. En él se resumen los
diferentes procesos que afectan a la propagación de los fotones a través del
espacio libre, tales como la absorción atmosférica, el scattering o la turbulencia.
También se estudia el efecto de la radiación ambiental que puede colarse en
el sistema de QKD incrementando el error. Finalmente se describe la óptica
en espacio libre utilizada en emisor y receptor para aumentar la eficiencia de
la detección de la señal óptica en Bob, lo que se traduce en una mejora de la
velocidad de trasmisión de clave.
El Capítulo 5 está dedicado a proporcionar una descripción detallada del
módulo del receptor. En primer lugar se describe la configuración de esta
unidad. Después se detallan los módulos utilizados para la detección de fotones
individuales y para el procesamiento de los tiempos de llegada de éstos al
receptor. También se presenta la caracterización y corrección llevadas a cabo
en el receptor de los estados de polarización. Al final de este capítulo se
describe la detección de la señal de sincronizado y las técnicas empleadas para
el filtrado de la radiación ambiental.
En el Capítulo 6, se proporciona una descripción de los experimentos rea-
lizados para caracterizar el sistema de QKD completo y se presentan los re-
sultados obtenidos para dos enlaces ópticos a diferentes distancias. También
se describe el programa desarrollado para el cálculo del error de cada trans-
misión y para la corrección del desfase temporal entre las secuencias de emisor
y receptor. Los experimentos llevados a cabo se diseñaron para determinar la
frecuencia óptima del sistema así como el número medio de fotones por pulso
para el que la tasa de transmisión de clave segura fuera máxima. También se
caracterizó la influencia de la radiación ambiental, la estabilidad del sistema y
la robustez del mismo frente a perturbaciones externas que pudieran afectar el
alineamiento entre ambas estaciones. El capítulo finaliza con una estimación
de la máxima distancia a la que el sistema puede operar, para varios regímenes
de turbulencia.
Finalmente el Capítulo 7 resume las conclusiones de los capítulos anterio-
res y proporciona ideas sobre posibles modificaciones a realizar en el sistema
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de QKD presentado en esta tesis con el objetivo de mejorar su seguridad,
velocidad de transmisión de clave segura y distancia de transmisión.
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Conclusiones y trabajo futuro
Este capítulo ofrece un resumen de los resultados y conclusiones
obtenidos de la implementación y caracterización del sistema de
QKD presentado en esta tesis. También se recogen las aportaciones
del presente trabajo al campo de la criptografía cuántica. Por
último, se proponen posibles actualizaciones y modificaciones del
sistema de QKD descrito, que podrían aumentar su tasa de clave
segura así como la distancia de transmisión.
Conclusiones
La presente tesis aporta una descripción detallada de un sistema de trans-
misión cuántica de clave en espacio libre, que implementa el protocolo B92
a altas velocidades de transmisión en un entorno urbano. Las conclusiones
más relevantes extraídas del diseño y caracterización del sistema así como del
estudio del área se resumen a continuación.
1. Teóricamente, QKD en tándem con el cifrado de Vernam ofrece el nivel
más alto de seguridad de entre todas las técnicas desarrolladas hasta la
fecha, así como perspectivas de seguridad en un futuro en el que los orde-
nadores cuánticos formen parte de nuestra vida diaria. Sin embargo, para
ser realmente competitiva todavía se han de solventar diversos aspectos
como una mayor robustez ante los ataques por canal lateral, mayores
distancias de transmisión y tasas más altas de clave segura.
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2. En implementaciones experimentales de sistemas de QKD un espía puede
obtener información de las ‘huellas’ que dejan los dispositivos físicos uti-
lizados. Un sistema de QKD debe ser por ello cuidadosamente diseñado
de forma que todas las posibles vulnerabilidades o fisuras experimenta-
les se tengan en cuenta y se determine la fuga de información que dichas
fisuras pudieran producir, para así establecer las pruebas de seguridad
apropiadas. Sin embargo, el debate sobre las estrategias adecuadas para
conseguir que la QKD sea segura en presencia de estas fisuras es intenso y
muy abierto [Yuan et al., 2011b]. Todavía no se ha encontrado una solu-
ción satisfactoria, lo que pone de manifiesto la necesidad de una prueba
de seguridad más general que incorpore el uso de dispositivos imper-
fectos. Acín et al. propusieron una estrategia denominada criptografía
cuántica independiente de los dispositivos [Acín et al., 2007], aunque su
realización experimental supone todavía un gran reto tecnológico. Des-
pués de casi tres décadas de su nacimiento, la criptografía cuántica ha
alcanzado su madurez y se enfrenta probablemente a su reto más difícil:
seguridad incondicional en un mundo ‘imperfecto’.
3. Para conseguir altas velocidades de transmisión el emisor del sistema de
QKD descrito utiliza dos VCSELs con gran ancho de banda modulados
por un generador de patrón de pulsos que opera a frecuencias de GHz.
El régimen de emisión de fotones individuales se consigue atenuando los
diodos láser a un número medio de fotones por pulso de aproximadamente
0.1. Los VCSELs se optimizaron en función de sus niveles de corrien-
tes de control (modulación y bias) para minimizar su contribución a la
tasa de error causada por interferencia entre símbolos. La corriente de
bias óptima es de 2 mA y la de modulación en torno a 6 mA, con una
contribución al QBER de menos del 0.5% para una frecuencia reloj de
1 GHz. El análisis de los espectros de los láseres reveló que estos ape-
nas cambian con la corriente de modulación, frecuencia reloj o tiempo
de funcionamiento. El desplazamiento de los espectros con la corriente
de bias era de unos 0.15 nm/mA para valores altos de corrientes, y de
aproximadamente la mitad para corrientes mínimas de bias.
4. El receptor del sistema de QKD analiza la polarización de los fotones
que le llegan según el protocolo B92. Como detectores del sistema se
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seleccionaron dos SPADs, debido a su alta eficiencia, bajo ruido, facilidad
de uso y disponibilidad comercial. Se caracterizaron cuatro Si-SPADs en
términos de su eficiencia de detección, tasa de cuentas oscuras y contribu-
ción al QBER. Los dos SPADs con mejor comportamiento presentaban
eficiencias de detección de 29% y 35%, y tasas de cuentas oscuras de
170 y 250 cuentas/s, respectivamente. La tarjeta utilizada para medir y
almacenar los tiempos de llegada de los fotones detectados consiste en
un Analizador de Intervalos de Tiempo GT658PCI de GuideTech. La
interfaz de usuario de LabVIEW suministrada con la tarjeta se modificó
para monitorizar la tasa de cuentas en cada canal de entrada a la tarjeta
y para proporcionar las listas de tiempos de llegada de los fotones a cada
canal del receptor. Cada estado de polarización es detectado en un canal
diferente.
5. Con el fin de aumentar la eficiencia en la recepción de los fotones emitidos
por Alice se utilizó un telescopio en cada extremo del sistema de QKD. En
Bob, además del telescopio Schmidt-Cassegrain, se montaron dos lentes
con una distancia focal de 30 mm para mejorar el acoplamiento del haz
en las fibras.
6. Para alinear ambas estaciones, Alice se montó en un sistema gimbal
de alta precisión con dos motores rotatorios que proporcionaban los
movimientos en azimut y elevación necesarios para el correcto apun-
tamiento de Alice a Bob. El módulo óptico del receptor se acopló di-
rectamente al telescopio Schmidt-Cassegrain, cuyos motores facilitaron
el alineamiento con el transmisor. A su vez, un láser visible a una longi-
tud de onda de 650 nm emitía un haz paralelo a los haces de datos y de
sincronización para facilitar el alineamiento burdo.
7. Los estados no ortogonales de polarización que cifran la información bi-
naria son transmitidos en espacio libre desde Alice hacia Bob. La atmós-
fera constituye un excelente canal de transmisión debido a la ausencia
de birrefringencia, lo que permite preservar los estados de polarización
de los fotones. Además, en el entorno de λ∼ 850 nm hay una ventana
de baja absorción en la que existen detectores de fotones individuales
eficientes. Sin embargo, factores como la atenuación atmosférica, las
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condiciones climáticas y la turbulencia, limitan la máxima distancia de
transmisión alcanzable. Las medidas realizadas en esta tesis se hicieron
para enlaces ópticos en condiciones de partículas de aerosoles urbanos, y
su atenuación se calculó con MODTRAN para una visibilidad de 5 km,
resultando ser de unos 2 dB/km. Además, se hicieron cálculos para esti-
mar la pérdida geométrica del haz en el receptor considerando diferentes
regímenes de turbulencia. Las simulaciones revelaron que para un régi-
men de turbulencia intermedio (C2n ≈ 10−15) el sistema podría operar
potencialmente hasta una distancia de 4.4 km.
8. Los sistemas de QKD en espacio libre también se ven afectados por la
radiación solar ambiental así como por otras fuentes de luz ambiental que
se acoplan en el sistema aumentando el error. Se implementaron técni-
cas de filtrado espacial y espectral, y además Alice y Bob fueron aislados
mediante un tejido opaco y un tubo largo antireflectante colocado alrede-
dor de la lente principal del telescopio de Alice. El filtro interferencial de
1 nm de FWHM redujo la radiación ambiental unos 30 dB, y el filtrado
espacial llevado a cabo por las fibras ópticas con un núcleo de 62.5 µm
de diámetro proporcionó un campo de visión restringido al receptor. Es-
tas técnicas de filtrado y aislamiento hicieron posible el funcionamiento
diurno del sistema con altas velocidades de transmisión.
9. La relación de extinción de polarización para los dos estados cuánticos
no ortogonales a λ∼850 nm se caracterizó a lo largo de todo el sistema
de QKD. En general, la absorción inherente a los materiales de ciertos
componentes ópticos degradaba la linealidad de los estados de polariza-
ción, siendo particularmente significativa para el estado diagonal. Para
contrarrestar dicho efecto se utilizaron una lámina de cuarto de onda en
Alice y dos láminas de cuarto de onda más una lámina de media onda en
Bob, con lo que se consiguieron relaciones de extinción de polarización
que contribuyeron con menos de 0.25% al QBER total.
10. La sincronización óptica entre emisor y receptor se llevó a cabo mediante
la emisión por parte de Alice de pulsos periódicos intensos a una longi-
tud de onda de 1550 nm (diferente a la de los datos) y con una tasa
de repetición de 10 MHz. La señal de sincronización electrónica para la
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modulación del VCSEL de sincronizado se obtuvo de la salida de trigger
del generador de patrón de pulsos del transmisor. En Bob se usó un
fotodetector de InGaAs para su detección, y su nivel de voltaje fue mejo-
rado mediante un amplificador de transimpedancia con el fin de obtener
el voltaje requerido a la entrada de la señal de reloj externa de la tarjeta
que mide los tiempos de llegada de los fotones.
11. La eficiencia de transmisión del canal (0.87 para un enlace de 300 m), la
eficiencia total de la óptica del receptor (0.14), la eficiencia de detección
de los SPADs (0.32), y la eficiencia del protocolo B92 (0.25) dieron como
resultado una eficiencia total entorno a 0.01 para un enlace óptico de
300 m.
12. El sistema de QKD en espacio libre fue caracterizado para dos enlaces
ópticos de diferente distancia, 30 m y 300 m, en un entorno urbano. La
tasa de clave secreta fue calculada a partir de las medidas del QBER y de
la tasa de la secuencia sifted, asumiendo el peor de los escenarios posibles
en el que se estuvieran llevando a cabo dos ataques simultáneos: el ataque
USD y el ataque PNS. Los siguientes resultados fueron obtenidos a partir
de la caracterización del sistema:
• La frecuencia reloj óptima para el funcionamiento del sistema, es de-
cir, la que proporciona la tasa más alta de clave secreta, es 1.5 GHz.
La frecuencia máxima a la que el sistema puede operar es 2.75 GHz,
con un QBER por debajo del 8% en condiciones nocturnas.
• El número medio de fotones por pulso óptimo es µ ∼ 0.1, con el
que se consigue un compromiso óptimo entre seguridad y tasa de
transmisión de la secuencia sifted.
• El funcionamiento diurno del sistema ha sido demostrado en condi-
ciones de radiación solar muy elevada, alcanzando tasas promedio
de clave secreta de 0.7 Mbps para un enlace de 30 m y de 0.5 Mbps
para 300 m.
• En condiciones nocturnas se alcanzaron tasas de clave secreta de
hasta 1 Mbps para el enlace de 300 m. Esta tasa de clave secreta es
un orden de magnitud mayor que las alcanzadas previamente por
otros sistemas en condiciones comparables.
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• Se ha demostrado que el sistema es muy estable ya que, para el
enlace de 300 m y después de un período de 24 horas con el sis-
tema funcionando sin intervención alguna sobre él, las tasas que
se obtuvieron de secuencia sifted y de clave secreta fueron el 87%
y el 80%, respectivamente, con relación a sus valores al inicio del
experimento.
• La robustez del sistema frente a posibles desalineaciones demostró
que, sólo tras una reducción del 90% en la tasa de la secuencia sifted,
se alcanzaban valores de QBER superiores al 6%. Esta tendencia
indica que el sistema podría estar potencialmente alineado a 300 m
durante 4 o 5 días sin intervención externa.
Trabajo futuro
Como se ha mencionado en la primera conclusión, hay determinados aspectos
de la QKD como su seguridad incondicional, la transmisión a grandes distan-
cias o conseguir mayores tasas de clave segura, en los que se debería realizar
un gran esfuerzo con el fin de conseguir que las implementaciones reales de
sistemas de QKD sean verdaderamente competitivas.
En lo que respecta a la seguridad, el plan de investigación inmediato incluye
mejorar el sistema de QKD discutido en esta tesis para implementar un proto-
colo más seguro frente a posibles atacantes, el protocolo BB84 con decoy states.
Esto hará que el sistema sea invulnerable frente a los ataques PNS y USD, y
aumentará la tasa de clave segura al menos un orden de magnitud. Para ello
serán necesarios más componentes ópticos y mecánicos con el fin de incluir
en el montaje los estados de polarización adicionales, así como dos VCSELs
más en Alice, dos detectores más en Bob, y moduladores de intensidad para
generar las diferentes intensidades de los decoy states.
Para hacer que el sistema sea más robusto frente a posibles ataques es esen-
cial garantizar que los espectros de los láseres sean totalmente indistinguibles,
de modo que no se suministre ninguna información extra al intruso. En el
sistema actual los VCSELs son estables en potencia, puesto que los drivers de
los láseres tienen un control automático de potencia que mantiene la potencia
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óptica promedio de salida del láser estable ante posibles cambios de tempera-
tura y de las propiedades del láser. Este control puede variar ligeramente la
corriente bias del láser, lo que podría desplazar su espectro de emisión. Para
asegurar una longitud de onda de emisión estable se prevé controlar la tempe-
ratura de los láseres. Esto permitiría sintonizar de manera precisa la longitud
de onda de emisión de los VCSELs deseada, de forma que fuera idéntica para
ambos láseres. Además, puesto que ambos VCSELs son multimodo, el control
por temperatura permitiría usar un filtro paso-banda estrecho que asegurara
la propagación de un único modo espectral.
En cuanto a la velocidad de transmisión de clave secreta, ésta podría mejo-
rarse reduciendo el QBER del sistema. De día, la mayor contribución al QBER
es la radiación ambiental. Para reducirla se ha diseñado una nueva configu-
ración de Alice en la que los espejos son innecesarios. La implementación de
la nueva configuración de Alice requerirá recolocar la óptica, lo cual implica
modificar el conjunto de lentes del telescopio de salida y la placa óptica.
La radiación ambiental se podría reducir también usando un filtrado espa-
cial más estrecho, por ejemplo con fibras ópticas de menor diámetro. Sin em-
bargo, esto reduciría también el ángulo de aceptación del receptor, haciendo al
sistema más vulnerable frente a turbulencias. Por lo tanto, otra optimización
del sistema consiste en implementar técnicas automáticas de apuntamiento
y seguimiento rápidos —actualmente en desarrollo— que permitan un fun-
cionamiento continuo en condiciones de turbulencia en la atmósfera. Esto
permitiría también aumentar la distancia del enlace óptico del sistema.
Por último, el sistema está siendo mejorado para la implementación de los
procesos de corrección de errores y amplificación por privacidad en tiempo real,
con el objetivo de generar la clave secreta final compartida por Alice y Bob.

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction and objectives
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [Bennett et al., 1984] —more generally
known as quantum cryptography— has become a new paradigm in data pro-
tection. The laws of Quantum Mechanics, rather than assumed computational
limitations, are now responsible for ensuring data communications. QKD
allows two parties to share a cryptographic key, having Heisenberg’s uncer-
tainty principle and No Cloning theorem [Wootters et al., 1982] as their prin-
cipal allies. The novelty of this scheme is that the ‘quantumness’ of this proper-
ties allows the legitimate users to detect the presence of an eavesdropper in
the channel and thus certify the security of the transmission.
Free-space QKD was primarily aimed towards satellite communications,
and the main efforts have concentrated in achieving long distances to proof its
feasibility [Schmitt-Manderbach et al., 2007]. However, short-distance (intra-
city range) free-space QKD links are also of considerable importance, since
they can partly alleviate the existing ‘connectivity bottleneck’ in metropoli-
tan networks. Furthermore, free-space optics (FSO) in general, has a consi-
derable advantage over optical fibre, namely their flexibility of installation and
portability. Unlike optical fibre, which becomes an irrecoverable cost when the
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customer leaves, FSO links can be moved to different locations as required.
QKD applied to short free-space links in urban areas is an interesting alter-
native to current public-key cryptography, which is threatened by a quantum
computer attack. In this context, QKD is aimed principally to financial, go-
vernment and military institutions located within the same city. However, for
QKD to be a realistic alternative, it needs to be implemented at high speed,
so that secure keys can be generated at high rates to be used in tandem with
the one-time pad [Vernam, 1926], the only unbreakable cipher proposed so far.
Therefore, the prime objectives of this thesis were the design and imple-
mentation of a high-speed QKD system in free space. Quantum key exchange
at high rates can be achieved through several approaches. The choice of wave-
length and detectors is critical as well as other considerations such as the
design of the transmitter and receiver and the synchronisation method. Two
low-absorption atmospheric spectral windows in the near-infrared regions of
λ∼850 nm and λ∼ 1550 nm are usually used in free-space optical communi-
cations. Although the latter wavelength has an associated higher transmission
and it is slightly less affected by turbulence effects and backscattering, detec-
tion technology must also be considered. Indeed, while InGaAs single-photon
detectors have greatly improved their performance in terms of the maximum
repetition rate they can operate at (from MHz to GHz) [Yuan et al., 2008],
they are still outperformed by commercially-available Si single-photon ava-
lanche detectors (Si-SPADs) in critical parameters such as dark-count rate,
detection efficiency and afterpulsing probability. Likewise, superconducting
single-photon detectors, although exhibiting low timing jitters and low dark-
count rates at λ∼850 nm [Clarke et al., 2011], still show lower detection effi-
ciencies than Si-SPADs, and must be cooled down to temperatures as low as
3 K. After analysing the mentioned issues, a source of photons of wavelength
850 nm in conjunction with Si-SPADs as the single-photon detectors was cho-
sen as the most efficient and practical solution to achieve GHz clock rates.
In general, the design of a transmitter and a receiver capable of operating at
high bit rates needs to take into consideration several key factors: an emitter
allowing GHz clock rates with very high temporal precision, a receiver able
to process large amounts of data without delaying the protocol speed, and a
synchronisation mechanism that does not slow down the whole communication
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transfer. Moreover ensuring the most critical factors are addressed, such as a
high linearity of the polarisation quantum states and an efficient reduction in
the background radiation, permits low error rates and hence high secure key
rates. In the following a brief outline describing the contents of each chapter
in this thesis is given.
1.2 Outline
The contents of this thesis are arranged as follows.
In chapter 2 the concept of QKD is introduced. Firstly, the main achieve-
ments through history in the field of cryptography are described. Then an
overview of the context of cryptography previous to the birth of QKD is given,
highlighting the vulnerabilities of the classical ciphers that are used to encrypt
nowadays communications. Quantum key distribution is then presented as a
possible solution to such vulnerabilities. The most representative protocols
that implement QKD and the components involved in a QKD system are also
discussed. Finally, the most relevant eavesdropping attacks against QKD are
described, and a review of free-space experimental QKD systems is provided.
Chapter 3 is devoted to describe the configuration of the transmitter mo-
dule, designed and implemented for the QKD system presented in this disser-
tation. Then, several experiments carried out to characterise and optimise the
performance of the transmitter in terms of the driving conditions and spectral
behaviour of the lasers, the linearity of the polarisation states encoding the
binary sequence sent by Alice, the timing synchronisation technique or the
shielding from solar radiation, are described among others. This chapter con-
cludes with a description of the equipment where the transmitter is mounted
on.
Chapter 4 discuss the transmission channel, outlining the different pro-
cesses that may affect the propagation of photons through free space such
as atmospheric absorption, scattering or turbulence. Also the effect of back-
ground radiation that may couple into the QKD system and increase the error
rate is studied. Finally, the free-space optics used in both transmitter and re-
ceiver to enhance the efficiency of the channel and therefore the transmission
rates is described.
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Chapter 5 is intended to provide a detailed description of the implemented
receiver module of the QKD system. The configuration of this unit is firstly
discussed. Then, the modules used for the detection of single photons and
the recording of their arrival times at the receiver are described. Also the
characterisation and improvement of the detected polarisation states regarding
their linearity are presented. At the end of this chapter, the detection of the
synchronisation signal and the background filtering techniques are discussed.
In chapter 6 a description of the tests performed to characterise the entire
QKD system and the experimental results obtained for two optical links of
different distance are provided. Also the program developed to compute the
error rate and to correct for the temporal shift between the transmitter’s and
receiver’s sequences is explained. The experiments allowed establishing the
optimum clock frequency and the optimum mean photon number per pulse
for which the highest secret key transmission rate is achieved. The influence
of background radiation, the system’s stability and the robustness to external
perturbations that might affect the alignment between both stations is also
analysed. The chapter ends with an estimation of the maximum distance the
system could operate at regarding several turbulence regimes.
Finally, chapter 7 summarises the conclusions of previous chapters and
provides some clues about possible modifications that could be applied to the
QKD system presented in this thesis to enhance its security, secret key rate
and transmission distance.
Chapter 2
Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) allows a theoretically secure
key distribution over an untrusted channel, which is guaranteed
by the laws of Quantum Mechanics. In this chapter a historical
overview of the principles of Cryptography is first presented, briefly
describing the main characteristics of symmetric and asymmetric
ciphers. Then the threat that the birth of a quantum computer may
pose to the security of these classical ciphers is remarked, and the
concept of quantum cryptography as an alternative method to en-
sure communications is introduced. A brief description of the pro-
tocols most frequently used for its implementation and an overview
of the main components of a QKD system are also described. The
foundations of QKD security are then discussed, and the most rele-
vant eavesdropping attacks against QKD systems are summarised.
The chapter concludes with a section devoted to review up to date
representative QKD experimental systems operating in free space.
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2.1 Brief introduction to Cryptography
Throughout history, the old art of communicating secrets has constantly played
an essential role in many contexts: political, economical, social, etc., with the
military being of especial relevance. Nowadays the fast development and wide
use of computers have dramatically increased the possibilities of cryptography,
which has become an unnoticeable part of everybody’s life whenever sensitive
data like credit card information is sent through communication networks.
Cryptography is a science that studies the methods to securely transmit
information between two parties, rendering the message unintelligible to any
unauthorized third party. It is therefore the process of hiding information by
modifying an ordinary message, known as plaintext , to obtain an apparently
meaningless message or ciphertext , which is incomprehensible to anyone who
ignores how it was generated. To achieve this, an algorithm (also called a
cryptosystem or cipher) is used to combine a message with some additional
information —known as the key— to generate a cryptogram. This process is
called encryption. The reverse process to encryption, with the knowledge of
the key, is called decryption. For a cryptosystem to be secure it should be
impossible to decrypt the cryptogram without the key.
Cryptography is used nowadays not only to guarantee that solely the le-
gitimate parties have access to the ciphered information (i.e., to ensure confi-
dentiality), but also to cover further objectives such as authentication, digital
signatures or non-repudiation. Cryptography is one of the two branches of
the broader discipline of Cryptology, being the other one Cryptanalysis: the
art of gaining unauthorized access to cryptosystems with the aim of obtaining
information from ciphertexts without knowing the key or by acquiring the key
itself, also known as code breaking.
From the beginnings of civilization humans have wished to communicate
secretly. With the aim of concealing information the ancient Greeks wrote
messages on wooden tablets, which later were covered with wax. The Spartans
were the first to use a strictly speaking cryptographic system in warfare. They
invented the skytale, a device which consisted of a wooden rod with a strip of
papyrus or parchment wrapped around it. The sender would write a message
on the strip from left to right along the length of the skytale (see Figure 2.1).
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When the strip was unwound the message appeared as a list of meaningless
letters. Then the message was conveyed to its destination and could only be
readable by wrapping the strip around a rod with the same diameter as the
original piece. The skytale is an example of a transposition cipher, where the
letters of the plaintext are rearranged by a special permutation.
Figure 2.1 – Skytale was the first cryptographic device implementing
permutations.
The first substitution ciphers were used by the Romans. In a substitution
cipher (also known as Caesar cipher since Julius Caesar made use of it to
communicate with his generals) the characters of a plaintext are replaced by
characters located a certain number of places further down the alphabet. A
shift of three places was originally used, so that the letter A was replaced
by D, the letter B by E, and so on. For example, the English word PLUG
appears as MIRD after the substitution with this cipher. More generally, in
substitution ciphers the letters of the plaintext are replaced by other letters,
numbers or arbitrary symbols. Although easy to encrypt, ciphers based on
one-to-one substitutions, also known as monoalphabetic ciphers, can be easily
broken by frequency analysis , a cryptanalysis technique proposed in the ninth
century by Al-Kindi that takes advantage of the known rate of recurrence of
certain letters in a particular alphabet [Sergienko, 2006].
The above simple examples of ciphers already contained the two basic me-
thods of encryption that are still employed by cryptographers today, namely
transposition and substitution, techniques that can also be combined to pro-
duce more complex ciphers. Monoalphabetic ciphers were gradually replaced
along the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries by more advanced techniques. In
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the 1460s a device that simplified the use of Caesar ciphers was invented by
Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472). It consisted of two concentric discs with
different characters (see Figure 2.2), used as plaintext and ciphertext alpha-
bets respectively. After replacing a letter of a disc by its corresponding letter
of the second disc, a rotation of the discs changed the relation between both
alphabets. This allowed to easily modifying the cipher alphabet, so that a
letter repeated a certain number of times in the plaintext did not produce a
repeated character in the ciphertext.
Figure 2.2 – Alberti’s disc was the first cryptographic device
implementing subtitutions.
Through his proposal of, by rotating the discs, varying the shift between
both alphabets for each letter within the same message, Alberti would have
discovered the so called polyalphabetic ciphers, which are basically a superposi-
tion of Caesar ciphers with different shifts that are established by the key. For
instance, for the key 7–12–17, the first letter in the message is replaced by the
character corresponding to a shift of 7 positions, the second of 12, the third
of 17, the fourth again of 7, and so on repeating the shifts 7–12–17 until the
whole message is ciphered. Using this key the message TABLE is transformed
into the meaningless AMRSQ.
In 1586 Blaise de Vigenère, combining ideas from Alberti, Johannes
Trithemius and Giovanni Porta, developed one of the most powerful and well
known polyalphabetic ciphers, called after him the Vigenère cipher . It consists
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in using the table shown in Figure 2.3, which contains 26 different cipher al-
phabets, instead of only one, to encrypt a message. The table is obtained by
successively shifting each alphabet one position to the left. The top row in
lower case contains the plaintext alphabet. Then each character of the key
indicates the particular ciphertext alphabet that must be used to encrypt each
character of the plaintext. If the key is not long enough, it is repeated and
concatenated until it has the same length as the plaintext. Figure 2.4 shows an
example of a plaintext encrypted with this scheme using the key “MJGMCDT”.
With this key the first letter of the plaintext must be encrypted using alpha-
bet “M” (row 12), the second with alphabet “J” (row 09), the seventh with
alphabet “T” (row 19), the eighth with alphabet “M” again, and so on. Hence
the letter “o” of the plaintext should read in the ciphertext “A”, which corres-
ponds to column “o” and row 12 (alphabet “M”) of the table. To decipher the
message the receiver needs to know the key. Then he identifies along the row
corresponding to each character of the key, the column where the equivalent
character of the ciphertext lies. The lowercase letter in the top row of that
column indicates the corresponding letter of the plaintext. Thus in our exam-
ple, in the row corresponding to the first letter of the key (“M”), the first letter
of the ciphertext (“A”) lies in the column “o”.
Figure 2.3 – The Vigenère polyalphabetic cipher allowed the use of
26 different cipher alphabets for fast encryption/decryption.
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Figure 2.4 – Cryptogram using the Vigenère polyalphabetic cipher with
the key “MJGMCDT”.
The advantage of polyalphabetic ciphers was that they guaranteed the secu-
rity of the encrypted information against a potential frequency analysis, since
the same letter was encrypted by a different letter each time. However, polyal-
phabetic ciphers were slower and much more complex to use than their pre-
decessors, which made them less practical for most applications, particularly
when a large number of encrypted messages needed to be sent. Therefore,
cryptographers tried to find a cipher harder to crack than monoalphabetic ci-
phers but easier to implement than polyalphabetic ciphers. The result was the
homophonic substitution cipher , where each letter is replaced with a variety of
substitutes, the number of which must be proportional to the rate of repeti-
tion of the particular letter in the language being used. Although this cipher
was much more secure than a monoalphabetic one, it was also breakable. In
fact, every new “unbreakable” cipher was successively broken with much or less
effort. A comprehensive review of the historical development of cryptographic
methods can be found in [Singh, 1999].
It was not until 1917 that a true unbreakable code was proposed. It is
called the one-time pad and was invented by an AT&T Bell Labs engineer,
Gilbert Vernam (the United States patent #1310719 was issued to him in
1919 [Vernam, 1919]). Using this technique a binary conversion of the message
is first performed. The key is another binary sequence that must be as long
as the message. To generate the ciphertext the sender has to add modulo 2
—exclusive-OR (XOR) logical operation— each bit of the plaintext with the
corresponding bit of the key. The receiver decrypts the message (recovers the
plaintext) by combining (adding modulo 2) each bit of the ciphertext with
the corresponding bit of the key. Using the one-time pad, also known as the
Vernam cipher , the ciphertext does not contain any patterns from the plaintext
nor gives any information about the plaintext to a cryptanalyst. It is secure,
provided the key is as long as the message, truly random and used only once.
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Its security lies in the randomness of the resulting ciphertext. Notice that if
the key of a Vernam cipher is a random stream of bits, then the ciphertext
is random even if the plaintext is not random [Salomon, 2006]. Indeed, it is
the only mathematically proven secure technique of encryption (see [Shannon,
1948] and [Shannon, 1949b]).
However, the one-time pad assumes that Alice and Bob (as sender and
receiver are commonly known in cryptography) share a secret random sequence
of bits, i.e., the key. Therefore, the security of a communication ciphered with
the one-time pad depends upon the security of the key distribution process.
However, there is no guarantee with classical key distribution schemes (for
instance with carriers) that an eavesdropper cannot make a copy of the key
during the distribution process.
To overcome this problem public key cryptography was invented. It is a
completely new approach, which uses two cryptographic keys, a public key and
a private key. The former is used for encryption and it is publicly announced
(e.g., published in a website), whereas the latter is used for decryption and has
to be kept secret. These two keys are interconnected via a one-way function,
which is easy to compute in one way (to obtain the public key from the private
key) but extremely hard to compute in the opposite way (to extract the private
key from the public key).
In the following subsections the fundamentals of the two major branches in
which classical cryptography can be divided in, namely secret key or symmetric
cryptography and public key or asymmetric cryptography, are briefly outlined.
2.1.1 Symmetric ciphers. The problem of key distribution
Secret key or symmetric cryptography is the traditional and most intuitive
scheme for secure communications, in which two parties both encrypt and
decrypt their messages using the same shared secret key. This scheme is repre-
sented in Figure 2.5. A sender, Alice, uses a secure key that must be shared
with the receiver, Bob, to encrypt a message. The obtained ciphertext is then
transmitted through an insecure channel and decrypted by Bob using the same
shared key. The processes of encryption and decryption are symmetric and
hence the name of this type of ciphers. An eavesdropper, commonly known
26 2. Quantum Key Distribution
as Eve, attempting to gain information about the message, may perform some
attacks on the communication channel between Alice and Bob to obtain some
estimation of the plaintext and also of the encryption key.
Secret key cryptography is subdivided into two fundamental groups
depending on the number of characters encrypted: stream ciphers and block
ciphers. In the former, each bit of the plaintext is encrypted individually, while
in block ciphers a transformation is made with a group of characters of the
original message. Stream ciphers are widely used in communication protocols,
as the A5 used in GSM (Global System for Mobile communications) or the E0
generator used in Bluetooth technology.
Figure 2.5 – Scheme of a symmetric cryptographic transmission where
a message is encrypted using a secret key. The obtained ciphertext is
transmitted over an insecure channel and decrypted by means of the same
secret key shared by the transmitter and the receiver. Eve monitors the
channel to try to gain information about both key and message.
Among the developed block ciphers only three of them have been released
as public standards: the Data Encryption Standard (DES), later known as
DEA (Data Encryption Algorithm) and now superseded since it is not secure
due to insufficiently long keys (it could be cracked on a dedicated hardware in
less than 24 hours); the TDEA (Triple DEA), which uses blocks of 64 bits with
keys of 56, 112 and 128 bits; and the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard),
which uses 128-bits blocks with keys of 128, 192 and 256 bits. A comprehensive
review of the characteristics of symmetric ciphers can be found in [Fúster et al.,
2012, Ch.3].
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2.1.2 Asymmetric ciphers
Public key or asymmetric cryptography allows two parties who have never met
before to communicate securely. The fundamental difference with secret key
cryptography is that in public key cryptography there is no need for sharing a
secret key between the parties prior to communication. In this case each party
possesses a private key, which is always kept secret, and a public key, which is
freely distributed.
The principle of asymmetric cryptography was first proposed in [Diffie
et al., 1976] by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, who were then graduate
student and professor at Stanford University, respectively. The Diffie-Hellman
(DH) key exchange algorithm is a method for securely sharing a secret key
between two parties over an untrusted channel. This key can then be used to
cipher a message using a symmetric cipher. The first practical cipher based on
public key cryptography was developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman from
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology [Rivest et al., 1978]. It is known as
RSA and even today it is widely used. If one party, say Bob, wants to receive
messages encrypted with RSA, he must first choose a private key, which re-
mains secret. Then he generates a public key from the private key and sends
it openly to Alice, who uses it to encrypt her message. She then transmits
the ciphertext to Bob, who decrypts it with his corresponding private key.
A scheme of a generic asymmetric cryptographic transmission is depicted in
Figure 2.6. Mathematically it is done the following way, as explained in [Fúster
et al., 2012, Ch.7]:
1. Bob generates two large prime numbers, p and q, of similar bit-length,
and computes n = p · q and the Euler’s totient function of n, that is,
φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
2. He chooses a positive integer e between 2 and φ(n), and prime with φ(n).
3. He determines, usually by using the extended Euclidean algorithm,
the multiplicative inverse of e mod φ(n), d, that is, the only integer
1 < d < φ(n) such that e · d ≡ 1 (mod φ(n)).
4. Bob’s public key is the pair (n, e) (represented as Key 2 in Figure 2.6),
and d is his private key (Key 1).
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If Alice wants to send an encrypted message to Bob, she must first obtain
Key 2 from Bob (his public key(n, e)). Then, she codifies the message as
an integer m such that 0 ≤ m < n. Finally, she computes the ciphertext
c = me(mod (n)) and sends it to Bob. Bob can recover the message (decryption
process) by computing m = cd(mod (n)).
Key distribution schemes based on public key cryptography, such as RSA
or Diffie-Hellman, have become very popular over the last 20 years and are
currently widely employed to establish a secret key over an insecure channel.
Figure 2.6 – Scheme of an asymmetric cryptographic communication,
where Bob generates his private key (Key 1) and public key (Key 2). The
latter is sent publicly to Alice who uses it to encrypt a message. The
ciphertext is transmitted over an insecure channel and is decrypted by
Bob using Key 1. Eve monitors the channel to try to gain information
about the message.
2.1.3 Security of classical Cryptography. The threat
of quantum computing
In nowadays communications both symmetric and asymmetric ciphers are
commonly used together. The public keys used by the cryptographic protocols
implemented on the internet are certified by established authorities, known as
certificate authorities (CA), which confirm through signatures that a particu-
lar public key certainly corresponds to a given party. Then a cipher based on
public key cryptography can be used to exchange a secret key with that party.
Subsequently this secret key may be used in a symmetric cipher to transmit
encrypted data. The security of this suite of cryptographic protocols relies
on the strength of symmetric ciphers, and on the use of one-way functions.
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However, it has not still been proven that reversing such one-way functions
without the information that is kept secret will always be computationally
demanding. Future mathematical advances or in computer science may put a
threat in such approaches.
The only unconditionally secure encryption scheme is the one-time pad, a
secret key algorithm. No restriction is made about computational power or
scientific progress available to break it. Nevertheless, in spite of the existence
of a secret key scheme perfectly secure against an attacker with arbitrary
computational power, symmetric ciphers have a major practical disadvantage:
before two parties can communicate securely they must somehow establish a
secret key. This is related to the well-known Kerckhoff’s principle, which states
that the security of a cryptographic system should not rely on the secrecy of
the algorithm used for encryption and decryption, but on the secrecy of the
key [Cobourne, 2011]. That is, confidence in a cryptosystem increases when
it is public and can be critically analysed by experts that search for security
weaknesses.
The security of public key cryptosystems is currently based on the com-
putational difficulty to solve certain mathematical functions, such as the fac-
torisation of large integers or the discrete logarithm problem. This means
that public key cryptography algorithms are potentially vulnerable to improve-
ments in computational power or the discovery of more efficient algorithms to
solve the mentioned one-way functions. Indeed, algorithms that perform inte-
ger factorisation and solve the discrete logarithm problem in polynomial time
—rather than exponential— on a quantum computer have already been pro-
posed [Shor, 1997], [Bruβ et al., 2007], and have experimentally been tested
in [Vandersypen et al., 2001], whereby a nuclear magnetic resonance quantum
computer was capable of factorising the number 15 into its prime factors 3 and
5. Although the question about the possibility that a quantum computer of a
practical useful size will ever be built or an efficient classical factorisation algo-
rithm ever be found is still open, it is obvious that the threat against current
public key cryptography is considerably serious (potentially catastrophic), and
therefore a more secure method to ensure communications is needed.
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2.1.4 The birth of Quantum Cryptography
Quantum Cryptography (QC) is the synthesis of quantum mechanics and cryp-
tography. It was first proposed around 1970 when Stephen Wiesner wrote an
unpublished manuscript, where he introduced the concept of quantum conju-
gate coding . The idea consisted in using two conjugate variables to encrypt a
message. Conjugate variables such as energy and time, position and momen-
tum or linear and circular polarisations, have associated quantum observables
that do not commute, i.e., they cannot have well defined values simultaneously.
Although the paper was originally rejected, it was finally published in [Wiesner,
1983], a year before the publication of the well-known paper of Charles Bennett
and Gilles Brassard [Bennett et al., 1984].
Quantum cryptography makes use of the laws of quantum mechanics, such
as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the no-cloning theorem, which
states that a qubit (a quantum bit) cannot be copied or amplified without
disturbing its original state [Wootters et al., 1982]. These two principles are
the main ingredients of quantum key distribution, which allows Alice and Bob
to share a secret random string of bits or cryptographic key, and in conjunction
with the one-time pad enables secure communication over an insecure channel.
Any disturbance on the qubits caused by an eavesdropper will be detected by
the legitimate users.
2.2 Quantum Key Distribution protocols
The main goal of a QKD protocol is the generation and distribution of a secret
key that will be used for encryption. Basically a QKD system involves Alice,
Bob and a quantum communication channel. Both parties have also access to
a classical insecure communication channel for post-processing purposes. This
is schematically shown in Figure 2.7. An eavesdropper is assumed to have
access to both channels and no restrictive assumptions are made about the
resources at his disposal.
The bits of the key are individually encoded in states of a quantum system,
as for instance in polarisation states of single photons, and then distributed
between the legitimate parties. Any eavesdropper’s attempt to intercept bits
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of the key implies that some measurements will be performed on the quantum
system, unavoidably changing its quantum state and therefore introducing
errors. These errors allow the detection of the eavesdropper. If the error rate
is above a certain threshold, the key is considered insecure and it is dismissed.
Figure 2.7 – Example of a cryptographic system based on quantum
key distribution.
2.2.1 Classification of QKD protocols
Although there is a wide number of QKD protocols, in [Scarani et al., 2009a]
all possible variety of protocols is classified into three main families:
Discrete-variable protocols, such as BB84 [Bennett et al., 1984], BBM
[Bennett et al., 1992b], E91 [Ekert, 1991], SARG04 [Acín et al., 2004],
[Scarani et al., 2004], the six-state protocol [Bennett et al., 1984], [Bruβ,
1998], [Bechmann-Pasquinucci et al., 1999] or the B92 [Bennett, 1992].
Continuous-variable protocols, either with gaussian modulation, like those
proposed in [Cerf et al., 2001], [Grosshans et al., 2002], [Weedbrook et al.,
2004] or [García-Patrón, 2007], or with discrete modulation [Silberhorn
et al., 2002].
Distributed-phase-reference protocols, such as Differential Phase Shift
(DPS) reported in [Inoue et al., 2002] or [Inoue et al., 2003], and Coherent
One Way (COW) [Gisin et al., 2004], [Stucki et al., 2005].
Other works classify the protocols according to different criteria, like in
[Martínez-Mateo, 2008] where they are categorised in protocols based on
non-orthogonal states and protocols based on entangled states .
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Discrete-variable coding is the original coding scheme, first published by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984. This type of QKD protocols is still the most
frequently implemented. In the following, the most popular of those protocols
are briefly described.
2.2.2 The BB84 protocol
As mentioned above, in 1984 Bennett from IBM and Brassard from the Uni-
versity of Montreal proposed the first QKD protocol. This protocol is called
BB84 and uses four quantum states to encode the bits of a cryptographic key.
For the polarisation-coding version, these quantum states are four polarisation
states: vertical, horizontal, +45◦ and −45◦, which form two conjugate bases
(rectilinear and diagonal). The procedure of the BB84 protocol is as follows
[Zbinden et al., 1998]:
Figure 2.8 – Schematic view of the BB84 protocol. Alice sends
a sequence of bits encoded in photons with random polarisation:
horizontal, vertical, +45◦ or −45◦ (row 1). Bob randomly chooses either
his diagonal or his rectilinear detector basis (row 2) and records the
results of his measurements (row 3). Finally, Alice and Bob compare the
bases they used and retain the results with compatible bases, obtaining
the sifted key (row 4).
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1. Quantum communication phase:
(a) Alice sends Bob a sequence of independently randomly polarised
photons. As above mentioned, four possible polarisations are used
(see Figure 2.8).
(b) For each received photon, Bob randomly uses one of the two conju-
gate bases (rectilinear or diagonal) to make a measurement.
(c) Bob records the bases he used and the results, these last called
raw key . Then he publicly acknowledges that he has received the
signals.
2. Public discussion phase:
(a) Alice broadcasts the bases she used to polarise each photon sent.
Bob broadcasts the bases he used to perform each measurement.
(b) Alice and Bob discard all bits corresponding to events where they
used different bases. The resulting string is called the sifted key.
(c) To test for eavesdropping Alice randomly chooses as test events
a fraction of the remaining events and publicly broadcasts their
positions and polarisations.
(d) Bob broadcasts the polarisations of the test events too.
(e) Alice and Bob compute the error of the test events, that is, the
fraction of bits for which their value disagree. If the error rate
exceeds an established threshold value (around 11%) [Lütkenhaus,
2000], the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, they continue to the last
steps.
(f) Alice and Bob each generate a binary string from the polarisation
information of the remaining data. At last, to generate a final se-
cret key they can perform classical protocols such as error correction
and privacy amplification, which will be briefly commented in sec-
tion 2.2.4.
If Eve tries to eavesdrop the key right after Alice has sent the string of
photons, she has to randomly guess the basis to detect each photon since she
ignores both, the bases used by Alice to prepare the photons and the bases
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in which Bob is going to detect them. After detection Eve has to regenerate
the photons in the bases she has chosen with the bit values she has obtained
and send them to Bob. The bases chosen by Eve will be with 50% probability
different from Alice’s bases. Eve does not introduce any error if she uses the
same basis as Alice used, since in the case that Bob measures correctly, Eve
used the same basis as both of them, and if Bob does not use the correct
basis, the result is then discarded. This happens with 50% probability. If
Eve does not use the same basis as Alice (the remaining 50%), the photon
will still be recorded by Bob correctly 50% of the time. Thus, the increased
error rate introduced by Eve if she intercepts and resends every photon in
the transmission is on average of 25%. As mentioned above, Alice and Bob
compute the error rate by publicly comparing a subset of the sifted key. Error
rates exceeding a secure pre-established limit reveal eavesdropping.
It should be stressed that the classical communication channel between
Alice and Bob must be authenticated. Otherwise, Eve could easily perform
a man-in-the-middle attack by acting as Alice to Bob and as Bob to Alice. Re-
cently a method for quantum authentication has been experimentally
demonstrated for the first time [Clarke et al., 2012].
2.2.3 The B92 protocol
The B92 protocol proposed in [Bennett, 1992] is basically a simplified varia-
tion of the BB84 protocol. The main difference is that only two non-orthogonal
states rather than four are necessary in the B92 protocol to guarantee the se-
curity of a QKD system. This security depends on the indistinguishability of
non-orthogonal quantum states and the inevitable perturbation arising from
measurements performed on these states when the sequence of encoding states
is unknown to an eavesdropper. In the QKD system investigated in this the-
sis, the B92 protocol was implemented using two non-orthogonal polarisation
states of single photons, say |u0〉 and |u1〉, associated with the bit values 0 and
1 respectively, as shown in Figure 2.9. At the receiver two projection operators
P0 and P1, orthogonal to |u1〉 and |u0〉 respectively, are used. In practice these
projection operators can be implemented with two polarisers (see Figure 2.10).
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Figure 2.9 – Example of B92 photon polarisation and bit encoding.
Similarly to the BB84 protocol, Alice sends a string of photons randomly
encoding the binary values ‘0’ and ‘1’ with two linearly polarised quantum
states at a relative angle of 45◦. Bob performs measurements of qubits with
either of two polarisers (see Figure 2.10), which sometimes fail (the polariser
of each channel is oriented to block the unwanted polarisation state in that
channel), but when a measurement succeeds it always provides the bit value
correctly —note that under these measurement scheme if Alice transmits a ‘0’
the probability of Bob detecting a ‘1’ is minimal. That is, Bob still randomly
chooses a basis for each photon measurement but if he chooses the wrong basis,
he will not measure anything. Thus there is no need for reconciliation of basis
sets between Alice and Bob to discriminate ambiguous measurements; the
string measured by Bob is directly the sifted key, what simplifies this protocol
when compared to the BB84 protocol. Bob only tells Alice in which instances
he measured a photon (but not, obviously, if this was a ‘1’ or a ‘0’).
The fact that two non-orthogonal quantum states can be unambiguously
distinguished at the cost of some loss was first proven in [Ivanovic, 1987].
The fraction of the bits sent by Alice that Bob can measure unambiguously is
given by IAB = (1 − cosα), α being the angle formed by the non-orthogonal
polarisation states. The maximum of this fraction corresponds to 29% [Clarke
et al., 2001] for a relative angle α of 45◦. If Eve intercepts the stream of
photons from Alice and performs measurements on them, she will introduce a
loss in the sequence of photons she resends to Bob. This loss corresponds to
71% of the signal for a relative angle of 45◦, an amount that, in principle, is
detectable by Alice and Bob. However, the B92 protocol exhibits a security
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weakness not present in the BB84 protocol: if the loss of the channel is higher
or equal to 71%, Eve’s presence would remain unnoticed if she compensates all
the loss she causes by replacing the normal ‘lossy’ channel by a ‘lossless’ one.
This attack (the unambiguous state discrimination strategy) will be discussed
in subsection 2.4.3.
Figure 2.10 – Experimental scheme at Bob for the detection of two
non-orthogonal polarisation states ‘0’ and ‘1’. P0 and P1 are two
polarisers that perform projection measurements and are oriented to
block the unwanted state in that channel.
The B92 protocol with two non-orthogonal polarisation states above
described is a variation of the original B92 protocol [Bennett, 1992], which
uses two non-orthogonal coherent states. The unconditional security of the
original B92 has been proved in [Tamaki et al., 2004], [Tamaki et al., 2003],
and for some implementations with a strong reference pulse in [Koashi, 2004],
[Tamaki et al., 2009].
2.2.4 Error correction and privacy amplification
After Alice and Bob perform the basis reconciliation step of the BB84 protocol
they obtain the sifted key, which may still contain errors. Low error rates are
indicative of nothing more serious than noise and physical imperfections in
the devices. However, even these small errors can cause erroneous encryption
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and/or decryption of information. Therefore error correcting the keys resulting
from even the highest fidelity key exchanges is necessary.
Shannon’s information theory gives the theoretical minimum amount of
public information that must be exchanged to correct the errors of a given
message. This quantity of information is given by the binary entropy function
of the quantum bit error rate of the sifted key [Shannon, 1949a]. Brassard and
Salvail discussed several error correction codes in their work [Brassard et al.,
1994] before deciding the protocol entitled “Cascade” was an efficient method
for correcting errors.
The Cascade scheme is an iterative process whereby Alice and Bob divide
the sifted key into blocks. The parity of each block is then compared across
a public channel with those of even parity being accepted as error-free whilst
those of odd parity are subjected to further subdivision and comparison until
the error is found and corrected. Any errors that occurred in the even parity
blocks are detected and corrected by repeating the process several times with
different block sizes and permutations. The process continues until Alice and
Bob are sure that their sifted keys are identical.
Privacy amplification is the term given to the process of distilling a highly
secret key from a partially compromised bit string and is a required further step
in the key reconciliation process. This is due to information leakage, which
occurs as a result of the key exchange and error correction processes. The
amount of information that an eavesdropper may have depends upon factors
such as the eavesdropping strategy used, the error rate and the error correction
scheme used by Alice and Bob.
A typical privacy amplification process works as follows. Alice and Bob
apply a XOR operation to random pairs of bits. This time they do not
announce the operation results publicly. Instead they announce the positions
in the string of bits they used and they replace the two bits by their XOR
value. Hence, Eve cannot interact in this process and her information will be
reduced to an arbitrarily small amount that Alice and Bob decide.
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2.3 Components in a QKD system
A typical QKD system can be divided into three parts: the transmitter, whose
main purpose is to emit individual photons with associated conjugate variables
encoding a random sequence of bits; the quantum channel, which is the trans-
mission medium between emitter and receiver, and whose fundamental role is
to preserve the quantum states of the photons; and the receiver, which detects
single photons and randomly analyses their quantum states.
2.3.1 Transmitter. Emission of single photons
The main function of the transmitter of a QKD system consists in sending
single photons to the receiver, each carrying one bit of information. For that
purpose the transmitter would ideally use single-photon sources, i.e., a de-
vice that would generate exactly one photon when required. However, the
technology of single-photon emitters is still not sufficiently matured to permit
high transmission rates, and therefore the “single-photon regime” is generally
achieved by strongly attenuating a pulsed laser. This technique is known as
Weak Coherent Pulses (WCP) and ensures that the probability of having more
than one photon in a laser pulse becomes negligible.
This approximation has two disadvantages due to its characteristic Poisson
distribution. One affects the transmission rate, since the vacuum probabi-
lity is much higher than the probability of emitting a photon, so most of the
pulses are empty with the consequent decrease in the transmission bit rates.
The other concerns the security of the key, since the probability of more than
one photon in a laser pulse is always nonzero, thus an eavesdropper could
perform a photon-number splitting attack (see subsection 2.4.3). However,
protocols with attenuated coherent states that implement techniques such as
decoy states, which counteract this type of attacks achieving equivalent secu-
rity levels to those obtained with single-photon emitters, have already been
reported [Hwang, 2003], [Lo et al., 2005]. Moreover, these protocols allow the
use of higher mean photon numbers per pulse, and hence higher transmission
rates, maintaining the security level. Therefore, due to their simplicity WCPs
have been used in the majority of QKD systems to achieve the single-photon
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regime, since just an attenuator and a laser source are sufficient for their reali-
sation.
When a laser emission is attenuated to an average number of photons per
pulse µ, the probability of finding n photons in any pulse is given by Poisson
distribution:
P (n, µ) =
µn
n!
e−µ . (2.1)
Using equation 2.1, the probability of finding more than one photon in a
non-empty pulse can be calculated as:
P (n > 1|n > 0, µ) = 1− P (0, µ)− P (1, µ)
1− P (0, µ) =
1− e−µ(1 + µ)
1− e−µ
∼= µ
2
. (2.2)
Consequently, there is always a nonzero probability of finding more than one
photon in a pulse. Decreasing µ decreases this probability; however it also
decreases the transmission rate. The choice of µ is the subject of considerable
work [Lütkenhaus, 2000] and is determined by the characteristics of the system.
Another method of approximating single photons is the generation of
photon pairs by parametric downconversion [Kwiat et al., 1995], [Weinfurter,
2005]. This phenomenon consists in the generation of two entangled photons
when a laser beam pumps a nonlinear crystal. One of the photons is used as
the trigger for the second photon [Hong et al., 1986]. This technique has the
disadvantage of a highly inefficient photon-pair creation process, typically one
photon pair per 1010 pump photons [Gisin et al., 2002], so it is only worth
substituting faint laser pulses for this technique when the entanglement of the
photons is going to be exploited.
2.3.2 Channel: optical fibre or free space
A quantum channel can be any medium where light can propagate, although
it should be clarified that what is quantum is the information, not the channel
itself. Any quantum channel should ideally have low loss and should preserve
the quantum states, avoiding de-coherence from the environment. There are
two types of channels with these properties: optical fibre and free space.
Optical fibres are used in the already available commercial QKD systems,
and also in many scientific experimental setups [Hughes et al., 1999],
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[Tang et al., 2009]. The reason for that may lie in the fact that a fibre-
based quantum channel, when compared to a free-space one, is not affected
by external factors such as weather conditions, solar background radiation, or
the fact that free-space QKD usually requires the implementation of ancillary
techniques such as automatic tracking to maintain the alignment of the link.
However, optical fibres present some disadvantages too, such as their bire-
fringence [Agrawal, 2002]. Birefringence in optical fibres makes polarisation
coding-based QKD systems harder to implement, since it degrades the pola-
risation of the quantum states and a compensation method is essential, such
as ‘plug and play ’ QKD [Zbinden et al., 1997], [Stucki et al., 2001]. Moreover,
the loss in optical fibres limits the longest achievable distance for a fibre-
based QKD system (typically limited to about 200 km [Gobby et al., 2004]).
Figure 2.11 shows the bit transfer rate plotted against distance travelled along
a fibre-based quantum channel.
Figure 2.11 – Typical profile of the Rate versus Distance curve for a
fibre-based QKD link (after [Dianati et al., 2008]).
As can be observed in the figure, the negative slope of the curve be-
comes stepper at a certain distance, and at approximately 120 km the signal
disappears. This is due to the impossibility of amplifying and regenerating
the qubits without perturbing the quantum states and therefore increasing the
error rate [Li et al., 2007]. Much research is being done in an attempt to
extend this distance, for example in [Stucki et al., 2009] by using ultra low loss
optical fibres, or in [Scherer et al., 2011], where a non-perturbative theory for
practical QKD based on entanglement swapping is proposed. However, it is
yet a limiting factor in the potential deployment of quantum channels using
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optical fibres. Moreover, due to the impossibility of amplifying quantum bits,
it is not clear whether the installed fibre infrastructure can be easily used for
QKD.
Free-space quantum communications, on the other hand, will play an
important role in securing satellite-based global communications as well as
reducing the ‘connectivity bottleneck’ affecting metropolitan optical networks
[Willebrand et al., 2002]. A very important advantage of sending photons
through the atmosphere is that this medium is essentially nonbirefringent,
thus facilitating the use of polarisation coding. Moreover, free-space links have
negligible dispersion on polarisation and frequency. In addition, transmission
over long distances can be enhanced by selecting the appropriate wavelength
of the photons. Indeed the atmosphere has a high transmission window in
the vicinity of 850 nm, what is compatible with commercially available silicon
Avalanche Photo Diodes (APDs) photon-counting modules, which can have
detection efficiencies as high as 65%.
The emitter and receiver are usually connected in free space by two te-
lescopes pointing at each other. Although it may seem difficult to detect
single photons amidst background light, the first experiments already demons-
trated the feasibility of free-space QKD over laboratory [Bennett et al., 1992a],
[Buttler et al., 1998b], and over modest outdoor distances [Jacobs et al., 1996],
[Buttler et al., 1998a], [Hughes et al., 2000]. The contribution of background
radiation to the error rate can be kept reasonably low by using a combination
of software filtering (selecting only the photons detected in a determined time
window from the bit period), spectral filtering (by using narrow interference
filters ≤ 1 nm), and spatial filtering (‘cleaning’ the beam from higher spa-
tial modes and other surrounding areas outside the laser beam by passing it
through sufficiently small apertures), what is further discussed in section 5.8
of this thesis.
Finally, the performance of free-space QKD systems depends on atmos-
pheric conditions and air quality, which can be more noticeable in urban loca-
tions where pollution and aerosols degrade the transparency of the air.
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2.3.3 Receiver. Detection of single photons
The receiver of a QKD system should be capable of detecting single photons,
since each single photon carries one bit of information. Single-photon detec-
tion can be achieved by using different devices such as PhotoMultiplier Tubes
(PMT), micro channel plates, superconducting Josephson junctions, Single-
Photon Avalanche Diodes (SPAD), Superconducting Single-Photon Detectors
(SSPD), among others [Fernández-Mármol, 2006, §3.7.2]. An ideal detector
for a QKD system should have good detection efficiency, low dark noise, low
timing jitter and low dead time. SPADs have been used as single-photon de-
tectors in the majority of the QKD systems built to date due to their high
efficiency and low noise equivalent power.
The characteristics of single-photon detectors have a significant bearing on
the overall system performance of the QKD system that employs them. In
[Clarke et al., 2011] a phase-encoded QKD system is used to compare the
performance of different types of single-photon detectors and to analyse their
influence on the final key exchange rate. The detectors studied were thick-
junction Si-SPADs, two different thin-junction Si-SPADs, a resonant cavity
thin-junction Si-SPADs and a niobium nitride nanowire SSPD. A theoretical
model of the experimental system was also developed to understand the com-
bination of the detector parameters that are desirable for efficient QKD, and to
predict the behaviour of the system with hypothetical realistic detectors and
evolutions of existing detectors. For instance, the theoretical model predicts
that for the reported system a better net bit rate can be achieved by using
PerkinElmer thick-junction Si-SPADs with 42% detection efficiency, 198 dark
counts per second and pulse read out electronics modified to give a Full-Width
at Half-Maximum (FWHM) timing jitter of 200 ps, than with 62 ps FWHM
timing jitter SSPDs with 10% detection efficiency and 10 dark counts per se-
cond, at distances of up to 15 km and clock frequencies up to 1 GHz. At
higher clock frequencies the system suffered from intersymbol interference,
which increased the error rate that could be obtained with the PerkinElmer
thick-junction Si-SPAD and thus reducing the net bit rate.
The principle of operation of SPADs and their choice as the detectors for
the system investigated in this thesis will be discussed in section 5.3, comparing
their general features to those of other single-photon detectors.
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2.4 Security of QKD
In this section the security of real-life QKD implementations is discussed. The
quantum bit error rate (QBER) plays a fundamental role in assessing the
security of a QKD system, and thus the definition of this figure of merit is
first presented. Next, both the security strengths and weaknesses of QKD are
described, including a revision of the most important eavesdropping strategies.
Finally, a new form of quantum cryptography, the so-called device-independent
quantum key distribution, is discussed.
2.4.1 Quantum bit error rate
The analysis of the QBER allows the authorised parties of a QKD system to
detect the possible presence of an eavesdropper in the transmission channel.
As already mentioned in section 2.2, Alice and Bob publicly broadcast the bit
values of a fraction of the sifted key —referred to as test events— and compute
their error rate to check for eavesdropping. If the error rate is larger than an
agreed threshold value above which the key transmission is considered as inse-
cure (since all errors must be attributed to the presence of an eavesdropper),
Alice and Bob discard the key and start a new exchange protocol. The QBER
is generally expressed as the ratio of wrong events (events for which Alice and
Bob’s values disagree) to the total number of received events:
QBER =
Nwrong
Nwrong +Ncorrect
. (2.3)
The errors in a free-space QKD system typically arise from three sources.
The first one is an error rate that results from imperfections in the optics of the
system and is equivalent to the fraction of photons, the polarisation or phase
of which is erroneously determined. This source of error can be characterised
by measuring the polarisation extinction ratio of the quantum states for a
polarisation-encoding QKD system or the classical fringe visibility V for a
phase-based QKD system [Mansuripur, 2002, Ch.24]. The second source is the
timing jitter of the QKD system, which may cause intersymbol interference,
as will be discussed in section 6.3.1. Finally, the third source of error in a
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QKD system is due to the noise present in the single-photon detectors, which
in turn can be originated intrinsically in the detectors, i.e., the dark counts,
or arise from external sources such as the solar background radiation. It is
usually accepted that the QBER must be under a value of ∼ 11% —or less,
depending on the actual protocol and implementation— to guarantee that an
eavesdropper has not tapped the channel [Lütkenhaus, 2000], [Brassard et al.,
2000].
2.4.2 Security foundations of QKD
Unlike conventional cryptography, QKD bases its security on the fundamental
laws of Physics: the no-cloning theorem and Heisenberg’s uncertainty princi-
ple. Furthermore, the security provided by QKD is guaranteed in the event
of a future attack, unlike current public key cryptography, which can leave
sensible information exposed in a future scenario involving a quantum com-
puter attack [Shor, 1994]. The security of QKD has been proven in several
studies [Shor et al., 2000], [Mayers, 2001] (even considering a noisy channel
[Lo et al., 1999]). However, some assumptions were made, such as the physical
security of encrypting/decrypting devices, a true source of random numbers,
an authenticated classical channel between both users, reliable single-photon
emitters and detectors, and all parties operating within the laws of Physics.
In [Wang, 2006] the unconditional security of the standard BB84 protocol is
demonstrated even when an imperfect source such as coherent light from a
laser is used. The security proof of this protocol was obtained based on the
virtual entanglement purification by classical hashing.
Regarding true sources of random numbers, the feasibility of using a phy-
sical random bit generator with chaotic semiconductor lasers in a high-speed
QKD system is described in [Honjo et al., 2009].
The assumption that all parties operate under the laws of Physics requires
that any eavesdropper be bounded by the laws of quantum mechanics. No
further restrictions apart from the eavesdropper’s inability to access the devices
are made. In particular, the eavesdropper is allowed to have arbitrarily large
quantum computing technology, far more powerful than the current state of
the art.
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Secure authentication is one of the most important aspects to consider
when evaluating QKD security. In order to be protected against man-in-the-
middle attacks, the classical communication that takes place in QKD must be
authenticated. Digital signatures are widely used in current communication
networks to verify the origin and authenticity of messages. These digital sig-
natures are usually based on the already mentioned one-way functions used in
public key cryptography, thus they are not secure for the same reason as public
key cryptography is not secure: the difficulty to reverse such functions with-
out the secret information has never been mathematically proven. Quantum
digital signatures (QDS), on the other hand, promise authentication verified
by information-theoretical limits and quantum mechanics [Clarke et al., 2012].
The assumption about the reliability of the physical devices is one of
the main weaknesses of QKD and is deeply discussed in the following sec-
tion. This is due to the physical imperfections of the devices available with
current technology that are used for the implementation of QKD [Scarani et al.,
2009b]. This was observed with the first prototype of a QKD system, which
leaked key information through the power supply used to feed the Pockel cells,
making different noises depending on the voltage needed for each polarisation
[Brassard, 2005]. This type of attack is commonly referred to as a side channel
attack and can be very powerful if the vulnerabilities of practical implementa-
tions of QKD are not properly characterised and bound.
2.4.3 Attacks to QKD systems
When assessing possible eavesdropping techniques it has to be assumed that
Eve possesses perfect technology and that she is just limited by the laws of
quantum mechanics (the no-cloning theorem) and not by technical obstacles.
It must also be considered that all errors derived from a key exchange are
caused by Eve. Even if the sources of errors of a QKD system are perfectly
characterised, the wrong detections have to be attributed to an eavesdropper
perturbation, as Eve could use “error-free” devices and hide the disturbance
she causes in them. It must also be assumed that Alice and Bob have available
only current technology. In the following the main eavesdropping strategies are
reviewed.
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Intercept-resend attack
The simplest eavesdropping strategy is the so-called intercept resend attack ,
where Eve merely intercepts the quantum channel, measures the photons sent
by Alice, and resends the states she has measured to Bob. The process in a
BB84 implementation would be as follows [Weier, 2003]:
Suppose Alice and Bob measure and receive in the same basis (otherwise
the event will be discarded during sifting). Let us assume that Alice sends a
horizontal polarisation state (which encrypts the ‘0’ binary value), and Bob
has his analyser set to the rectilinear detector basis (see Figure 2.8). If Eve
intercepts the photon from Alice and measures the polarisation in the recti-
linear basis too, she will measure in the correct basis and therefore she will
detect the horizontal polarisation and will transmit it. Bob, who is also using
the correct basis, will also measure the horizontal polarisation state. Eve will
have measured the bit correctly and she will not have introduced any error. In
50% of the cases, however, Eve will set her analyser to the diagonal basis. As
her measurement outcome is random she will transmit a 45◦ (‘1’) in 50% of the
cases and a 135◦ polarisation (‘0’) in another 50%. Since Bob’s measurement
result is random as well, in 50% of those cases (so in total in 25% of all cases)
he will measure a vertical polarisation state, that is, the opposite polarisation
to the one that Alice sent, in spite of both having used the same basis set.
Therefore, Alice and Bob will find a QBER of 25% when an intercept-resend
strategy is taking place, alerting them of Eve’s presence.
Unambiguous state discrimination attack
A special case of an intercept-resend attack is the unambiguous state discri-
mination (USD) attack [Dus˘ek et al., 2006], which can be applied whenever
Alice sends linearly independent signal states. In this attack Eve makes an
unambiguous state discrimination measurement to each photon [Clarke et al.,
2001]. She is then able to detect deterministically 29% of the photons, whereas
in the remaining 71% of the cases the measurement is ambiguous. Then, Eve
forwards a new photon to Bob in those cases where she knows she measured
the bit correctly, while she sends the vacuum state in the remaining cases. It
has to be assumed that Eve is able to establish a lossless channel with Bob.
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Therefore she can compensate some or all the loss she has caused when she
measured the photons from Alice. Since she has caused a loss of 71%, if the
loss of the transmission channel is equal or higher than that value, no key can
be exchanged between Alice and Bob securely [Tamaki et al., 2003]. If the loss
of the transmission channel is lower, Alice and Bob could still distil a secret
key, albeit at the cost of discarding the information gained by Eve through
privacy amplification. Therefore the B92 protocol is vulnerable to losses in the
transmission channel and thus they need to be carefully characterised.
Quantum cloning attack
Another eavesdropping strategy is the quantum cloning attack with a universal
quantum cloning machine proposed in [Gisin et al., 1997]. Using this quantum
cloning machine Eve copies the photons sent by Alice with certain fidelity
and keeps the copied photons in a quantum memory. When Alice and Bob
announce their bases in the sifting step, Eve can measure her qubits in the
correct bases. The introduced error is 16.7%, lower than that of an intercept-
resend strategy.
Optimal eavesdropping attack
An optimal eavesdropping attack has been studied in [Fuchs et al., 1997]. It
consists in Eve letting a four-dimensional probe (two qubits) interact unitarily
with a photon sent by Alice. She then waits until Alice and Bob announce the
used basis, and with this information she performs an optimised measurement
on the stored probe, depending on the basis. Under the threat of this attack
the key exchange must be considered insecure if the QBER exceeds a value of
14.6%.
Attacks exploiting imperfections of the physical devices
The above described attacks can be performed without any previous con-
sideration about the devices employed in QKD systems. However, the physical
imperfections of the components of QKD systems —also called loopholes—
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open the door to different powerful eavesdropping attacks that exploit such
vulnerabilities. Some of them will be described in the following.
Light modulators are vulnerable to a large pulse attack , presented in
[Vakhitov et al., 2001], whereby Eve sends high-power light pulses to obtain
information about the modulator settings, and thus by measuring the charac-
teristics of the reflected pulses she may know the transmission bases, which
allow her to detect the quantum states unambiguously. Light modulators can
also be attacked with a phase-remapping strategy, which is a type of intercept-
resend attack introduced in [Fung et al., 2007] and experimentally demons-
trated in [Xu et al., 2010], where the mentioned security loophole is exploited
in a commercial “plug and play” QKD system. It should be mentioned that
this attack introduces a high error rate and is discoverable under most QKD
protocols.
Furthermore, the characterisation of the physical channel and the cali-
bration of the cryptosystem hardware are necessary in order to establish a
quantum channel. If the calibration routine is not properly implemented, a
security loophole can be opened, as pointed out in [Jain et al., 2011b]. In this
paper a method to induce a large temporal detector efficiency mismatch in a
commercial QKD system is proposed and experimentally demonstrated. This
method is known as a channel calibration attack and consists in first deceiving
a channel length calibration routine and then, elaborating an optimal strategy
using faked states to break the security of the cryptosystem.
In the following eavesdropping strategies derived from imperfections in
photon emission and detection are described. Due to their serious implication
in security, these attacks have drawn considerable attention in the scientific
community in the last few years.
Attacks exploiting imperfections in photon emission
Different vulnerabilities arise from the physical implementation of the emission
of photons in practical QKD systems. The use of weak coherent pulses as
source of single photons implies a nonzero probability of generating more
than one photon in a pulse. Thus an eavesdropper can perform a photon-
number splitting attack (PNS) [Huttner et al., 1995], [Brassard et al., 2000],
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[Lütkenhaus et al., 2002], whereby she suppresses the pulses with only one
photon and resends the pulses with more than one photon, having previously
kept one copy for herself. To counteract the PNS attack several schemes have
been proposed: the non-orthogonal encoding protocol SARG04 [Scarani et al.,
2004], the differential phase shift QKD [Inoue et al., 2002], [Feng et al., 2007], or
the decoy-state method [Hwang, 2003],[Harrington et al., 2005]. In the decoy-
state technique Alice randomly replaces signal pulses (attenuated to emulate
the single-photon regime) by multiphoton pulses (decoy-states). Then Alice
and Bob compute the yield, or the conditional probability that a signal is de-
tected by Bob given that it is emitted by Alice as an n-photon state, for both
the signal states and the decoy-states. If the yield of multiphoton states is
abnormally high compared to that of the signal states, then the protocol is
aborted since a PNS attack may have taken place.
In plug-and-play systems [Muller et al., 1997] photons do a round trip from
Bob to Alice and back to Bob. They are first sent from Bob to Alice, and when
they enter Alice’s equipment, they get reflected by a Faraday mirror, phase
modulated and then sent back to Bob. This configuration makes these systems
highly vulnerable to a Trojan-horse attack [Gisin et al., 2006], whereby Eve
intercepts the channel between Alice and Bob and sends bright pulses to Alice.
She then analyses the backscattered light with a detector, whereby she can gain
some information about the key. In order to counteract this attack a detector
in Alice must be placed to monitor the level of incoming light. In addition,
careful filtering and timing, attenuation addition and phase randomization of
Alice’s apparatus must be implemented, in conjunction with a security proof
[Zhao et al., 2008b].
Another problem arises when Alice uses different laser diodes to encode
each binary state. They will have different intrinsic properties that make
them have different spectra. Careful adjustment of their temperature must be
done in order to ensure the same wavelength is emitted by both of them at all
times. Even so, the leakage of information should always be characterised and
bound.
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Attacks exploiting imperfections in photon detection
It is virtually impossible to manufacture identical detectors in practice. Hence,
when two or more detectors are used in a QKD system they may exhibit
different detection efficiencies depending on a combination of variables such as
time, frequency, polarisation, and/or spatial domains [Zhao et al., 2008a]. If
Eve manipulates a signal in these variables, she could effectively exploit the
detection efficiency loophole to break the security of a QKD system.
Single-photon detectors are sometimes used in the so-called gated mode,
which is very effective in reducing the background rate and the dark-count rate.
When operated in this mode the detector is sensitive to a photon only over a
short period of time, which is usually controlled by a bright timing pulse that
is launched from Alice preceding each single-photon pulse. In implementations
where two detectors are used, one of them is used to detect the ‘1’s and the
other to detect the ‘0’s. These two detection windows can be slightly time
shifted relative to each other, due to small optical path length differences
or delays in the circuitry. Eve can take advantage of this shift, break the
line between Alice and Bob, and subsequently generate a faked states attack
[Makarov et al., 2005], [Makarov et al., 2008], which is a type of intercept-
resend attack where she generates her own states and sends them to Bob
without alerting of her presence. In particular she manipulates the timing
of the pulses encrypting ‘0’ and ‘1’ states by introducing an additional time
shift [Makarov et al., 2006]. She makes the ‘0’ states to lie on one extreme
of its efficiency curve (see Figure 2.12) so that only detector ‘0’ can ‘see’ this
state, and analogously the ‘1’ states on the opposite side of the trace so that
only detector ‘1’ will be capable of detecting it. Therefore, since she can
control what Bob receives she will resend the states from Alice without being
detected. This attack is also known as time-shift attack . Some experimental
demonstrations of this attack are presented in [Qi et al., 2007] and [Zhao
et al., 2008a]. In [Lydersen et al., 2011b] a countermeasure to this attack
called bit-mapped gating is presented, which is a way to force the detections in
the middle of the detector gate by coupling detection time and quantum bit
error rate.
Silicon avalanche photodiodes emit fluorescence when an avalanche takes
place in the junction upon reception of a photon [Kurtsiefer et al., 2001]. This
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light could be sensed by an eavesdropper to assess which detector fired and get
information about the key. This attack can be avoided by using other detectors
that do not emit this back flashed light, which is discussed in [Collins et al.,
2007].
Figure 2.12 – Efficiency curves showing the mismatch between the
states received by Bob’s detectors (after [Makarov et al., 2006]).
Silicon avalanche photodiodes can be “blinded” [Makarov et al., 2009],
[Sauge et al., 2011], [Lydersen et al., 2010a] by firing bright pulses at them,
typically from 1 to 10 mW at λ∼780 nm, what is usually known as a blinding
or bright illumination attack . In this mode the detectors are totally insensitive
to single photons, but can be externally controlled by an eavesdropper to make
them click controllably. In [Makarov et al., 2009] an eavesdropping experimen-
tal attack was performed on a commercial QKD system whereby the whole
key was obtained without introducing any error. Against bright illumination
attacks “monitoring the photocurrent” was proposed as a countermeasure in
[Yuan et al., 2011a], which is based on the vast difference in the measured
APD currents as compared with normal operation.
However, the debate over the security of QKD against loopholes is intense
and very open [Lydersen, 2011], [Yuan et al., 2011b]. The scientific community
is divided between two approaches. One approach consists in securing QKD
systems by carefully assessing all possible loopholes, and limiting the informa-
tion leaked to an eavesdropper by an adequate experimental implementation
that minimises this information. The other approach consists in developing
new protocols and security proofs that are intrinsically secure against these
loopholes, such as the decoy state protocol for the PNS attack.
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Experimental demonstrations of eavesdropping attacks
In [Lamas-Linares et al., 2007] it is experimentally demonstrated how an eaves-
dropper may use the timing information that is revealed during public dis-
cussion between Alice and Bob, to have access to a significant portion of the
key without being noticed.
The first full-field implementation of a complete faked-state eavesdropping
attack on an operating QKD system is described in [Gerhardt et al., 2011].
A fibre link of 290 m was attacked during a few hours, and Eve was able
to obtain the same key as Bob from multiple QKD sessions. Eve remained
undetected since none of the usual parameters that are monitored during the
QKD exchange were disturbed.
In [Lydersen et al., 2010a] the crack by means of the blinding attack of
two commercial QKD systems (id3110 Clavis2 from ID Quantique and QPN
5505 from MagiQ Technologies) is demonstrated. The authors showed ex-
perimentally how Eve can use bright illumination to blind the gated detectors
of the QKD systems. This blinding converts them into classical linear de-
tectors, making them fully controllable by laser pulses superimposed over the
bright continuous-wave illumination. Based on these experiments, a detailed
proposal about how to attack gated detector with off-the-shelf components by
using thermal blinding is presented in [Lydersen et al., 2010b].
A technically much simpler but very effective attack, which does not re-
quire the interception of the quantum channel, is described and experimentally
demonstrated in [Weier et al., 2011] (see also [Weier, 2011]). Without being de-
tected, an eavesdropper can asymptotically obtain complete information about
the generated key by just exploiting the dead time of the single-photon detec-
tors. This strategy is called dead time attack , whereby Eve was able with very
simple equipment to correctly infer up to 98.8% of the key without significantly
increasing the QBER. The authors also provide an effective countermeasure
against this and similar attacks.
An after-gate attack performed on a quantum cryptosystem is presented in
[Wiechers et al., 2011]. Bright pulses were used as faked states timed to arrive
at the APDs outside the activation time. Then, the authors note that, as faked
states do not increase the QBER per se, this attack can remain undetected,
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thus enabling an intercept-resend attack. Nevertheless, they found a side effect
that increased the QBER: the after-pulse generation as a consequence of the
accumulated charge carriers in the detectors. The authors have also studied
the conditions to make the after-gate attack feasible despite the side effect,
and suggested countermeasures to avoid the attack. A summary of attacks
targeting the photocurrent mode of gated InGaAs APDs is given in [Yuan
et al., 2011b].
In [Lydersen et al., 2011a] it is demonstrated that an eavesdropper can
threaten the security of certain QKD systems that use superlinear threshold de-
tectors , if she carefully selects the amplitude of the trigger pulses. In addition,
the authors show that APD-based gated detectors have a superlinear response
at the falling edge of the gate. Therefore, they show that gated detectors could
be attacked by using faint trigger pulses with less than 120 photons per pulse.
They also emphasise that the ordinary security proofs are not applicable to
systems using those detectors.
Other attacks
If the receiver’s equipment in a QKD implementation is fixed and does not
depend on a choice of basis set for each qubit transmission, then the system
is totally insecure against an eavesdropper that has access, even just once,
to Bob’s apparatus, as shown in [Boyer et al., 2012]. This paper presents
a fixed apparatus attack , which is a special and very interesting case of the
reversed-space attack proposed in [Gelles et al., 2012].
Another proposed attack against a two way plug-and-play QKD system is
the passive faraday mirror attack presented in [Sun et al., 2011]. The Faraday
Mirror (FM) plays a significant role in the stability of these systems by compen-
sating the birefringence of the fibre. Nevertheless, practical FMs are imperfect,
which causes the QBER to increase leaving a loophole for Eve to eavesdrop
the key. Sun et al. show that under this attack the QBER induced by Eve
is much lower than 25%, which is the QBER for the general intercept-resend
attack when the FM is perfect. Indeed, if Eve implements a phase remapping
attack against a system with an imperfect FM, the QBER introduced can be
lower than 11%, which is the security threshold for the BB84 protocol under
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the collective attack [Biham et al., 1997] and one-way post-processing. The
authors also remark that, as the probability of Eve being successful depends
on the loss of the channel, passive faraday mirror attacks are only viable in
long-distance QKD systems.
2.4.4 Device-Independent Quantum Cryptography
The above subsection stresses the advantages of making quantum cryptogra-
phy potentially independent from the devices used in their implementation.
Several works have intended to prove the security of QKD independently from
the operating characteristics of the system, which is done by minimising the
assumptions that must be made about the supposed “always ideal” behaviour
of the hardware equipment employed in the experiments [Mayers et al., 1998],
[Gottesman et al., 2004]. This is what Device-Independent Quantum Key
Distribution (DIQKD) proposes [Acín et al., 2007]: a new form of crypto-
graphy that frees the security of the protocol from any assumptions on the
internal working of the devices (which can even have been manipulated by an
attacker), and aims to close the gap between the real implementations and
the theoretical proposals of QC. DIQKD is possible through a protocol of
quantum key distribution based on the observation of Bell’s inequality [Ekert,
1991], which guarantees that some amount of data is secure independently of
how these data was generated. The security proof of the above mentioned
DIQKD protocol is presented in detail in [Pironio et al., 2009].
Varizani and Vidick have recently proposed the first device-independent
security proof of a QKD protocol, which guarantees the generation of a linear
amount of the key even when the devices are subjected to a constant noise
rate [Vazirani et al., 2012]. The only assumptions in this paper are that the
stations of Alice and Bob are spatially isolated and that both, as well as Eve,
are bound by the laws of quantum mechanics.
An experimental realization of DIQKD is still to be made although seve-
ral proposals have already been made [Gisin et al., 2010]. An optical setup
is necessary to test Bell’s inequality and this will have losses due to various
factors, such as the coupling efficiency of the entangled pairs into the trans-
mission line, transmission losses of the channel, absorption losses of the optical
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components, etc. One has to assume that these losses could be used by an
adversary in malicious ways. This is commonly referred to as the detection
loophole. Thus, it has been established that in order to guarantee security,
the detection efficiency, which takes into account the efficiencies of the trans-
mission line and the single-photon detectors, should be in the order of 82.8%.
This value is very strict and makes a realistic implementation an enormous
challenge. One can assume that it will be facilitated when a quantum repeater
becomes a reality, but until then an experimental demonstration faces serious
difficulties.
In the case of devices being reused, a critical weakness of DIQKD protocols
has been recently identified in [Barrett et al., 2012], where a memory attack
is presented. It is based on the fact that some devices may store their inputs
and outputs during one protocol run, and in the public discussion step of
subsequent protocol runs they reveal some information about the recorded
data. Possible countermeasures against this attack are quite impractical and
include the destruction or the isolation of the devices after a single use.
As a resume it can be stated that the security of QKD is dependent upon
the validity of the laws of quantum mechanics, and upon the assurance that
no leakage of information takes place in the practical implementations. Very
careful examinations of QKD systems are necessary for each application, and
even then, no guarantee exists that the system will not be vulnerable. In fact,
commercial QKD systems that have been sold over the past years as secure
contained a serious vulnerability on them [Lydersen et al., 2010a], [Jain et al.,
2011a]. An excellent review about the security of practical QKD, with essential
theoretical tools that have been developed to assess the security of the main
experimental platforms, can be found in [Scarani et al., 2009a].
2.5 Experimental free-space QKD systems
In this section a summary of the most representative experiments in the field
of quantum communications over free-space links of several distances using
different QKD protocols is presented.
The feasibility of free-space QKD systems relies on their capacity for trans-
mitting and detecting single photons through the atmosphere in highly
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challenging conditions of background radiation and turbulence of different
magnitudes. Daytime operation is especially demanding due to solar back-
ground light, which increases the error rate if no careful filtering measures are
taken.
One of the first practical free-space QKD experiment was reported in
[Buttler et al., 1998a], where the authors developed and successfully tested
a QKD system that implemented the B92 protocol over a free-space optical
link of close to 1 km under nighttime conditions. The system was also tested
over 240 m, demonstrating that QBERs of 0.7% or less could be achieved.
The viability of free-space QKD over kilometer-scale distances was later
demonstrated in both daylight [Buttler et al., 2000] and at night [Rarity et al.,
2001]. In [Hughes et al., 2002a] and [Hughes et al., 2002b] measurements
were taken under both daylight and nighttime conditions in an experiment
over a 10 km path. That same year, secure key exchange over a free-space
link was achieved for an extended distance of 23.4 km between two mountains
[Kurtsiefer et al., 2002]. The results of these free-space trials showed the
possibility of implementing global quantum key exchange systems based on
quantum communication satellites [Pfennigbauer et al., 2005]. Indeed, the
first experimental analysis of the conditions needed for the implementation of
the single-photon exchange between an Earth-based station and a satellite was
reported in [Villoresi et al., 2008]. Also, the actual feasibility of satellite QKD
with present technology has been analysed in [Bonato et al., 2009b], among
other studies.
Experiments at much longer distances have been conducted, most no-
tably the quantum communications experiments across a 144-km path in the
Canary Islands (see [Ursin et al., 2007], [Schmitt-Manderbach et al., 2007],
and [Fedrizzi et al., 2009]). These are the longest QKD experiments to date,
which have achieved secure key generation over a free-space link at a rate
of 12.8 bits/s [Schmitt-Manderbach et al., 2007]. This distance is considered
sufficient to simulate the conditions of a satellite downlink [Meyer-Scott et al.,
2011].
Using the above mentioned 144-km free-space link in the Canary Islands,
three different configurations were established [Scheidl et al., 2009]. In the
first one an entangled photon source was placed at Alice’s location, resulting
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in a quantum channel attenuation of 35 dB. In the second configuration the
source was located asymmetrically between Alice and Bob, and the attenuation
was 58 dB. Finally, when the source was symmetrically placed in the middle
between Alice and Bob, the measured attenuation was 71 dB. Those attenuation
proved that entanglement-based QKD systems can tolerate higher channel
losses than systems based on weak coherent laser pulses, in particular when the
source is located symmetrically between the two communicating parties [Ma
et al., 2007], [Ma, 2008]. This confirmed that, when entangled-state sources are
located symmetrically in the middle between Alice and Bob, QKD is feasible
over distances of 300 km and even more.
Regarding systems that can operate at higher rates, in [Bienfang et al.,
2004] the successful exchange of sifted keys over a 730-meter free-space link
at transmission rates of up to 1 Mbps (sifted key rate) was demonstrated. A
classical channel at a wavelength of 1550 nm for synchronisation purposes was
sent in parallel with the quantum channel at λ∼845 nm.
Other experiments have been conducted to implement and test different
QKD systems in realistic atmospheric conditions. Several free-space QKD ex-
periments using entangled photons were performed over horizontal distances
from 0.7 km to 1.5 km [Erven et al., 2008a], [Erven et al., 2008b] and [Erven
et al., 2010]. A complete experimental implementation of a free-space QKD
system through a distance of 1.5 km using polarisation-entangled photon pairs
from a compact parametric down-conversion source was reported in [Marcikic
et al., 2006]. After error correction and privacy amplification average key
generation rates of 630 bits/s were observed throughout ten hours of con-
tinuous communication. Apart from a classical wireless link, no specific hard-
ware channel was required for synchronisation. The same distance of 1.5 km
was demonstrated in a QKD study operating at a mid infrared wavelength
to mitigate adverse foggy conditions [Temporao et al., 2008]. Other experi-
ments related to long-distance polarisation-entanglement implementations are
reported in [Aspelmeyer et al., 2003] and [Resch et al., 2005].
An experimental free-space QKD system using continuous variables was
demonstrated in [Elser et al., 2009] and [Heim et al., 2010]. In these works
a local oscillator was employed as spatial and spectral filter, which allowed
daylight operation with no restrictions. The system used binary encoding on
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coherent polarisation states and the quantum states were transmitted over a
100-m real atmospheric channel.
An entanglement-based free-space QKD system that links three buildings
was described in [Weihs et al., 2007]. The entangled photon pair source was
located on the rooftop of a building, which was located about 435 m from
the building where Alice was housed. Bob’s location was about 1325 m from
the source, the distance between Alice and Bob being about 1575 m. Single-
mode optical fibre connected the source to two telescopes that transmitted the
photons to Alice and Bob respectively. The authors pointed out that at the
time of submitting the paper they had performed experiments that included
only the 435-m link, while the second photon in each pair was detected locally
at the source location. In this configuration total detected pair rates of up
to 800 per second were obtained. This yielded a raw key rate of 400 bits/s,
which depending on the QBER would produce a lower final key rate after error
correction and privacy amplification.
Many free-space QKD implementations are limited to nighttime opera-
tion. In [Peloso et al., 2009] a lean entanglement-based QKD system was
presented. It implemented spectral, spatial and temporal filtering techniques,
which allowed continuous operation under varying light and weather condi-
tions during several days. Key rates of 385 bits/s were reported, including
error correction and privacy amplification processes. The reduction in the
error rate due to daytime background photons that can be achieved by strong
temporal filtering was also pointed out in [Restelli et al., 2010]. The reported
free-space QKD system implemented temporal gating down to 50 ps. This
was made by using fast-clock-recovery and commercial single-photon detec-
tors modified with additional electronic circuitry to enhance timing resolution.
Transmitting over 1.5 km and at clock rates of 1.25 GHz (800 ps between
transmission events), the observed QBER during daytime was of 4%, which
was less than one-third of the error rate obtained when no temporal gating
was used.
A free-space QKD system developed in the context of the SECOQC Project
at the University of Munich was described in [Peev et al., 2009]. It employed
the BB84 protocol with decoy states using polarisation encoded attenuated
laser pulses with a wavelength of 850 nm. Spatial filtering was used to reduce
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the background light so that the system could operate during the day. Random
sequences of WCPs of different polarisation and mean photon number were
generated by using eight laser diodes. Two stations separated a distance of
80 m were connected at a high rate (> 10 kbps) with a stable connectivity
to the QKD network in a 24/7 operation regime. In [Benton et al., 2010] an
autonomous system was also left running and generating shared key material
continuously for over 7 days.
In addition to the above mentioned experiments along horizontal propaga-
tion paths of different distances, several other experiments have been con-
ducted along ground-to-aircraft and ground-to-space communication paths
[Toyoshima et al., 2008], [Villoresi et al., 2008], [Bonato et al., 2009a]. Since
free-space QKD on earth has a distance limitation of a few hundred kilometers,
immediate direct solution for global coverage is the use of earth-to-satellite
links. Although the quantum channel in a satellite uplink may have very high
transmission losses, in [Meyer-Scott et al., 2011] a system using weak coherent
pulses and decoy states, which enables QKD operation with channel losses
up to 57 dB, has been described. Recently, the first demonstration of key ex-
change with rapidly moving stations (QKD between an aeroplane and a ground
station) has been reported [Nauerth et al., 2013].
Finally, [Tunick et al., 2010] presents interesting figures showing the quan-
titative relationships between the propagation distance or the transmission
speed, and the year several free-space quantum communication experiments
were performed, including a description of the different QKD protocols and
photons source wavelengths used in them.

Chapter 3
Design and characterisation of the
transmitter
A QKD system consists of three main parts: the transmitter, the
transmission or also called quantum channel, and the receiver. The
setup and experimental characterisation of the transmitter will be
described in this chapter. Firstly, a general view of Alice setup
will be provided, followed by several considerations regarding the
design and performance of the emitter. Among such implemen-
tation forethoughts, the generation of the Alice’s sequence will be
first commented. Then, the choice of highly attenuated coherent
light pulses as an approximation of single photons will be dis-
cussed. Subsequently, the characterisation of two vertical-cavity
surface-emitting lasers, the selected light source, is described re-
garding mainly their driving conditions and spectral behaviour.
Three essential points in the design of the transmitter will also be
discussed: the linearity of the polarisation states encoding the ‘0’s
and ‘1’s of the key, the timing synchronisation between emitter
and receiver, and the alignment of Alice’s three optical output
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beams. Finally, the gimbal system where Alice is mounted on and
the shielding from background radiation will also be described.
3.1 Setup of the transmitter
Figure 3.1 shows the layout of the transmitter. The purpose of the transmitter
module —in the following often called “Alice module”— is to send out indi-
vidual photons carrying binary information encrypted in two non-orthogonal
linear polarisation states.
Figure 3.1 – Diagram of the transmitter: Alice. VCSEL0 and VCSEL1
are two lasers emitting at λ∼ 850 nm; VSY NC is a third laser emitting
at λ ∼ 1550 nm, which is used for the timing synchronisation and is
combined with the λ∼850 nm pulses by means of a broadband pellicle
beam splitter (PL); A0 and A1 are two fibre-optic attenuators; C0,
C1 and CS are three collimators; P0 and P1 are two high extinction-
ratio polarisers; BS is a non-polarising beamsplitter; L1 and L2 are two
achromatic doublet lenses, which constitute the emitter’s telescope; and
M1 and M2 are two high-reflectivity mirrors.
This is achieved by driving two laser diodes —one for each linear polari-
sation— with electrical pulses, and heavily attenuating the optical output
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to an average photon number much below one photon per pulse. For that
purpose Alice uses a fast GHz pulse pattern generator in conjunction with
λ∼850 nm vertical-cavity surface-emitting lasers (VCSELs) controlled by
drivers that can operate at several Gbps. Each laser output is then sent
to a fibre-coupled attenuator, which also spatially filters the beam ensuring
that only one spatial mode is propagated. The attenuators are set so that
Alice sends out pulses with a mean photon number per pulse of µ∼0.1. Each
attenuated signal is then coupled into a collimator and a high extinction-ratio
polariser to produce the required linearly polarised quantum states. The states
are then combined by a non-polarising beamsplitter cube.
The timing synchronisation between emitter and receiver is carried out by
another beam at a different wavelength (λ∼1550 nm), which conveys Alice’s
internal clock signal to Bob. The synchronisation beam is combined with the
two polarisation states by using a broadband pellicle beamsplitter. The three
combined beams are then collimated and expanded to a diameter of ∼40 mm
by using a set of two achromatic doublet lenses. Finally, the transmitter is
mounted on a high-precision gimbal system, which facilitates the alignment
and pointing with the receiver. A picture of Alice module can be seen in
Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 – Picture of Alice module.
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In the following sections, the main components of the transmitter unit and
their characterisation will be described in detail.
3.2 Generation of Alice’s sequence
The generation of Alice’s sequence of electrical pulses that modulate the lasers
is performed by an Agilent 81133A Pulse Pattern Generator (PPG) with low
RMS jitter (< 1.5 ps) and a large operating frequency range (15 MHz to
3.33 GHz). The PPG is capable of generating pseudo-random bit sequences
(PRBS) from 25−1 to 231−1 of bit length. Its two channel outputs, inverted
and non-inverted, are used to drive both VCSELs (VCSEL0 and VCSEL1 in
Figure 3.1) with non-return-to-zero (NRZ) signals. Thus, when one VCSEL is
off the other one is on and vice versa. The trigger output is used to drive the
synchronisation laser.
The Agilent 81133A PPG can be programmed through several remote
programming interfaces [Agilent, 2007]. For remote controlling of the gene-
rator, the USB interface is used to establish the connection between a PC
and the instrument. The LabVIEW environment is utilised to generate a
pre-programmed sequence of a determined length, which by means of SCPI
commands is set as the data pattern of the PPG. A short sequence is also in-
serted at the beginning of Alice’s transmission to help correcting the temporal
delay between Alice and Bob’s sequences.
3.3 Source of single photons
Ideally, to emit the individual photons that encrypt each bit composing the
secret key single-photon sources should be used. However, protocols using
attenuated coherent states achieving equivalent security levels have been de-
monstrated [Lucamarini et al., 2009]. Moreover, though great efforts are being
made in the field [Collins et al., 2010], current single-photon sources have still
low efficiencies to enable high transmission rates [Gérard et al., 2004], [Bimberg
et al., 2010], [Claudon et al., 2010], [Grangier, 2006]. In the system presented
in this thesis the sender heavily attenuates a laser source, thus emitting the
so called weak coherent pulses (WCP) that follow a Poisson distribution. For
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that purpose two variable fibre-optic attenuators are used to provide a mean
photon number per pulse of µ∼ 0.1, which guarantees that only 0.5% of the
emitted pulses contain more than one photon. Vertical-cavity surface-emitting
lasers were used as laser source by the emitter and will be discussed in detail
in the following subsections.
3.3.1 Vertical-cavity surface-emitting lasers
VCSELs controlled by high-speed drivers, which can operate up to 4.25 Gbps,
were used at the emitter to achieve high transmission rates. A VCSEL is a
semiconductor laser that emits the light perpendicularly to the active-layer
plane. The optical cavities of VCSELs are very small, from one to three times
the wavelength emitted. Therefore, the probability that a photon travelling
through the cavity triggers the stimulated emission in a single pass is very low.
This makes high reflectivity mirrors essential for VCSELs. High reflectivity
mirrors are usually achieved by periodically alternating layers of different re-
fractive indexes, as it can be seen in the schematic shown in Figure 3.3. Such
structure is known as Bragg reflector [Smith et al., 2007, §17.4]. The Bragg
condition provides the width the layers must have, Λ, for the reflected waves
to be in phase:
2neffΛ = mλ , (3.1)
neff being the effective refractive index, m an integer and λ the wavelength
of emission. A Distributed Bragg Reflector (DBR) is a structure formed by
multiple layers of alternating materials such as GaAs and AlAs, each layer
with a thickness of λ/4. High reflectivities of typically 99.5% can be achieved
with a DBR [Hastings et al., 2005].
When population inversion is achieved, that is, when the injected carrier
density is above a certain level in the active layer, the cavity exhibits optical
gain. The minimum laser pump current needed for the optical gain to compen-
sate for the losses in the cavity is called the threshold current [Agrawal, 2002,
§3.3.2]. To minimise energy costs the threshold current should be as small as
possible. The main advantages of VCSELs when compared to edge-emitting
lasers [Agrawal, 2002, §3.4.4] are their small size, which allows them to be
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Figure 3.3 – Schematic gain structure of a VCSEL. The optical emission
of a VCSEL is perpendicular to the active layer (after [DTU, 2012]).
grown in arrays [Uchiyama et al., 1985], [Jewell et al., 1991], their operation
at low laser thresholds [Iga et al., 1987] and their low cost.
The operation spectral range of VCSELs based on GaAs technology in-
cludes wavelengths from λ∼ 650 nm to λ∼ 1300 nm. The VCSELs used for
the QKD system investigated in this thesis were GaAs HFE4192-582 Finisar
VCSELs designed for an emission wavelength of λ∼ 850 nm and a maximum
modulation rate of 4.25 Gbps.
3.3.2 Wavelength choice
Two low-absorption atmospheric spectral windows in the near-infrared regions
of λ∼ 850 nm and λ∼ 1550 nm are usually considered for free-space optical
communications. The latter wavelength has an associated higher transmission
(see Figure 4.2, section 4.1.3) and it is slightly less affected by turbulence
effects and backscattering. However, detection technology must also be consi-
dered. The advantage of choosing λ∼ 850 nm relies mainly in the possibility
of taking advantage of the more mature technology of Silicon-based single-
photon detectors. Indeed, while InGaAs single-photon detectors have greatly
improved their performance in terms of the maximum repetition rate they can
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operate at (from MHz to GHz) [Yuan et al., 2008], they are still surpassed by
commercially-available Si single-photon avalanche detectors (Si-SPADs) in cri-
tical parameters such as dark-count rate, detection efficiency and afterpulsing
probability. Therefore, Si single-photon detectors permit the operation at
higher repetition rates, which improves the key transmission rate. High trans-
mission rates are essential in a future scenario where QKD might be used in
conjunction with the Vernam cipher. Hence the importance of using laser
sources and detectors that can operate at high frequencies. Therefore a source
wavelength of λ∼850 nm in conjunction with Si-SPADs as the single-photon
detectors was chosen as the most efficient and practical solution to achieve
GHz clock rates [Gordon et al., 2004].
3.3.3 Driver and circuit board interface
The primary function of a laser driver is to provide with suitable currents for
bias and modulation of the laser diode (see Figure 3.4). The bias is a constant
current that pushes the laser diode operating range beyond its threshold value
and into the linear region. Modulation is an alternating current that is switched
on and off in synchronisation with the input voltage waveform.
Figure 3.4 – Input-output characteristics of the laser. IMOD represents
the modulation current, IBIAS the bias current, Ith the threshold current,
η is the slope efficiency, and PL and PH represent the low and high optical
power levels, respectively.
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The VCSELs were soldered onto two Maxim MAX3795 evaluation kits
(EV kit). The MAX3795 EV kit consists of an electronic board, which pro-
vides complete optical and electrical evaluation of the MAX3795 VCSEL driver
(see Figure 3.5). This driver contains a bias generator, a laser modulator and
safety features. It also has an automatic power control (APC) that adjusts the
laser bias current to maintain an average optical power output over tempera-
ture and changing laser properties. This is essential to perform quantum key
distribution experiments, as the average photon number per pulse needs to be
constant to typically 0.1, ensuring that the probability of two photons in the
same laser pulse is as low as 0.5%.
The MAX3795 laser driver operates up to 4.25 Gbps. It introduces low
jitter to the optical signal and is characterised by fast edge transitions, which
combined with a high speed pulse pattern generator, enabled key distribution
clocked up to 2.75 GHz, as will be discussed in chapter 6.
Figure 3.5 – Photographs of the front (left) and back (right) of the
MAX3795 driving board, where the HFE4192-582 Finisar VCSEL was
soldered onto.
A variable resistor RMODSET (R2 in Figure 3.5), located between the
MODSET pin and ground, controls the modulation current out of the MAX3795
to the VCSEL. The bias current output of the MAX3795 is controlled by the
resistor RBIASSET , placed between the BIASSET pin and ground. In open-
loop operation, BIASSET monitors the bias current level of the VCSEL. In
closed-loop operation (when APC is activated), RBIASSET limits the maximum
allowed bias current, and the potentiometer RPWRSET (R1 in Figure 3.5) is
then used to adjust the desired average optical power output. The BIASMON
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output provides a current proportional to the laser bias current, and it can
be monitored at TP3 (VBIASMON) of the MAX3795 driver board using the
equation below:
IBIAS =
9 · VBIASMON
402
. (3.2)
An optical evaluation of the signal emitted by the lasers was performed.
The extinction ratio RE, defined as the ratio of the high signal level to the low
level, was evaluated at different modulation currents (i.e., different values of
RMODSET ) for a fixed bias current of ∼ 9 mA (see Figure 3.6). For that pur-
pose, the optical output of each VCSEL was launched into a 62.5 µm-diameter
multimode fibre, which in turn was connected to a high-speed photodetector
with a 2 GHz bandwidth and a responsivity of 0.4 A/W. The output of the
photodetector was in turn connected to a 2.5 GHz bandwidth oscilloscope
(model DPO 7254). The VCSELs were modulated with a square sequence
at a frequency of 1 GHz. The extinction ratio in dB was then calculated as
RE(dB) = 20 log(VH/VL), where VL and VH are the low and high voltage levels
of the signal displayed in the oscilloscope, respectively. Figure 3.6 shows that
the extinction ratio increased with the modulation current (inversely propor-
tional to RMODSET ).
Figure 3.6 – Extinction ratio of the optical output of VCSEL1 against
RMODSET , which is inversely proportional to the modulation current.
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The extinction ratio can also be expressed as a function of the optical power
levels as:
RE(dB) = 10 log10
PH
PL
= 10 log10
IBIAS − ITH + IMOD/2
IBIAS − ITH − IMOD/2 , (3.3)
ITH being the threshold current, IBIAS the bias current, IMOD the modulation
current, and PL and PH the low and high power levels respectively. It is
obvious from Eq. 3.3 that high extinction ratios should be obtained for high
values of IMOD. The extinction ratio was also evaluated experimentally at
different bias currents for the maximum modulation current. Figure 3.7 shows
that the highest extinction ratios were measured for bias currents comprised
between 4 and 9.5 mA. This interval of bias currents includes the theoretical
optimum values, which for the typical values of ITH (between 0.5 and 2 mA)
and the maximum modulation current (∼15 mA) were calculated from Eq. 3.3
to be between 8 and 9.5 mA. Although RE is not exactly the same figure of
merit as the QBER, it was still useful to estimate the optimal operation range
for the modulation and bias currents of the VCSELs. Besides, the QBER
program was still not developed at this point of the project.
Figure 3.7 – Extinction ratio of VCSEL1 against the bias current for a
maximum modulation current at 1 GHz clock frequency.
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For a maximum modulation current and a fixed bias current the quality
of the optical output emitted by the VCSELs was evaluated and compared
with the electrical driving input. The jitter (peak-to-peak) was measured at
different clock frequencies for a 231−1 bits sequence. The photodetector and
the digital DPO 7254 oscilloscope were used for that purpose. Figure 3.8 shows
the measured jitter and Figure 3.9 the eye diagrams of the electrical and optical
signals at clock frequencies ranging between 1 and 3 GHz.
Figure 3.8 – Jitter of the electrical input of the MAX3795 driver and
the optical output of the VCSEL0 against clock frequency.
Considering that the photodetector and the oscilloscope bandwidths are
2 GHz and 2.5 GHz respectively, the jitter of the optical signal was even lower
than ∼80 ps at frequencies up to 2.75 GHz. At 1 GHz and 2 GHz some ringing
effects were observed in the eye diagrams of the electrical signal. Moreover
some reflections due possibly to impedance discontinuities in the circuit board
were observed at 2 GHz and 3 GHz of the electrical eye diagrams. At 3 GHz
some portions of the electrical eye diagram separate into two distinct lines.
This is called Pattern Dependent Jitter (PDJ), which results from wide varia-
tions in the number of consecutive bits contained in NRZ data streams working
against the available bandwidth. One condition that could cause this effect
was an excessive modulation current that saturated the transistor, limiting its
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high-speed switching capabilities. The decreased switching speed limits the
bandwidth during the rising edge.
Figure 3.9 – Eye diagrams of the electrical input of the laser driver and
the optical output emitted by VCSEL0 at three clock frequencies.
3.3.4 Optimisation of the driving conditions of theVCSELs
In the previous section, the optimisation of the driving conditions of the
VCSELs as a function of the extinction ratio of the emitted optical signal
was described. This gives an approximate idea of the optimal driving condi-
tions of the VCSELs but it is not as accurate as the information provided by
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the QBER, which is the final parameter that needs to be optimised. For this
purpose the setup shown in Figure 3.10 was used.
Figure 3.10 – Schematic of the experimental setup for the optimisation
of the driving conditions of the VCSELs.
The laser driving board was connected to a pulse pattern generator (PPG),
which provided the electrical signal that drove the VCSEL. The laser output
was then connected to a fibre-optic attenuator to approximately simulate the
channel loss and the receiver efficiency of the QKD system. The output of the
attenuator was connected to a Si-SPAD, the output of which was divided to
monitor the count rate in a photon counter, and to record each photon arrival
time with a Time Interval Analyser (TIA) card (discussed in section 5.4).
These arrival times served to reconstruct the detected signal, which was then
compared with the bit pattern used to modulate the laser in order to calculate
the QBER or error rate, defined by the ratio of incorrect counts (those for
which the detected bit value was different from the emitted bit) to the total
number of detected events or number of photon arrivals. The trigger output of
the PPG was set to 10 MHz and was directly connected to the external-clock
input of the TIA to synchronise the transmitted and detected signals. The
measured error rate in this experiment only takes into account the error rate
due to the source of photons and the detectors of the QKD system, isolating
it from the error rate contribution of all the optical components of the QKD
system.
The bias and the modulation currents of the VCSEL were adjusted to
find the minimum QBER. First, since it was previously established that high
modulation currents provided high extinction ratios, three fixed values of the
modulation current close to its maximum were chosen. For each of them, the
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bias current was varied between 2 mA and 5 mA and the QBER was measured,
as shown in Figure 3.11 (values taken for VCSEL0 at a clock frequency of
1 GHz). The same measurements were repeated for VCSEL1 obtaining similar
curves. The optimal value, i.e., the lowest QBER, was obtained for a bias
current of 2 mA for both lasers (the minimum bias current that could be
set). This is due to the falling edge of the optical pulses not being abrupt, i.e.,
having an associated ‘tail’. This tail is then detected in the adjacent bit period,
resulting in incorrect photon events that increase the QBER. Decreasing the
bias current pushes down the high level of the optical signal, thus decreasing
the length of these tails, and hence the QBER.
Figure 3.11 – Quantum bit error rate against the bias current of
VCSEL0 at three particular values of the modulation current and 1 GHz
clock frequency.
Once established the optimal bias current (2 mA), the error rate was
measured to determine the optimal modulation current (controlled by
RMODSET ), which from Figure 3.12 can be seen that corresponded for both
VCSELs to a value of RMODSET of 2.5 kΩ (∼6 mA).
In the system under study, when one VCSEL is off the other one is on and
vice versa. Therefore the off state plays a critical role in the QBER, since
all photons detected in this level are counted as wrong events. Hence, it is
essential that the off state of each laser emission be as close to zero as possible.
Increasing the modulation current pushes down the off state of the optical
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signal (PL in Figure 3.4), which as just discussed decreases the QBER. The fact
that the maximum modulation current (minimum RMODSET in Figure 3.12)
does not give the minimum QBER is likely due to relaxation oscillations that
take place when the lasers are switched on from the completely off state.
Figure 3.12 – Quantum bit error rate against RMODSET for both
VCSEL0 and VCSEL1 at the optimum bias current of 2 mA and 1 GHz
clock frequency.
3.3.5 Spectral analysis
The spectral behaviour of both lasers, VCSEL0 and VCSEL1, was charac-
terised with an optical spectral analyser (OSA) ADVANTEST Q8384 as a
function of several parameters: bias and modulation currents of the lasers,
clock frequency and time. For simplicity purposes only the results obtained
for VCSEL0 are represented in the following figures, but similar spectra and
conclusions were drawn for VCSEL1.
To evaluate the influence of the bias current in the spectral characteristics
of the VCSELs, the spectra of the lasers were taken as a function of the bias
current for a fixed (optimal) modulation current. It was observed that when
increasing the bias current the spectrum shifted towards higher wavelengths
with a shift of ∼0.15 nm/mA, as shown in Figure 3.13 (left).
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The dependence of the spectra with the clock frequency was evaluated
for fixed values of the bias and modulation currents, and it is represented in
Figure 3.13 (right), from which it can be concluded that the spectrum hardly
shifted (60 pm) in the frequency range from 0.5 GHz to 3 GHz.
Figure 3.13 – Central emission wavelength of VCSEL0 against the bias
current (left) and against the clock frequency (right).
To characterise the spectral behaviour in the proximities of the optimum
values of bias and modulation currents the spectral shift with bias at a fixed
modulation current was represented in Figure 3.14 (top left and zoom in
bottom left), and with modulation at a fixed bias in Figure 3.14 (top right
and zoom in bottom right).
Figure 3.14 (bottom left) shows that for VCSEL0 a spectral shift of 38 pm
can be observed for an increment of 0.5 mA in the bias current, i.e., the varia-
tion in bias current caused a shift in the central wavelength peak of VCSEL0
of 76 pm/mA, in the range of bias currents close to the minimum bias. Simi-
larly, in Figure 3.14 (bottom right) a shift of the peak emission of 22 pm can
be observed, corresponding to a variation of the modulation current of 2 mA,
which means that the spectra only changed by approximately 11 pm/mA of
modulation current. These changes with bias and modulation currents were
considerably small. Nevertheless, since the bias and modulation currents for
both VCSELs were set to fixed values (the optimum ones) through the mea-
surements taken for the QKD system, the expected spectra variation was mi-
nimal.
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Figure 3.14 – Emission spectra of VCSEL0 at three different bias
currents (top left) and zoom on the graph showing the spectral shift
(bottom left); and emission spectra of VCSEL0 at two modulation
currents (top right) and zoom (bottom right).
The spectral behaviour was also characterised with time and it was found
that after two hours the spectrum only shifted 14 pm, as shown in Figure 3.15.
Figure 3.15 – Spectra of VCSEL0 in two different instants (left) and
zoom of the spectra showing a shift of 14 pm (right).
The APC of each VCSEL driver maintained an average optical power
output over temperature and changes in laser properties. However, this is not
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sufficient to guarantee complete indistinguishability of both VCSELs. This
could be achieved by using a Peltier cooler in each VCSEL, which would fine
tune their emission wavelength to a precise desired wavelength that would be
identical for both. Moreover, since both VCSELs are multimode, a narrow
bandpass filter would ensure that only one spectral mode propagates. How-
ever, due to the difficulty of attaching a Peltier cooler to the VCSELs since
they were soldered onto an electronic board, this option had to be abandoned.
3.4 Characterisation of the polarisation states
Birefringence and polarisation dependent loss of optical fibres may modify the
angle and linearity of the polarisation states. To prevent these undesirable
effects Alice module was designed avoiding optical fibre once the polarisation
states were defined. For this reason optical fibres were used in the emitter
only to convey the photons from the lasers outputs to the collimators of Alice
module. Therefore no birefringence due to optical fibres was introduced in the
QKD system since only free-space optical components were employed in the
transmitter and receiver optical modules (see Figure 3.1 and Figure 5.2).
The polarisation of the non-orthogonal quantum states should be main-
tained as linear as possible to minimise the QBER contribution due to pho-
tons detected in Bob with the wrong polarisation (polarisation leakage, see
section 6.4). For this reason a thorough analysis of the polarisation extinction
ratio (PER) through the optical components that could alter the polarisation
of the quantum states was performed. The linearity of the diagonal state
was particularly difficult to be maintained since it became elliptical due to
several factors. Firstly, in the cube beamsplitter at Alice the junction of the
two prisms at the cube has a lower refractive index than that of the material
surrounding it, i.e., the incident medium is denser. Therefore, the situation
of internal reflection is given (ni > nt). In this case, for an incident angle θi
larger than the critic angle θc, the phase difference ∆ϕ between the two com-
ponents of the electric field, parallel and perpendicular to the incident plane, is
different from 0 or pi, which means the incident linear state will acquire some
ellipticity [Hecht, 2002, §4.6]. Moreover, in a more general case the mate-
rial at the junction of the beamsplitter cube might have some absorption (the
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refractive index is complex). This means that ∆ϕ of the polarisation states
after passing through the beamsplitter is 0 or pi (no change in ellipticity) only
for incident angles of 0◦ or 90◦. This can be observed in Figure 3.16, which
shows the PER of the beam transmitted through the cube beamsplitter as a
function of the incident angle of polarisation. The initial linearity of the pola-
risation states before passing through the beamsplitter is only maintained for
incident angles of 0◦ or 90◦ (10◦ and 90◦ in Figure 3.16, maybe due to imper-
fections in the measurement or in the beamsplitter). For the remaining angles
the PER dropped significantly (from more than 4000:1 to less than 500:1).
Figure 3.16 – PER of linearly polarised light incident on the cube
beamsplitter and PER of the light after being transmitted through,
against the angle of incidence.
This effect has also been studied for the light hitting the mirrors that are
used to direct the beams in Alice module. Figure 3.17 represents the PER of
the light reflected by the first mirror and after the second mirror as a function
of the incident polarisation angle. The PER values show that the mirrors
turn the incident linearly polarised beam into elliptical, except for the two
mentioned angles of incidence where the absorption effect is minimum.
Since for one of the incident angles the PER still maintains high (for exam-
ple for the angle of incidence of 80◦ in Figure 3.17), this incidence could be
chosen as one of the two polarisation states necessary for the B92 protocol,
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Figure 3.17 – PER of linearly polarised light incident on the first mirror
in Alice, reflected by the first mirror, and after the second mirror, as a
function of the angle of incidence.
in this case the vertical state, which was set at P0 (see Figure 3.1). The
other state, the diagonal one, had to be set at 45◦ from the vertical state and
the low PER found at this angle made necessary some polarisation correction
technique. For this effect a quarter-wave plate was placed between the po-
lariser of the diagonal channel and the cube beamsplitter. The orientation
angle of the quarter-wave plate was carefully optimised to compensate for
the phase shift the components of the electrical field would suffer after pass-
ing through Alice. Figure 3.18 represents the PER of the light exiting Alice
(transmitted through the cube beamsplitter, and reflected by the pellicle beam-
splitter and the mirrors), as a function of the angle of polarisation set in P1
without correcting with the quarter-wave plate (circles) and after placing the
quarter-wave plate to enhance the PER of the diagonal state (triangle). An
improvement from 60:1 to 2700:1 after compensating the phase shift with the
quarter-wave plate was observed.
Finally, Figure 3.19 shows the polarisation extinction ratio exiting Alice
of the light emitted by VCSEL0 and VCSEL1 for different incident angles of
polarisation (set in P0 and P1 respectively). The graph also shows the chosen
angles of polarisation for the non-orthogonal quantum states encoding the ‘1’s
and the ‘0’s of the transmitted sequence.
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Figure 3.18 – Polarisation extinction ratio of the light exiting Alice
(from the transmission channel at the beamsplitter) against the angle of
polarisation set in P1; without any polarisation correction (circles) and
after correcting the diagonal polarisation state with a quarter-wave plate
(triangle).
Figure 3.19 – Polarisation extinction ratio of the quantum states at
Alice’s output against the incident angle of polarisation.
As the polarisation states need to be set at a relative angle of 45◦ for the
implementation of the B92 protocol, the quarter-wave plate orientation was
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adjusted to optimise the extinction ratio of the state at 45◦ (the diagonal
state) from the state with the maximum PER (the vertical state). After that,
a PER of ∼ 4000 : 1 was achieved for the diagonal state. The vertical state
had a PER of ∼7000 : 1 and did not need any compensation.
3.5 Optical synchronisation
To synchronise emitter and receiver Alice sends out a periodic bright pulse
of different wavelength from that used for the key at a sub-multiple value of
the clock frequency. Figure 3.20 depicts a schematic of the synchronisation
process. The wavelength chosen for that purpose was λ∼ 1550 nm, since it
transmits well in the atmosphere and off-the shelf components are available
at this wavelength. It is also spectrally far from λ ∼ 850 nm, and therefore
they can be easily discriminated in the receiver module using a dichroic mirror.
The laser requirements were: to be fibre-coupled, since it reduced considerably
the complexity of the setup and more importantly, to have a high bandwidth,
so that the rise and fall times were sufficiently small and the jitter as low as
possible not to increase the error rate of the system. The laser used was a
RayCan 1550 nm single-mode VCSEL with single-mode fibre pigtail, capable
of data rates up to 4 Gbps, with rise and fall times of typically 90−120 ps.
Figure 3.20 – Schematic of the synchronisation process. Alice sends
out a periodic bright pulse at λ∼1550 nm synchronous with the signal
carrying the key. The synchronisation signal is detected at the receiver
side by an amplified photodetector (PD) and serves as the reference clock
for the timestamp card in Bob.
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The value of the synchronisation frequency was determined by the time-
stamp module in the receiver side, which has an external-clock input for a user
supplied 10 MHz reference that has to be synchronous with the signal carrying
the key. The synchronisation frequency at the emitter was obtained from the
trigger output of the pulse pattern generator in Alice by subdividing the clock
frequency so that the resulting frequency was 10 MHz. Therefore the trigger
output served as the driving signal for the λ∼ 1550 nm laser, which was sol-
dered on a driver board identical to the board for the λ ∼ 850 nm VCSELs
discussed in section 3.3.3.
In the transmitter module the λ ∼ 1550 nm VCSEL was connected to a
collimator via a pigtailed single-mode fibre. The collimated beam was then
combined with the λ ∼ 850 nm photons by means of a broadband pellicle
beamsplitter, to be then expanded and sent to the receiver by the telescope
composed by the set of lenses L1 and L2, as depicted in Figure 3.1.
Although the lenses in Alice were achromatic, the spectral range did not
cover the whole λ∼850 nm to λ∼1550 nm and hence there was some chromatic
aberration. Therefore, as the telescope in Alice was adjusted to collimate the
λ∼850 nm beams, the λ∼1550 nm beam diverged. This incurred in additional
loss for the synchronisation signal, since it reached the receiver telescope larger
than its optimal dimensions. However, this loss did not constitute a major
problem, even for the experiments at 300 m, as the power in the receiver end
satisfied the voltage requirements of the timestamp card, as it will be discussed
in section 5.7.
3.6 Beams alignment
The three laser beams in Alice, the two at λ∼ 850 nm carrying the key and
the synchronisation beam at λ∼ 1550 nm, had to be made coincident in the
far field since only one output telescope was to be used to expand and send the
beams to the receiver. This coincidence of the beams was extremely important
and had to be sufficiently precise for both λ∼ 850 nm beams (encoding the
‘ones’ and the ‘zeros’ of the key) to be detected in the receiver end with the
same efficiency.
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Such a task was far from trivial with the original components of the trans-
mitter module. The configuration of the initial version of Alice contained a
gimbal mount for the beamsplitter cube (BSC), metrics of which was different
from the metrics of the rest of mounts (for the polarisers, the collimators and
the pellicle beamsplitter). Therefore, to adapt both types of metrics three
custom-made aluminium sheets were used, two sheets for the coupling with
the λ∼850 nm channels and another sheet for the junction between the BSC
and the pellicle beamsplitter (PBS). However it resulted impossible to make
coincident the λ∼850 nm beam transmitted through the cube with the other
λ∼ 850 nm beam reflected by the cube, and these in turn with the synchro-
nisation beam, since due to the lack of sufficient accuracy in the fabrication
of the aluminium sheets, the beams were from its origin at a slightly different
height.
Consequently the gimbal mount for the BSC was replaced with a static
mount of the same metrics as the other mounts. The gimbal mount of the
original version of Alice provided with azimuth, elevation and rotation move-
ments for the BSC, which in conjunction with the x−y mounts that were
used to hold the collimators were useful to direct the beams with the aim
to make them coincident. With the static mount however, these movements
had to be achieved independently for each channel. Several combinations of
three different types of mounts were tried to hold collimators: static, x−y and
kinematic mounts. The size of each type of mount also played a role, since a
compact design of Alice was desired. The coincidence of the three beams could
finally be achieved with a static mount for the channel of the ‘0’s (which would
be the reference beam), and two kinematic mounts, one for the synchronisation
channel and other for the channel emitting the ‘1’s.
Figure 3.21 represents a schematic of the alignment technique. Three flat
mirrors were utilised to extend the trajectory of the beams to ∼ 24 meters.
The λ∼850 nm beam that comes from VCSEL0 and gets reflected by the BSC
—which we shall call the ‘0’ beam— was chosen as the reference beam for the
alignment. Then the ‘1’ beam and the ‘sync’ beam were directed to the same
point through each mirror, so that they kept coincident along the whole beam
trajectory.
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Figure 3.21 – Method for the alignment of the three beams exiting
Alice: ‘0’ beam, ‘1’ beam and ‘sync’ beam. The ‘0’ beam was the
reference, whereas ‘1’ and ‘sync’ beams were aligned to the reference
with the help of kinematic mounts.
Next, a further technique for beam alignment was used to confirm the
coincidence of the beams in the far field (see Figure 3.22). It consisted of the
use of a curved mirror and a CCD camera placed at the focal length of the
mirror. Parallel beams focus at the same point and coincident beams remain
together when moving the CCD camera along the focus and Rayleigh zone.
Figure 3.22 – Method for making the three beams from Alice coincident
by using a curved mirror and a CCD camera.
A slight deviation between the ‘0’ and ‘1’ beams was observed. The ‘1’
(transmitted) beam was then directed to the exact position of the ‘0’ (reflected)
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spot. Finally it was verified that the spots on the camera kept coincident along
the optical axis of the curved mirror. Figure 3.23 shows the images of the beams
at λ∼850 nm on the CCD camera. The image centroids were calculated and
their value proved that the positions of the spots on the CCD camera were the
same.
Figure 3.23 – Pictures taken by the CCD camera of the ‘1’ and ‘0’
spots, showing that they were coincident.
3.7 Gimbal system
All Alice’s optics is mounted on a 30 cm-side square optical breadboard, which
is in turn mounted on a custom-made gimbal system that is used for the
alignment of emitter and receiver. The gimbal scheme is shown in Figure 3.24.
It consists of a structure that provides with the azimuth and elevation
movements. Two rotation stages with high-precision angular positioning accu-
racy are employed for that purpose. Both are controlled by a programmable
double-axis driver. The motor in the base supplies the azimuth trajectory and
has a minimum incremental motion of 0.001◦, while the lateral motor with a
minimum incremental motion of 0.00025◦ provides the elevation rotation. In
each lateral support of the gimbal structure a bearing holds a rod with an
L-shaped holder where Alice is mounted on. Finally, the whole gimbal system
is supported by a robust tripod, designed to bear a weight of up to 90 kg (see
Figure 3.25).
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3.8 Shielding the emitter from background radiation
The current design of Alice module reflects stray background light mainly
through the mirrors, being partially sent out to Bob’s telescope, thus increasing
the error rate. Other setups of the transmitter optics are being considered so
that mirrors become dispensable. However, an effective measure to reduce
the amount of stray light that is coupled in the transmitter is the use of a
blackout-material shield and a long tube around the main lens. Therefore a
long antireflective tube was attached to Alice’s main objective lens, and the
whole module was also covered with a box built with light blackout cardboard
and fabric (see Figure 3.26).
The reduction in background was characterised for just the tube placed in
Alice first, and for both the tube and the blackout material later. Although
considerable deviations were found in the measurements (due to the random
changes in solar background and the difficulty characterising the background
rate with and without the tube and box under exactly the same background
conditions), the reduction in background was clear, especially in the second
case when both tube and shield were put in Alice, when an average reduction
of 6 dB was found.
Figure 3.24 – AutoCAD design (left) and picture (right) of the gimbal
system for the transmitter. Two high precision DC motors —a lateral
and a base motor represented in the figure by LM and BM— provide the
azimuth and elevation movements required for the alignment between
Alice and Bob.
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Figure 3.25 – Alice mounted on a robust tripod.
Figure 3.26 – Pictures of the transmitter with the antireflective tube
(left) and with the shielding fabric and card (right).
3.9 Conclusions
In this chapter the electronics and optical setup of the transmitter module
have been discussed.
To achieve high transmission rates Alice uses a fast GHz pulse pattern
generator that generates the initial sequence of electrical pulses used to drive
the two VCSELs. Each laser output is then attenuated so that a mean photon
number of much less than one photon per pulse is achieved. This ensures that
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with high probability only one photon encoding the same bit will be sent to
the receiver, which is crucial for the security of QKD systems.
The laser sources were two GaAs VCSELs designed for an emission wave-
length of λ ∼ 850 nm and a maximum bit rate of 4.25 Gbps. They were
soldered on two driving boards containing a bias generator, a laser modulator
and an automatic power control. An optimisation of the driving conditions of
the VCSELs regarding their contribution to the quantum bit error rate was
performed. The optimal bias current obtained was 2 mA and the optimal mo-
dulation current ∼ 6 mA, with a contribution to the QBER less than 0.5%
at a clock frequency of 1 GHz. Besides, the spectral behaviour of both lasers
was studied, resulting in a wavelength shift of ∼0.15 nm/mA of bias current.
However such shifting was not a matter of concern since the system would be
operating at a fixed bias level. Overall, the spectrum hardly changed with
modulation current, clock frequency or time.
The polarisation extinction ratio of the light transmitting through each
λ∼850 nm channel was measured for different angles of incidence at different
points throughout the transmitter. It was found out that certain optical com-
ponents degraded the linearity of the polarisation states, affecting above all
the diagonal state. A quarter-wave plate was used to counteract such effect.
After that, extinction ratios of ∼ 7000 : 1 and ∼ 4000 : 1 for the vertical and
diagonal polarisation states respectively were achieved.
To synchronise emitter and receiver Alice sends out a periodic bright pulse
at a wavelength of 1550 nm and at a repetition rate of 10 MHz. The syn-
chronisation signal at the emitter was obtained from the trigger output of the
pulse pattern generator, which served as driving signal for the λ∼1550 nm
synchronisation VCSEL.
An important issue for an efficient reception of the key is the alignment of
the three beams in Alice module. The coincidence of the three beams in the
far field was performed by using a curved mirror and a CCD camera placed at
its focal length.
Finally, the transmitter’s optics was mounted on a high-precision gimbal
system for its alignment with the receiver unit, and the whole structure was
covered with blackout material to reduce the amount of stray light that may
be collected by Alice.

Chapter 4
Free space as the quantum channel
The transmission channel is the physical medium that transports
the quantum states encrypting the binary data between the sender
and receiver of the QKD system. It has the fundamental role of
preserving the quality of such quantum states, hence the name
it sometimes receives as the quantum channel. Sending photons
over a free-space link faces several challenges that need to be con-
sidered, such as the influence of everyday atmospheric conditions
(rain, fog, snow, etc.). The transmission efficiency of the atmos-
phere is usually referred to as atmospheric extinction, which in-
cludes the interaction with air molecules, aerosol particles and
water droplets through scattering and absorption. Additionally,
atmospheric turbulence leads to inhomogeneities in the refractive
index of the air, which can cause beam spreading, beam wander
and scintillation, which are often translated into variations in the
signal intensity at the receiver. Also the effect of background ra-
diation coupling into the receiver telescope results in an increased
error rate. This chapter is intended to briefly review the relevant
aspects concerning free-space communication. The optical compo-
nents used in transmitter and receiver to optimise the propagation
of the beams through the atmosphere and enhance the detection
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efficiency are also described. The calculation of some important
parameters such as the attenuation of the link or the beam size at
the receiver’s end, are also discussed in this chapter.
4.1 Factors affecting free-space QKD
The quantum channel of the QKD system presented in this thesis is free space,
i.e., photons carrying information encoded in their polarisation state propa-
gate through the air from the sender to the receiver. To minimise the error
rate of the key transmission it is fundamental that the transmission medium
preserves such quantum states. Fortunately, the atmosphere is essentially a
non-birefringent medium, thus enabling QKD protocols based on polarisation
coding. Another advantage is the very low absorption coefficient of the at-
mosphere in the near-infrared window between λ∼ 830 nm and λ∼ 860 nm,
ensuring high transmission efficiencies. There is however a limiting factor,
which is the need of a free line of sight between emitter and receiver. The de-
pendence of the transmission efficiency on weather conditions constitutes also
a major challenge in free-space communication systems. In the following, the
main factors affecting the performance of free-space quantum key distribution
are discussed.
4.1.1 Line of sight requirement between Alice and Bob
As mentioned above, free-space QKD requires line of sight (LOS), which simply
means that sender and receiver at their respective locations can see each other.
As optical beams propagate and diverge in a linear way, the LOS requirement
is less strict when compared to microwave systems, which need more area free
from obstacles to take into account the extension of Fresnel zones.
In order to determine whether line of sight exists between two remote loca-
tions, visual observation is the easiest approach. For long distances (>1 km),
visual observation is not so trivial, and it can be necessary the use of field
glasses and telescopic lenses. Also a variety of GIS (Geographic Information
Systems) mapping software can be found to allow determining whether line
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of sight exists between two known locations. Such programs can load high-
resolution 3D topology maps, which include information regarding buildings
and their specific locations.
Rooftop to rooftop is a typical deployment scenario in conventional commu-
nications. Additionally, when the roof access is not available or convenient, it
might be possible to locate the transmitter and receiver modules indoor behind
windows. If the former option is chosen, the delicate equipment of QKD sys-
tems should be carefully isolated from external harshness. In the case of the
QKD system discussed in this thesis, the second scenario was chosen, and Alice
and Bob were placed behind windows in their respective locations. However,
special attention has to be paid to the angle the beam makes with the window:
the more perpendicular the incidence, the lower the bounce-back of the beam.
Moreover, it should be taken into account that some windows contain glass
coatings to reduce glare, and are often specifically intended to reject infrared.
Such coatings could reduce the signal by 60% or even more.
In spring and summer measurement campaigns, experiments were carried
out with the windows open. However, in winter campaign Alice’s window
had to be closed to reduce the effect of turbulence on the beam caused by
the difference of temperatures between the inside and outside, as discussed in
the following subsection. That measure did not constitute a major problem
since the additional loss introduced by the window was considered for the
attenuation that had to be applied to the lasers in order to achieve the single-
photon regime.
4.1.2 Sources of loss
In QKD each emitted photon carries one bit of information, and thus, one
obvious way of achieving high transmission rates is through minimising the
losses of the quantum channel and the receiver. Therefore a careful charac-
terisation of each contribution to the total loss was performed. The protocol
used in these experiments, the B92, is especially sensitive to loss, as it was
discussed in section 2.2.3, and hence the importance of properly characterising
the losses.
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One source of loss in a free-space optical system is due to the imperfection of
the optical components, that is, optical loss . The amount of this loss depends
on the characteristics and quality of the equipment. This value has been
characterised in Alice, and it is taken into account for the total attenuation
applied to the lasers output to reach an average photon number per pulse µ of
0.1. The loss of the receiver optics was characterised to be ∼8.6 dB, including
the coupling of the signal into the optical fibres (see section 5.6). Several
other causes of loss that can occur in a typical free-space optical system are
geometrical loss, pointing loss, and atmospheric loss.
Geometrical loss refers to the loss originated from the divergence of the
optical beam. This loss is equal to the ratio of the area of the receiver collecting
optics to the total area of the beam at the receiver. Alice’s telescope has been
designed to avoid geometrical loss for links lower than 3 km, as discussed in
subsection 4.2.1, and therefore the contribution of this loss should be zero for
links under this distance.
Moreover, if the transmitter does not accurately point to the receiver, an
additional loss must be expected, the so-called pointing loss . The misalign-
ment between both stations might happen due to building sway and thermal
fluctuations. The influence of relative pointing deviations on the bit error rate
and the key transmission rates achieved with the system presented in this the-
sis has been characterised in sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5. The results show that
the system is quite robust with a potential alignment maintained for 4 or 5
days without external intervention at a distance of 300 m. Nevertheless, since
emitter and receiver are mounted on precise gimbal platforms for their align-
ment, a tracking process with high-precision motors will be implemented in
the most coming future so that such effects can be compensated for. Exam-
ples of tracking systems that operate in free-space QKD implementations are
described in [Schmitt-Manderbach, 2007] and [Gorman, 2010].
In a free-space optical link different atmospheric phenomena such as ab-
sorption, scattering and turbulence, may perturb and attenuate the signals
that propagate through it. It must also be stressed that all these effects are
weather dependent. They are described in more detail in the following subsec-
tion.
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4.1.3 Atmospheric effects on beam propagation
The atmosphere is composed of oxygen and nitrogen molecules, and depending
on weather, of large amounts of water vapour as well. Pollution adds other
constituents to the atmosphere, especially in big cities and industrialised re-
gions. Infrared photons propagating through the air can be scattered or ab-
sorbed by these particles. However, by selecting the right transmission wave-
length, it is possible to benefit from optimal atmospheric windows. The QKD
system discussed in this thesis operates at a wavelength of 850 nm, where for-
tunately the existence of a low absorption window coincides with the availabi-
lity of commercial, high-efficiency single-photon detection modules, as already
mentioned in section 3.3.2.
Overall there are three main atmospheric factors affecting optical wave
propagation: scattering, absorption and turbulence (refractive index fluctua-
tions). The attenuation of beams due to absorption and scattering is described
by Beer’s Law [Houghton, 1986, Ch.2], while turbulence is described by Navier-
Stokes equations [Mikulevicius et al., 2004], [McDonough, 2004], or also by
the simplified Kolmogorov’s statistical approach [Kolmogorov, 1941]. In gene-
ral, absorption and scattering cause attenuation of electromagnetic radiation,
which depends on the wavelength. The transmission, τ , of radiation through
the atmosphere as a function of distance, z, is given by Beer’s Law as
τ =
I(λ, z)
I0(λ)
= exp(−zγ(λ)) , (4.1)
where I(λ, z) is the intensity of the radiation at the distance z, I0 is the inten-
sity at the origin, and γ is the attenuation coefficient, which is a sum of four
individual weather-dependent parameters —molecular and aerosol scattering
coefficients, αm and αa, and molecular and aerosol absorption coefficients, βm
and βa— and is given by
γ = αm + αa + βm + βa , (4.2)
that is, the total attenuation is caused by the combined effect of different
scattering and absorption phenomena, which are further divided according to
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the size of interacting particles: molecular (smaller) or aerosols (larger parti-
cles).
Scattering
Scattering can be understood as a redirection of photons when they interact
with other particles in the atmosphere, which can lead to a significant reduction
of the signal intensity at the receiver’s location. There are several scattering
regimes depending on the size of the atmospheric particles that interact with
the light. For particle radius r  λ/2pi, the scattering is in the Rayleigh
regime; for r ≈ λ/2pi the scattering is in the Mie regime; and for r  λ/2pi
geometrical optics can be used to study the scattering process. According to
this description, fog is the main cause of beam attenuation due to scattering,
since the average radius of fog particles is similar in size to the infrared wave-
lengths typically used in free-space optics. Rain and snow particles are larger
than fog particles, thus being much less of an obstacle to the beam.
Rayleigh scattering takes place when a charge imbalance is induced by
the optical radiation incident on the bound electrons surrounding a gaseous
molecule. The electrons oscillate at the frequency of the incident beam and
reradiate the light as a scattered wave. Particles involved in Rayleigh scattering
are air molecules and haze. The scattering coefficient is proportional to λ−4,
what means that long wavelengths are less scattered than short wavelengths.
Figure 4.1 represents this wavelength dependence of the Rayleigh scattering
cross section in the infrared spectral range.
The implemented QKD system transmits the key at a wavelength of 850 nm
and the synchronisation signal at a wavelength of 1550 nm, both moderately
affected by Rayleigh scattering.
Mie scattering occurs for particles comparable in size with the transmission
wavelength, being fog, haze and aerosol particles the main contributors to this
scattering process in the near-infrared wavelength range. To assess the amount
of light extinction due to Mie scattering it is necessary to know the composi-
tion, concentration, and size distribution of the atmospheric particles. In the
case of aerosols, factors like location, time, wind velocity, or relative humi-
dity must be considered. As this implies significant experimental complexity,
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empirical models have been formulated describing aerosol conditions as a func-
tion of wavelength and visibility, the latter depending on local environmental
parameters. However, if the exact theoretical formula describing Mie scattering
is simulated by precise numerical methods, the dependence obtained of the
attenuation coefficient with the wavelength in the infrared spectral range is
not very drastic. By empirical observation it can be concluded that the highest
beam attenuation is mainly due to Mie scattering caused by fog, and that it
is accentuated when the distance increases.
Figure 4.1 – Rayleigh scattering cross section as a function of
wavelength (after [Willebrand et al., 2002, Ch.3]).
Absorption
When photons interact with atmospheric molecules, these absorb part of the
energy from the incident photons. This quantum process is known as absorp-
tion, which alters the electronic, vibrational, and/or rotational state of the
molecule, thus producing the typical absorption spectra of molecules with a
series of discrete absorption lines. The shape of these lines depends on several
line-broadening effects, such as Doppler broadening and pressure broadening
[Wallace et al., 2006, §4.4.3]. In the infrared atmospheric window most of the
absorption is caused by water, carbon dioxide and ozone, being water vapour
the primary molecular absorber in the near infrared range. It is evident that
the attenuation of a signal will strongly depend on the number of absorbing
particles. Given a specific wavelength, its corresponding extinction coefficient
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can be computed by taking into account the type of particles present in the
atmosphere and the information obtained from experimental molecular spec-
tra. The transmission spectrum under a standard urban atmosphere —in our
case aerosol concentration with 5 km visibility— was obtained by using the
simulating atmospheric transmission computer code MODTRAN [Anderson
et al., 2000]. As it can be seen in Figure 4.2, the simulation using this code
resulted in transmittances of 0.52, 0.62 and 0.80 for the wavelengths of 650 nm
(red was used for alignment purposes), 850 nm (key distribution) and 1550 nm
(synchronisation signal), respectively. The transmission spectrum can also be
computed with other atmospheric transmission programs, such as LOWTRAN
or FASCODE [Anderson et al., 1995]. Both MODTRAN and LOWTRAN are
band models and provide spectra of lower resolution than FASCODE, which
is a line-by-line model.
Figure 4.2 – Atmospheric transmittance as a function of wavelength
under urban aerosol conditions and a visibility of 5 km (data simulated
with MODTRAN 4.0).
Figure 4.3 shows the transmission spectra under both, urban aerosol con-
ditions and rural conditions, where different extinction of the signal at the
wavelength of 850 nm for both scenarios can be observed.
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Figure 4.3 – Atmospheric transmittance versus wavelength considering
two types of aerosol scenarios: rural extinction with a visibility of 23 km
and urban extinction with a visibility of 5 km (data simulated using
MODTRAN 4.0).
Turbulence
Turbulence in the atmosphere has a considerable effect on the transmission of
a beam over a free-space link. Small variations in temperature (< 1◦C) lead to
changes in the wind velocity (eddies). The derived changes in the atmospheric
density give rise to a variation of the index of refraction on the order of 10−6.
As a result, the light modifies its path while propagating through the air.
Since these inhomogeneities in the refractive index are variable in time or in
space, the changes in the index of refraction seem as turbulent behaviour to
the outside viewer.
Depending on the ratio between the size of the atmosphere’s eddies and
the beam size, three different phenomena may appear under turbulence. The
beam can be deflected, leading to beam wander , when turbulent eddies are large
compared to the beam diameter. When turbulent eddies are small compared to
the diameter of the beam they give rise to scattering, producing beam spreading
in a higher order than diffraction theory predicts. The use of large optics and
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a large beam diameter can compensate partly for these effects. On the other
hand, fluctuations in the received intensity, caused by small variations in the
optical path, which can produce destructive or constructive interference, are
known as scintillation. Although turbulence is not a time-invariant, easy-to-
model phenomenon, various approaches have been proposed. The most used
and verified is the Kolmogorov model [Friedlander et al., 1961].
During the measurement campaigns for the characterisation of the QKD
system presented in this thesis, the three effects above mentioned could be ob-
served. Of the three turbulence effects, scintillation might possibly be the most
frequent. A possible solution to mitigate this effect in astronomical telescopes
and, recently, in free-space optical systems has been the use of adaptive optics,
such as deformable mirrors. Similarly, QKD implementations that employ
adaptive optics have also been reported [Capraro, 2008], [Capraro et al., 2008],
[Chapuran et al., 2009], [Safari et al., 2009], although there are still some limi-
tations to the use of these systems.
Regarding beam spreading, a diameter almost double than that calculated
was measured at a distance of ∼ 300 m from the sender. However, it cannot be
asseverated that lack of precision in the collimation technique was not in part
the cause of such effect. In summer measurement campaign, a displacement of
the beam centre of more than 2 cm for a 300-m link could be observed when
turning the air conditioning on in the transmitter location. Since emitter
and receiver were located inside their respective buildings, the temperature
difference between the inside (∼ 20◦C) and outside (>30◦C) created great tur-
bulence at the window frontier. When the air conditioning was off, this beam
wander could barely be perceived. The opposite situation occurred in winter:
low temperatures outside (<10◦C) and ∼ 20◦C inside caused even a more per-
ceivable beam wander effect than in summer, which was especially noticeable
after sunset. In this case the turbulence due to the difference of temperatures
was solved by closing the window in Alice’s location, thus avoiding the air flow
which caused the turbulence at the origin of the beam. This measure did not
cause additional losses since, as already mentioned, the loss introduced by the
window was taken into account for the attenuation applied to the VCSELs.
Another way of overcoming beam wander is by slightly defocusing the beam to
increase the beam diameter so that it always overlaps the receiver’s aperture.
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However, this of course causes additional losses in the system. Since the beam
wander takes place over relatively long time scales, it can be compensated by
actively tracking the transmitter and receiver.
4.1.4 Weather conditions
One disadvantage of free-space setups resides in the dependence of the trans-
mission on weather conditions. While with clear air the attenuation at
λ∼850 nm can be lower than 0.2 dB/km, it rises to 2−10 dB/km in case
of moderate rain, up to 20 dB/km under heavy rain, and up to 100 dB/km in
clouds [Kim et al., 2001b], [Grabner et al., 2011]. However, the impact of rain
is significantly much lower than that of fog, which can cause the attenuation
to increase over 300 dB/km [Kim et al., 2001a]. The reason is that raindrops
(with radii between 200 and 2000 µm) are considerably larger than the wave-
length of commonly used free-space laser sources.
In snow weather conditions absorption of infrared wavelengths also takes
place, although scattering is not a major problem since the size of snowflakes
is large when compared to infrared wavelengths. The shape and size of ice
crystals constituting snowflakes vary, but usually they are larger than rain
particles. Typically, the attenuation caused by light snow in beam propagation
varies from 3 dB/km to 30 dB/km, which is more than light rain and less than
moderate fog.
Fog is the worst-case scenario in terms of laser transmission since it is
composed of small water droplets with radii similar to the wavelengths in the
near infrared. The particle size distribution depends on the degree of fog.
When visibility lies between 0 and 2 km, weather conditions are considered as
fog. If instead of visibility a more quantitative definition of foggy conditions is
required, particle size or density measurements are employed. Physical charac-
terisation of fog is a very complicated task, and the theory of fog process is
not well understood yet. Factors like the height may modify the density distri-
bution of fog particles, making more complex the theoretical modelling of fog.
Indeed, the limited amount of information regarding the local impact of fog
on the availability of free-space optical systems is certainly one of the prime
challenges for the field.
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4.1.5 Background light
Background light couples into the receiver telescope leading to more back-
ground noise and an increased error rate. The errors generated by the back-
ground light can be reduced to a reasonable level by using a combination of
spectral, spatial and temporal filtering. Some free-space QKD systems that
implement efficient methods to reduce background radiation, enabling the ope-
ration in daylight conditions, have been demonstrated in [Benton et al., 2010],
[Hughes et al., 2002b]. Spectral and spatial filtering are implemented in the
QKD system discussed in this thesis by means of a 1-nm interference filter and
62.5 µm-diameter optical fibres, respectively. This will be further discussed in
chapter 5. Additionally, careful shielding of emitter and receiver units with
blackout material greatly contributes to reduce the level of background radia-
tion that couples into the system.
4.2 Free-space optics used in the QKD system
A schematic of the free-space optical link is shown in Figure 4.4. To enable
Bob to collect as many photons from Alice as possible, two telescopes are
installed, one at each end of the QKD system. In the following subsections,
the telescopes of sender and receiver, and the optical equipment needed to
enhance the total efficiency of the link, are described.
Figure 4.4 – Schematic of the free-space optics used for the QKD link.
4.2. Free-space optics used in the QKD system 103
4.2.1 Design of the transmitter telescope and collimation
of the output beam
On Alice’s side the telescope consists of two achromatic doublet lenses. The
choice of the lenses was done according to several factors, such as the trans-
mission distance of the link, the receiver telescope and the off-the-shelf availa-
bility. On the receiver’s side a Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope is used to focus
the beam from the transmitter. Due to the design of a classical Cassegrain
telescope the secondary mirror limits the diameter of the received beam, in
our case to less than 90 mm. Regarding the distance of the optical link, it was
initially thought to be close to ∼ 3 km for key distribution in urban radii. The
maximum achievable transmission distance of the system is discussed in more
detail in section 6.5.
In order to reduce the effects of Gaussian beam divergence, the beam
coming out of Alice had to be expanded and collimated. The radius w (to
the 1/e2 of the intensity) of a Gaussian beam as a function of distance z is
defined as
w(z) = w0
√
1 +
(
z
zR
)2
, (4.3)
zR being the Rayleigh length, and w0 the beam waist [Menzel, 2007, §2.4].
The Rayleigh length is in turn given by zR ∼= piw20/λ. Figure 4.5 represents
the radius of the beam w, as a function of the propagating distance z at a
wavelength of λ ∼ 850 nm, for different initial beam radius at the emitter’s
aperture, w0.
The chosen diameter of the output beam at Alice was ≈ 40 mm
(w ≈ 20 mm), since at a distance of 3 km the beam was still sufficiently small to
be coupled into the receiver telescope, and the availability and cost of the lenses
to be used were within reasonable margins. Therefore two lenses were used to
expand and collimate the ∼ 7 mm-diameter beams coming out from the fibre-
coupled collimators (see Figure 3.1), to an approximately 40 mm-diameter
gaussian beam, which is then transmitted through free space to the receiver
telescope. The first lens focuses the beam to a diameter of 13.82 µm while the
second lens, placed at its focal length from the waist of the beam, expands the
beam to a 39.15 mm-diameter collimated beam.
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Figure 4.5 – Beam radius ω against the propagation distance z for
several values of the beam waist at the transmitter aperture w0.
The linear approximation for the divergence of the beam is given by the
equation θ ' λ/piw0 [Menzel, 2007, §2.4]. Using this equation with a
39.15 mm-diameter Gaussian beam yields a total angular spread of the beam of
2θ = 13.82 µrad, which corresponds to the beam diameter being broadened by
52.56 mm over the 3 km link —resulting in a beam diameter of 91.71 mm—.
For comparison purposes, if no telescope had been used in the sender, the
∼7 mm beam out of the collimators with a divergence of θ = 77.75 µrad would
have produced a beam diameter of ∼ 466.5 mm at the receiver at 3 km.
In order to ensure that the output beam was collimated, i.e., that the
second lens was placed at its focal length from the focal plane of the first lens,
a collimating technique using the Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope was carried
out. It consisted in firstly placing a CCD camera at the focal length of the
Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope. This was achieved by imaging the moon at the
focal plane. The exact focus of the telescope was thus found. Then the beam
from Alice was directed to Bob’s telescope at a distance of 30 m. Parallel rays
cross at the focal point when passing through a lens or any other converging
optics and therefore, if the beam from Alice was well collimated, the size of
the focus at Bob’s telescope would be minimum. Therefore, this spot was
minimised on the CCD camera by changing the position of Alice’s second lens,
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L2, in relation to the first lens, L1. A schematic of this collimation technique
is illustrated in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6 – Collimation method of Alice’s output beam using the
receiver telescope and a CCD camera. The position of the lens L2 is
adjusted until the smallest spot on the CCD camera is achieved.
However, perfect collimation of the beam at short distances was not necessary
provided that the diameter at the receiver telescope was smaller than 90 mm
(to ensure the secondary mirror of the Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope did not
block the incoming beam).
Although the two lenses of the transmitter telescope were achromatic, there
was still some aberration due to the spectral separation between λ∼ 850 nm
and λ∼1550 nm. Therefore, as the collimation process was performed for the
λ∼850 nm signal, the λ∼1550 nm beam diverged due to chromatic aberration
since only one optical path existed for both wavelengths. This fact resulted in
extra loss for the synchronisation signal, as it reached the receiver larger than
expected. As already discussed in section 3.5, such loss did not represent a
major problem, given that the power at the receiver exceeded the sensitivity
of the timestamp card.
4.2.2 Receiver telescope
On the receiver’s end the beam from Alice is collected by a Schmidt-Cassegrain
telescope. It is a Meade LX200ACF model with a diameter of 25.4 cm, an
equivalent focal distance of 2.5 m and fine-pointing capability. It also includes
a GPS to facilitate a quick and precise alignment of the telescope. A Schmidt-
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Cassegrain telescope is composed of a primary and a secondary mirror. The
former is a spherical mirror and its spherical aberration is rectified by a thin
lens with 2-sided aspheric correction. The latter is a convex mirror. A diagram
of the Meade 8” LX200GPS model is depicted in Figure 4.7, similar to the 10”
model used in the proposed QKD system.
Figure 4.7 – Diagram of Meade Schmidt-Cassegrain 8 inch LX200GPS
(after [Meade, 2003]). Not to scale.
In the Meade Schmidt-Cassegrain optical system shown [Meade, 2003], light
enters from the right, passes through the correcting plate, proceeds to the
primary mirror, and then to the secondary mirror. The convex secondary
mirror multiplies the effective focal length of the primary mirror and results
in a focus at the focal plane, with light passing through a central perforation
in the primary mirror.
Bob’s optics has been designed to be directly coupled to the output of the
telescope by using lightweight and compact mounts, as shown in Figure 4.8.
In the following subsection it will be discussed how the λ ∼ 850 nm beam
propagates from Alice’s optics to Bob’s telescope, and how it is efficiently
coupled into the receiver’s optical fibres.
4.2.3 Optical path: from the laser sources to the
detectors
A schematic of the free-space optics of the whole QKD system is shown in
Figure 4.9. The aim of the diagram is to show the optical path of the Gaussian
beam from the transmitter’s side through the free-space link to the receiver. A
4.2. Free-space optics used in the QKD system 107
5.6 µm single-mode optical fibre is used in Alice to spatially filter and couple
the laser output into a collimator to provide a collimated free-space beam (only
one fibre and one collimator are represented in the schematic for simplicity
purposes).
Figure 4.8 – The Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope with Bob’s optics
attached to it.
The beam is then expanded with L1 and L2, which are two doublet lenses
that constitute the transmitter telescope described in section 4.2.1.
Figure 4.9 – Setup of the free-space optics. L1, L2 and L4 are three
achromatic doublet lenses; L3 is the Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope; f0,
f1, f2, f3 and f4 are focal lengths; df0, df1, df3, df4, d0, d2 and dZ are
beam diameters; Z is the length of the link; and θ is the beam divergence
angle.
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On the receiver’s side, L3 is a lens that represents Bob’s telescope with the
same equivalent focal distance, and L4 is a 30 mm focal length doublet lens
used to improve the coupling of the beam into the optical fibre that conveys
the photons to the photodetectors.
When a Gaussian beam passes through an optical system, its waist is
modified. Diffraction instead of paraxial equations determines the size and
location of the new waist. In [Siegman, 1971] matrix transformations are used
to study Gaussian beam propagation through lenses and mirrors. A quite
useful approach to this problem has been developed in [Self, 1983], where a
method to model the transformations suffered by a laser beam through simple
optics is presented. It consists in calculating the Rayleigh range and the beam
waist location following each individual optical element. For comparison with
the geometrical optics case in calculating the focusing effect of a thin lens,
the waist of the input beam is regarded as the object, and the waist of the
output beam as the image. The situation for a positive lens with real object
and image beam waists is shown in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10 – Geometry of the imaging of a Gaussian beam by a lens,
shown for the case of a positive lens and real object and image waists.
The new beam parameters are then calculated using a formula analogous
to the well known standard lens formula, which includes the Rayleigh range of
the incident beam [Smith, 2000]:
1
s+ z2R/(s− f)
+
1
s′
=
1
f
, (4.4)
where s and s′ are the distances from the waist of the input and output beams
to the lens, respectively, f is the focal length of the lens, and zR is the Rayleigh
range of the original beam. The waist and focus are not at the same loca-
tions, and if the beam is weakly convergent they can be quite separated. The
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calculation of the size and location of the new waist can be made, respectively,
by means of the following equations:
w21 =
f 2w20
z2 +
(
piw20
λ
)2 , (4.5)
z′ =
−zf 2
z2 +
(
piw20
λ
)2 , (4.6)
w0 being the radius (to the 1/e2 points) of the original waist, w1 the radius of
the new waist, z the distance from the first lens focal point to the plane of w0,
and z′ the distance from the second lens focal point to the plane of w1. In the
special case where s = f , the equation providing the new waist size reduces
to:
w1 =
λf
piw0
. (4.7)
Using the above equations, the beam waists and their locations along the
optical path depicted in Figure 4.9 have been calculated. The collimated beam
diameter at the collimator output in Alice, d0, can be calculated using Eq. 4.7
since the output of the fibre is located at the focal length of the collimator:
d0 =
4 f0 λ
pi df0
= 6.96 mm .
Note that d0 = 2w0. As the distance between the collimator and L1 is ∼ 12 cm,
the beam diameter will be maintained along this path. Thus, again Eq. 4.7
can be applied to calculate the waist size of the beam after L1:
df1 =
4 f1 λ
pi d0
= 13.82 µm .
As already mentioned, L2 placed at its focal length from the waist of the
incoming beam (in this case it coincides with the focal plane of L1), will expand
and collimate the beam into the following diameter:
d2 =
4 f2 λ
pi df1
= 39.15 mm .
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The spot size at the receiver’s end will be increased due to diffraction in the
transmitter’s aperture (L2). The QKD system under discussion was charac-
terised for a 300 m link. Using Eq. 4.3, the diffraction limited spot after 300 m
has a diameter of dZ = 40.02 mm. The new beam waist df3 after the Schmidt-
Cassegrain telescope and its distance z′ to the focal plane of the telescope (see
Figure 4.10) can be calculated for a link of Z = 300 m using a variation of
Eq. 4.5 and 4.6 respectively:
df3 = d2
f3√
(Z − f3)2 + z2R
= 67.63 µm ,
z′ =
(Z − f3) f 23
(Z − f3)2 +
(
pi d22
4 λ
)2 = 0.89 mm .
The beam then passes through Bob module (described in detail in chapter 5)
and is coupled into two optical fibres (one for each polarisation state), which
are then connected to the single-photon detectors. The optical fibres used in
the setup have a core diameter of 62.5 µm, which is a good compromise between
easy coupling and spatial filtering of the background radiation. As the beam
waist after the receiver telescope df3 is larger than the core of the fibre, an
additional lens L4 is employed to improve the coupling of the beam into the
fibre (see Figure 4.9). The new size of the beam waist df4 and its location
depend on the distance between L4 and the location of the waist df3 (which is
almost coincident with the focus of the Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope). Such
distance has to provide two conditions: a beam waist df4 smaller than the core
of the fibre, and a beam divergence well-suited to the fibre’s numerical aper-
ture. The 62.5 µm optical fibre has a numerical aperture NA = 0.275± 0.15.
Therefore, considering the most restrictive value, the maximum beam diver-
gence allowed is θ = arcsin(0.275 − 0.15) = 0.125 rad. In order to establish
the best location for L4, the diameter of the beam waist after L4 (df4) and
the beam divergence, were calculated as a function of the distance between L4
and the waist df3 of the input beam. From Figure 4.11 it can be seen, that the
maximum beam divergence allowed for the beam after L4 (0.125 rad as just
above calculated) corresponds to a distance of ∼50 cm between L4 and df3.
However, shorter distances have associated lower beam divergences and larger
focus depths, making easier to place the fibre at the beam waist, and as a
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result allowing a better coupling of the beam into the fibre. Shorter distances
were achieved either by moving the focal plane of the Schmidt-Cassegrain tele-
scope with the focus knob, or by displacing L4. The calculated waist diameters
df4 show that the beam waist requirement being smaller than the core of the
optical fibre was widely satisfied.
Figure 4.11 – Waist diameter of the beam after lens L4 (left) and its
divergence (right) against the distance between L4 and df3.
4.2.4 Alignment of the transmitter and receiver telescopes
The technique implemented to align the telescopes of Alice and Bob consisted
in propagating a visible laser beam at a wavelength of λ∼650 nm through the
same path as the λ∼850 nm and λ∼1550 nm beams or parallel to it.
For short links the λ∼ 650 nm laser was launched through the synchroni-
sation channel as the red beam did not diverge much and could be perfectly
observed at the receiver. For long links (hundreds of meters), launching the red
laser through any of the data or synchronisation channels was not viable since
the beam reached the receiver’s end very divergent due to chromatic aberra-
tion. Therefore, for experiments at long distances, a parallel beam to the data
and synchronisation beams was used to align both stations. This was done by
launching the red laser output into an optical collimator via a pigtailed optical
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fibre. The collimator was held by means of a kinematic mount and placed
parallel to the λ∼850 nm and λ∼1550 nm beams at a certain distance from
L2, as Figure 4.12 shows. By fine tweaking the kinematic mount, the alignment
beam was made parallel with the data and synchronisation beams. For this
purpose a planar mirror was utilised, as represented in Figure 4.12. First, the
mirror was oriented to make the reflected beam of the synchronisation channel
reach the focus of L1 (step 1 in the figure). This ensured the surface of the
mirror was perpendicular to the beam wavefront. Then the kinematic mount
was adjusted for the reflected λ∼ 650 nm beam to hit the same point in the
collimator where it emerged (step 2).
Figure 4.12 – Schematic of the method used to establish parallelism
between the alignment beam (λ ∼ 650 nm) and the beams carrying
information at λ∼850 nm and λ∼1550 nm.
At 300 m the parallel red beam could perfectly be distinguished on a white
screen placed at the aperture of the receiver telescope with a diameter of
∼3 cm. As the position of the λ ∼ 850 nm spot relative to the position of
the alignment beam was known, Alice and Bob’s telescopes could be coarsely
aligned with this method. The fine alignment was later performed by maxi-
mising the detected optical power after Bob module, as will be further discussed
in section 6.1.
4.3 Conclusions
The quantum states encoding the binary data of the key are transmitted
through free space from sender to receiver. The atmosphere constitutes an ideal
transmission medium as it is non-birefringent and therefore no
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compensation is required to preserve the polarisation states of the photons.
Moreover, the existence of a low absorption window in the proximity to
λ∼850 nm, where efficient single-photon detectors are available, makes this
medium attractive for a QKD system.
However, there are some issues concerning a free-space channel that need
to be addressed. One is the beam divergence, which has been taken into
account by correctly designing the aperture of Alice’s telescope. Regarding
atmospheric attenuation, under urban aerosol conditions the attenuation at
λ∼ 850 nm is ∼ 2 dB/km. Turbulence in the atmosphere, especially at low
altitudes and in urban areas, can lead to fluctuations of the beam position at
the receiver. Although this effect in most cases is not a fundamental limitation,
it might cause additional detection losses. Another aspect of free-space QKD
systems that needs special attention is the background from the sunlight or
other sources of ambient light, which may be collected by the receiver causing
an increased error rate. Several techniques such as spectral, spatial and timing
filtering can be applied to maintain a low error level.
Two telescopes have been installed, one at each end of the QKD system,
in order to enable Bob to collect as many photons from Alice as possible. In
addition to the Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope, two imaging lenses with 30 mm
focal length have been mounted in the receiver module to enhance the beam
coupling into the fibres. Finally, to facilitate the pointing between both sta-
tions, an additional visible laser at λ ∼ 650 nm is sent in parallel with the
λ∼850 nm and λ∼1550 nm beams.

Chapter 5
Design and characterisation of the
receiver
In this chapter the experimental setup of the QKD receiver is dis-
cussed. Firstly, a description of the optics is given, followed by
the general features of single-photon avalanche diodes and a com-
parison to other detectors. Next, a description of the timestamp
card used to record the arrival times of the photons coming from
Alice is given. Moreover, the characterisation of the polarisation
extinction ratio of the non-orthogonal quantum states at Bob is
discussed as well as the measures taken to improve it. Then, the
components involved in the detection of the synchronisation signal
are described. Finally, the filtering and isolation methods to re-
duce the background radiation that couples into the receiver are
presented.
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5.1 Setup of the receiver
The receiver must have the capability of detecting single photons, analyse their
polarisation and record their time of arrival. Figure 5.1 shows a schematic of
the main parts of the receiver module. The beam of photons sent from Alice
is collected by a Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope (described in section 4.2.2),
which focuses it into a smaller beam waist. Bob’s module contains the optics
responsible for three key processes: the discrimination of the synchronisation
signal at λ ∼ 1550 nm and the beam at λ ∼ 850 nm; the spectral filtering to
remove the background radiation from the received signal; and the polarisation
analysis of the incoming quantum states according to the B92 protocol. After
the analysis of their polarisation, the photons are coupled into multimode op-
tical fibres, and launched into two single-photon detectors (SPD). The output
of each detector is connected to an input data channel (‘ch0’ and ‘ch1’) of the
Time Interval Analyser (TIA), which time-tags the arrival of every detected
photon. The synchronisation signal at λ ∼ 1550 nm is coupled into an optical
fibre, and is detected and amplified by an InGaAs photodetector (PD) and
a fast trans-impedance amplifier, respectively. The amplified signal is then
connected to the external-clock input of the TIA.
The optics, the single-photon detectors and the timestamp card or TIA are
further described in the following sections, as well as the ancillary processes
such as synchronisation and filtering.
Figure 5.1 – Diagram of the receiver. SPD are single-photon detectors,
and PD is an InGaAs photodetector to detect the synchronisation signal.
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5.2 Configuration of the optics module
As already mentioned, the B92 protocol is a two-state protocol, where the bits
of the sequence sent by Alice are encoded into two non-orthogonal polarisation
states. A suitable receiver will therefore require the ability to detect this type
of signal encoding.
A photograph and a diagram of Bob’s optics are shown in Figure 5.2.
The receiver has been designed to be directly coupled to the output of the
Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope via a standard 25 mm cage plate. The whole
optomechanical module has been constructed as a cage assembly system, as
shown in the picture of Figure 5.2.
The first component the photons encounter at the input of the receiver’s
optics is a half-wave plate, which is used to align the incident electric field of the
vertical state with the optic axis of the dichroic mirror, so that the degradation
of this polarisation state is minimised. The diagonal state is later recovered in
‘channel 0’ (ch0 in the figure) by means of two quarter-wave plates. The beam
at λ ∼ 850 nm and the synchronisation beam at λ ∼ 1550 nm are spectrally
discriminated by a dichroic mirror. The background radiation is filtered by
using a narrow band-pass spectral filter centred at λ ∼ 850 nm. The spectral
filtering will be further discussed in section 5.8.
Figure 5.2 – Picture (left) and diagram (right) of the receiver’s optics.
SPD are single-photon detectors and PD is an InGaAs photodetector;
L1, L2 and L3 are three doublet lenses used to couple the signals into
the optical fibres.
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The discrimination of the two non-orthogonal polarisation states encrypting
the binary states ‘1’ and ‘0’ is achieved by using a non-polarising beamsplitter
and two high-extinction polarisers. Provided the beamsplitter is of good qua-
lity and properly coated, the incoming photons are equally and randomly split
between the two detector arms. In ‘channel 0’ (ch0 in Figure 5.2) the polariser
is oriented orthogonally to the angle of polarisation of the state ‘1’, so that
only the zeros are detected in this channel. On the other hand, in ‘channel 1’
(ch1 in Figure 5.2) the polariser is oriented against the state ‘0’, and thus
only the ones can be detected in this arm. Such configuration provides with a
deterministic measurement of the quantum states, albeit at the cost of losing
75% of the received photons: 50% of the incoming photons are lost since they
will enter the incorrect channel and will be blocked by the polariser; and half of
the remaining 50% that have entered the correct analyser arm will be blocked
by the polarisers, since these form an angle of 45 degrees with the polarisation
state to be detected in each channel. The advantage of this protocol com-
pared to the BB84 is that only two quantum states are required and no basis
reconciliation is needed.
With the help of two imaging lenses with a focal length of 30 mm, the
photons are coupled into two 62.5 µm-diameter multimode fibres (one for each
polarisation), which are then connected to two Silicon single-photon avalanche
diodes (SPADs), which emit an electrical pulse whenever a photon is detected.
These ‘clicks’ created in the electronics of each SPAD are then recorded by a
timestamp card, that is, the arrival times of the detected photons are logged.
Both, the SPAD and the timestamp card, are described in the following.
5.3 Single-photon detection
One of the technological challenges of QKD is the detection of single photons.
There exists a variety of devices capable of registering the energy of a sin-
gle photon, which include photomultiplier tubes, superconducting transition
edge sensors, superconducting nanowire sensors, avalanche photodiodes, para-
metric upconversion detectors, and single-photon detectors based on quantum
dots and semiconductor defects. The most significant features that define the
performance of single-photon detectors are listed in the following:
5.3. Single-photon detection 119
• Detection efficiency, which is mainly determined by the constituent
materials of the detector.
• Dark-count rate or rate at which the detector registers events generated
in the absence of an arriving photon.
• Timing resolution, given by the statistical distribution of delays from the
time of detection of a photon and the generation of an electrical signal.
Usually this is measured as the FWHM of the timing jitter of the signal.
• Recovery time or dead time, which is the interval of time that follows the
absorption of a photon until the detector is able again to register a second
photon. This time depends on the finite bandwidth of the device (due to
various characteristics such as carrier transit times, parasitic capacitance
effects, etc.), and the afterpulsing effect [Hiskett et al., 2001], [Cova et al.,
1991].
An ideal detector from the QKD design point of view should have a low
dark-count rate not to increase the quantum bit error rate, a short dead time
allowing high data rates, a small timing jitter to ensure good timing resolution,
and high detection efficiency, enabling the detection of as many photons as
possible. Also, the ability to resolve photon number is a plus, because in the
great majority of conventional single-photon detectors a multiphoton pulse
triggers the same output signal as a single photon, what makes the QKD
systems using these detectors vulnerable to a bright illumination attack (see
subsection 2.4.3).
The noise equivalent power (NEP) is a commonly used figure of merit for
photodetectors, and it is defined as the optical power required to measure a
unity signal-to-noise ratio. It takes into account the efficiency of the detector
and the dark-count rate, and it is given by
NEP =
hν
η
√
2D ,
where D is the dark-count rate, η is the detection efficiency, ν is the photon
frequency and h is the Planck’s constant. NEP is measured in W Hz−1/2,
and it should be as low as possible. However, typical detectors (those not
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resolving the number of photons in a pulse) do not measure optical power.
Moreover, the timing performance of the detector is not taken into account in
this figure of merit, and it does not provide a meaningful relationship between
D and η for QKD experiments. Actually, the contribution of the detectors
to the QBER is given by the ratio of the dark-count rate to the detected
photon rate. Furthermore, the timing jitter ∆t of the detector is usually the
limiting factor of the minimum time interval of the bit width, which is related
to the maximum clock frequency and consequently the maximum net bit rate.
Therefore, a dimensionless figure of merit useful for QKD that takes all of
these factors into consideration can be formulated as
H =
η
D∆t
.
For a given wavelength, the higher the value of H, the better the detector
[Hadfield, 2009].
In addition to the mentioned criteria, an ideal detector should be practical.
A detector that needs liquid helium or even nitrogen cooling would certainly
render commercial development difficult. Unfortunately, the fulfilment of all
the above criteria at the same time turns out quite difficult. Due to their
high efficiency, low dark-count rates, sub-nanosecond timing resolution and
commercial availability, most of the QKD systems built so far [Stucki et al.,
2001], [Hiskett et al., 2001], [Ghioni et al., 2003] have used SPADs as single-
photon detectors. Three different semiconductor materials are used: silicon,
germanium, or indium gallium arsenide, depending on the operation wave-
length.
Silicon single-photon avalanche diodes (Si-SPADs) generally exhibit consi-
derably less afterpulsing effects and lower dark-count rates than Ge and InGaAs
single-photon avalanche detectors, which also need to be cooled down to cryo-
genic temperatures. Si-SPADs operate efficiently only at short wavelengths
(typically up to ∼ 1000 nm). This is one of the two main reasons conside-
red for the selection of an operating wavelength of λ∼ 850 nm for the QKD
system, as discussed in section 3.3.2. The other reason is its low absorption
through the atmosphere. There are several single-photon detector technologies
available for use at a wavelength of λ∼ 850 nm, some of which are discussed
in the following section.
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5.3.1 Single-photon detectors operating at a wavelength
of 850 nm
The timing performance of several single-photon detectors was characterised
in a GHz-clocked phase-encoding system described in [Clarke et al., 2011]. A
number of previous demonstrations of QKD at a wavelength of 850 nm have
used thick-junction Si-SPADs as detectors [Gordon et al., 2004], [Bienfang
et al., 2004]. While offering good detection efficiencies of ∼ 40% at this wave-
length, these detectors also exhibit relatively large FWHM timing jitters of
∼400−500 ps. Timing jitters of this duration can lead to intersymbol inter-
ference at clock rates of ∼ 1−2 GHz as the timing jitter exceeds the clock
period, resulting in photon events being recorded in adjacent bit windows.
Thin or shallow-junction Si-SPADs have a narrower depletion layer than thick-
junction Si-SPADs, and the electric field is concentrated on the surface of the
device. Due to this effect, thin-junction Si-SPADs typically have shorter dura-
tion timing jitters of FWHM∼70 ps, but can exhibit long tails in their timing
profile caused by relatively slow diffusion of photo-generated carriers into the
device multiplication region [Dautet et al., 1993]. These diffusion tails (see
Figure 5.3) can be characterised by the FWHM, full-width at 10th-maximum
(FW10%M) and full-width at 100th-maximum (FW1%M) timing jitters, and
are reported numerically in Table 5.1. These thin-junction detectors generally
exhibit reduced detection efficiencies of <10% at λ ∼ 850 nm.
Table 5.1 – Characteristic parameters of specific detectors when used
at a wavelength of 850 nm.
Type Detector DCR Detection FWHM FW10%M FW1%M
(s−1) efficiency (%) (ps) (ps) (ps)
Thick-junction PerkinElmer 198 42 432 837 1473
Si-SPAD
Thin-junction MPD 200 8.4 71 276 898
Si-SPAD IDQ 15 1.6 63 193 1245
Resonant cavity 21 18 74 271 913
NbN SSPD 10 10 62 120 196
superconducting
nanowire
The detection efficiency of a thin-junction Si-SPAD may be enhanced, with-
out compromising the temporal response and dark-count rate, by the use of
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Figure 5.3 – Normalised instrument responses for the indicated
detectors.
a resonant cavity to increase the effective interaction length for absorption
of incident photons [Ghioni et al., 2009]. The instrument response of such a
detector can be seen in Figure 5.3, where it may be observed that it is com-
parable with that of a similarly structured thin-junction Si-SPAD from Micro
Photon Devices (MPD), which was grown on an all-silicon substrate and did
not incorporate a resonant cavity.
In recent years, there has been a great deal of interest in the use of nanowire
superconducting single-photon detectors (SSPD) [Takesue et al., 2007], [Collins
et al., 2007]. These detectors are based around a thin, narrow strip of a super-
conducting material, such as niobium nitride (NbN). This NbN strip is biased
close to the critical current and cooled to a temperature below the supercon-
ducting transition temperature (typically of 3 K). An incident photon creates a
resistive hotspot as the current density in specific parts of the nanowire exceeds
the critical level, which leads to a readily detectable current pulse. The thin-
junction Si-SPADs and the SSPD exhibit comparable FWHM timing jitters.
However, compared to the rest of detectors under analysis, the SSPDs have an
approximately Gaussian temporal response, as can be seen in Figure 5.3. An
SSPD may be operated at a number of different bias currents —as the bias
current is increased, the detection efficiency increases but the dark-count rate
also increases. In the experiments described in [Clarke et al., 2011], the SSPDs
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have a detection efficiency of ∼ 10% at a wavelength of λ∼850 nm, which
corresponded to a dark-count rate of ∼ 10 counts/s. SSPDs have previously
been proved at GHz clock rates in various QKD demonstrations [Takesue et al.,
2007], [Tanaka et al., 2008].
The detectors characterised in [Clarke et al., 2011] were a PerkinElmer
SPCM-AQR-12 thick-junction Si-SPAD with an active-area diameter of 180 µm
[PerkinElmer, 2005], a 20 µm active-area diameter thin-junction MPD PDM
CCTC Si-SPAD [MPD, 2012], a 50 µm active-area diameter IDQ id100-MMF50
thin-junction CMOS Si-SPAD [IDQ, 2012], an experimental 20 µm diameter
active-area resonant cavity thin-junction Si-SPAD [Ghioni et al., 2009] and a
NbN nanowire meander line SSPD with a meander area of 20µm× 20µm and
a fill factor of 50% [Miki et al., 2008]. The SSPD was operated at a tempera-
ture of 3 K in a closed-cycle refrigerator [Radenbaugh, 2004], whereas the rest
were peltier-cooled to an operating temperature in the range of ∼ 230− 260 K.
The experiments proved that, as a consequence of their lower overall QBER
values due to the lower FWHM timing jitters they exhibit, the experimen-
tal resonant cavity Si-SPAD and the SSPD gave higher sifted bit rates at a
clock frequency of 1 GHz despite having lower detection efficiencies than the
PerkinElmer thick-junction Si-SPAD. However, it has been previously shown
that the FWHM timing jitter of a PerkinElmer thick-junction Si-SPAD can
be reduced by modifying the pulse readout electronics within the detector mo-
dule [Rech et al., 2006]. This modified circuit reduced the FWHM timing jitter
of the detector without affecting the dark-count rate or detection efficiency.
The shortest FWHM timing jitter of an unmodified PerkinElmer Si-SPAD
described in the literature was 350 ps, which decreased to 200 ps after cir-
cuit modification [Restelli et al., 2010]. This improved timing jitter indicates
that the modified PerkinElmer thick-junction Si-SPAD can provide secure key
exchange rates comparable with the SSPDs and the resonant cavity Si-SPADs.
5.3.2 Single-photon avalanche diodes
As already mentioned, due to their high efficiency, low noise, simplicity and
commercial availability, Silicon single-photon avalanche diodes have been used
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in the QKD system discussed in this thesis. Their structure and principle of
operation are described in the following.
Single-photon avalanche diodes are based on an avalanche photodiode
(APD) structure. APDs are based on the avalanche breakdown process in
semiconductors. This process takes place when an electron-hole pair generated
by the absorption of a photon gains sufficient kinetic energy (due to the exis-
tence of a high electric field across the device) to ‘release’ further electron-hole
pairs via the process of impact ionisation. The geometry of an APD should on
one hand maximise photon absorption, and on the other hand minimise the
generation of localised uncontrolled avalanches being produced by the strong
electric field (greater electric-field uniformity can be achieved in a thin region).
Both requirements demanded that APDs with separated absorption and mul-
tiplication regions were designed, which are known as Separate-Absorption-
Multiplication APD (SAM APD) devices. Photons impinging on the detector
are absorbed in a large intrinsic region, and then the generated electrons drift
across this region towards the region with a stronger electric field. In the mul-
tiplication layer they gain enough energy for avalanching to occur. An example
of this device is illustrated in Figure 5.4 [Saleh et al., 2007, S18.4].
SPADs are avalanche photodiodes which are reverse-biased beyond their
avalanche breakdown voltage, what is known as Geiger mode operation (see
Figure 5.5), leading to an absorbed single photon being able to trigger an
electron avalanche. Hence, single photons are able to generate a current large
enough to be detected and used by the electronics of the APD.
However, carriers that are generated by photon absorption experience ava-
lanche gain, which triggers a macroscopic breakdown of the diode junction.
To control this effect in a practical device the avalanche must be stopped
and the equilibrium must be restored in order to enable the detection of the
next photon. This is achieved by means of a quenching process [Cova et al.,
1996]. Three possible quenching circuits can be used: passive quenching, active
quenching and gated-mode circuits.
In passive-quenching circuits a large resistor (50 − 500 kΩ) ) is connected
in series with the APD. This causes the voltage across the APD to decrease as
soon as the avalanche starts [Brown et al., 1986]. When the voltage is below the
breakdown voltage the avalanche stops and the diode recharges. The recovery
5.3. Single-photon detection 125
Figure 5.4 – Schematic of a reach-through avalanche photodiode
structure (after [Saleh et al., 2007]). The region i is very lightly doped.
The regions p+ and n+ are heavily doped. The electric field reaches a
maximum in the multiplication layer. Photon absorption occurs in the
wide intrinsic region. Electrons drift through the intrinsic region into a
thin p−n+ junction, where they experience a sufficiently strong electric
field to cause avalanching. The device is called a “reach-through” device
since, with the application of sufficient reverse bias, the depletion region
reaches through the intrinsic material to the p+ area and maximises the
absorption volume.
time of the diode depends on its capacitance and on the value of the resistor.
Maximum count rates between a few hundred kilohertz and a few megahertz
can be obtained.
In active-quenching circuits the bias voltage is actively forced below the
breakdown voltage immediately after the leading edge of the avalanche current
is detected [Brown et al., 1987]. Since this permits shorter dead times (tens of
nanoseconds) than in passive quenching, count rates up to tens of megahertz
can be obtained.
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Figure 5.5 – Typical trace of the photocurrent of an APD. Internal
gain is achieved when the APD is biased above the avalanche breakdown
voltage.
In gated-mode operation the bias voltage is maintained below the break-
down voltage and it is raised above it only for a few nanoseconds when a photon
arrival is expected. This reduces efficiently the dark-count rate due to trapping
effects. If the detector is gated off for a period sufficiently long enabling all
the carriers to release, trapping effects contribution can be reduced noticeably
[Levine et al., 1984]. This mode of operation is commonly used in quantum
key distribution with WCP, where the incoming photons are expected within
a known arrival time. Prior timing information is then needed and it should
be suitably characterised.
5.3.3 PerkinElmer Single Photon Counting Module
The QKD system investigated in this thesis uses PerkinElmer Single Photon
Counting Modules (SPCM) AQR 12 [PerkinElmer, 2005]. The SPCM-AQR-12
is a self-contained device, which uses a thick-junction Si-SPAD with an active
area of 180 µm diameter and a wavelength detection range from 400 to 1060
nm. It also contains an active quenching circuit (AQC) and a temperature
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controller. The datasheet of the PerkinElmer module [PerkinElmer, 2005]
quotes a maximum output count rate of 15 Mcounts/s before saturation, a
detection efficiency of approximately 45% at 830 nm, a maximum dark-count
rate of 500 counts/s, a typical dead time of 50 ns between pulses, and an
afterpulsing probability of 0.5%.
Four PerkinElmer SPCMs, labelled SPAD 1, SPAD 2, SPAD 3 and SPAD 4,
were characterised in terms of detection efficiency and dark-count rate (see
Table 5.2). For that purpose a VCSEL emitting at a wavelength of 847.7 nm
was modulated at a frequency of 25 MHz, and its optical output was attenuated
up to a 0.1 mean photon number per pulse so that a rate of 2.5 Mcounts/s
reached the detectors. The counts at the output of the SPADs were measured
with a photon counter (SR400).
The ratio of the dark-count rate D to the detection efficiency η was cal-
culated. This figure of merit pointed to SPAD 1 and SPAD 2 as the better
detectors. However, to take into account the timing jitter of the detectors,
an additional experiment was performed to measure the QBER of the trans-
mission of a bit sequence. It turned out that, under the same conditions, the
detectors that provided the lower QBERs were SPAD 1 and SPAD 3, hence
they were the detectors selected for the experiments discussed in chapter 6.
Table 5.2 – Comparison of several relevant features for four PerkinElmer
SPCMs.
Detector Detection efficiency Dark-count rate D/η
η(%) D(counts/s)
SPAD 1 29.2 170 5.82
SPAD 2 26.2 140 5.34
SPAD 3 35.5 250 7.04
SPAD 4 31.6 400 12.66
5.4 Time Interval Analyser
The timestamp card used to record the time of arrival of each detected photon
is a GT658PCI from GuideTech. It consists of an ultra-fast, DC−400 MHz
Time Interval Analyser (TIA) with a timing resolution of 75 ps. TIAs are
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super high-speed time and frequency measurement instruments, the fast mea-
surement rate of which, compared to traditional time interval counters, pro-
vides new capability to analyse dynamic changes in frequency or time intervals
[Guidetech, 2009].
Basically, time interval analysers log the time of occurrence of events at
their data inputs. Events are defined as a signal voltage crossing a specified
threshold in the positive or negative direction. These “time-tags” of the positive
or negative edges are logged into memory along with the total count of edges
received.
The GT658 card has two main input channels, A and B, where the outputs
of the two SPADs of the receiver are connected to. It also has an external-clock
input (EXT CLK) for a user-supplied 10 MHz reference, to be used instead of
the on-board 10 MHz timebase. This external 10 MHz reference was given by
the synchronisation signal at λ∼1550 nm.
The I/O block of the board is composed of four comparators that “square”
the input signals. Each comparator’s output is a logic high whenever the posi-
tive input voltage is greater than the negative input, and a logic low otherwise.
The analog input signals of the TIA are applied to the positive inputs of the
comparators, and a programmable voltage is applied to the negative inputs.
This programmable voltage dictates the voltage point on the signal in which
an event will be captured. Each of the two main channels (A and B), and the
EXT CLK input, have separate threshold settings.
The LabVIEW user interface supplied with the TIA allows enabling each
data channel separately, and setting the respective input impedances (50 Ω or
1 MΩ) and threshold voltages also independently. Some modifications were
applied to the software so that after each measurement (key exchange) was
performed, the software provided the number of events received per second
and the lists of arrival times detected in each data input.
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5.5 Analysis and correction of the polarisation extinction
ratio
To minimise the fraction of photons, the polarisation of which is erroneously
detected (thus increasing the error rate), the polarisation extinction ratio of
the quantum states must be characterised through the optics of the receiver
in order to allow identifying the optical elements contributing to polarisation
degradation and hence to apply the necessary measures to correct the linearity
of the polarisation states.
Therefore, a thorough analysis of the PER through the optical receiver
module was performed. It was observed that the dichroic or pump mirror
used to discriminate the synchronisation signal at λ∼ 1550 nm and the data
signal at λ ∼ 850 nm, was the component that deteriorated the linearity of
the polarisation states the most. To minimise the effect of the dichroic mirror
on the polarisation the ‘vertical state’ was aligned with one of the axes of
the dichroic mirror by using a half-wave plate (see Figure 5.2). The ‘diagonal
state’, at 45◦ from the ‘vertical state’, remained between the two axes of the
dichroic mirror, and hence its polarisation became elliptical.
Figure 5.6 – Polarisation degradation after the dichroic mirror at
λ∼ 850 nm. The PER of the vertical quantum state was analysed and
corrected by using a λ/2 waveplate.
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Figure 5.6 shows the worsening of the PER of both states after passing
through the dichroic mirror (Figure 5.6-a), and how the PER of the ‘vertical
state’ improved when the half-wave plate was used (Figure 5.6-b). The cou-
pling of the signal into a multimode optical fibre with a diameter of 62.5 µm
filtered the reflections from the mirror back to the detector, thus further im-
proving the PER of the ‘vertical state’ (Figure 5.6-c). The ‘diagonal state’ did
not improve with the fibre coupling due to its low PER.
To recover the linearity of the ‘diagonal state’ two quarter-wave plates
were used. The process by which two quarter-wave plates improve the PER
of one polarisation state without altering the other state at 45◦ is illustrated
in Figure 5.7. The first quarter-wave plate is oriented so that the ‘diagonal
state’ becomes as linear as possible. On the other hand, as the ‘vertical state’
is incident on the first quarter-wave plate at ∼ 45◦ to the optical axis of the
plate, its polarisation becomes almost circular after passing through it. The
second quarter-wave plate is then used to recover the linearity of the vertical
state, since incident circularly polarized light is changed to linearly polarised
light.
Figure 5.7 – Effect of two consecutive quarter-wave plates on the
polarisation of two non-orthogonal states. α is the ellipticity degree
of the incoming diagonal polarisation state.
As already explained in section 5.2, each polariser is oriented at 45◦ to
the polarisation state to be detected in its corresponding channel, that is,
orthogonally to the polarisation to be extinguished in that channel. There-
fore ‘channel 0’ blocked the polarisation state of the ‘1’s, represented by the
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diagonal state; and ‘channel 1’ blocked the ‘0’s, or vertical states. Efficiently
blocking these states is crucial to keep the error rate low, and the less linear
they are, the worse the blocking is. Therefore, improving the PER of the
‘blocked states’, especially the ‘diagonal state’ in ‘channel 0’ (as it was the less
linear state) was essential. This was done with the two λ/4 plates in ‘channel
0’, as explained above.
Figure 5.8 shows the PER values of the two polarisation states in the trans-
mission and reflexion channels of the receiver, ch0 and ch1 in the figure. As
discussed above, it can be seen how the use of the half-wave plate improves
the PER of the ‘vertical state’ in both channels, and how the two quarter-wave
plates in channel ‘0’ improve the PER of the ‘diagonal state’ in this channel.
This reduces the polarisation-induced QBER, i.e., the contribution to the error
rate due to polarisation leakage.
5.6 Receiver loss
The overall optical loss of the receiver was characterised through measuring the
contribution of each component in order to estimate the count rate expected
at the receiver for each emission rate at the transmitter. The loss of each of
Bob’s components at a wavelength of 850 nm is summarized in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 – Total loss of the receiver and optical loss of each
optical component.
Component Insertion loss (dB)
Telescope 4.43
λ/2 plate 0.2
Dichroic mirror 0.16
Interference filter 1.6
Beamsplitter plate 0.05
Polariser 1.46
Optical fibre (∅ = 62.5 µm) 0.7
Total loss 8.6
The highest loss of the system (4.43 dB or 64% loss) is due to the anti-
reflection coating of the Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope, which is designed to
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Figure 5.8 – PER of the non-orthogonal polarisation states at the
receiver in three cases: (a) without applying any polarisation-correcting
measure, (b) improving the vertical state in ch1 by using a λ/2 plate,
and (c) improving the diagonal state in ch0 by using two λ/4 plates. P0
and P1 are two high extinction polarisers.
5.6. Receiver loss 133
enhance the transmission of the telescope at the visible range, as shown in
Figure 5.9, thus decreasing other wavelength ranges. Quotes for the trans-
mission at λ ∼ 850 nm were not available, but it can be estimated from the
transmission curves of the Meade telescope that if the tendency of the “Meade
Ultra-High Transmission Coatings” curve is maintained, then the transmission
at a wavelength of 850 nm may agree with the measured telescope loss
(4.43 dB loss ≡∼ 36% transmission).
Figure 5.9 – Transmission curves of the Meade telescope.
The total efficiency of the QKD receiver, ηreceiver, can then be calculated as
ηreceiver = ηopt × ηprotocol × ηspad,
where ηopt is the transmission of the optical module including the telescope,
ηprotocol is the efficiency of the B92 protocol, and ηspad is the detectors efficiency.
The optical loss in Bob module (8.6 dB ≡ 0.14 transmission), the efficiency of
the B92 protocol (0.25), and the detection efficiency of the SPADs (∼ 0.32),
yield a total receiver efficiency of ∼ 0.01. Therefore, knowing the count rate
emitted by Alice it is possible to calculate the expected count rate at Bob.
For example, if the emitter sends a sequence to the receiver at a frequency
of 1 GHz with a mean photon number per pulse µ of 0.1, a photon rate of
100 Mcounts/s would be emitted, and a count rate of ∼1 Mcounts/s would be
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detected in the receiver, without taking into account the transmission loss of
the quantum channel (∼ 2 dB/km).
5.7 Detection of the synchronisation signal at the
receiver
As already mentioned, the signal at λ∼1550 nm carries the 10 MHz reference
(synchronous with the data signal at λ∼ 850 nm), which is connected to the
external-clock input of the time interval analyser. The minimum voltage level
needed at the external-clock input of the TIA was measured to be 140 mV
peak-to-peak with 1 kΩ input impedance. The loss of the λ∼1550 nm signal
from emitter to receiver was then characterised for a 30 m link to verify whether
the power at the receiver would be enough for the TIA to operate. The optical
power from the pigtailed fibre of the λ∼ 1550 nm laser at the emitter at its
maximum modulation current was ∼550 µW, while the received power in Bob
at the entrance of the λ∼1550 nm photodetector was ∼120 µW, which meant
the synchronisation signal experienced a loss from the emitter to receiver of
6.6 dB. A large part of the loss was due to the coating of the receiver telescope.
As the InGaAs photodetector (Thorlabs DET01CFC) used to transform the
optical synchronisation signal into an electrical signal had a photo sensitivity
of 0.95 A/W, the voltage at the external-clock input of the TIA was 114 mV
(with 1 kΩ input impedance), which was insufficient for the operation of the
card.
Consequently, a trans-impedance amplifier was designed and implemented
to increase the voltage level of the synchronisation signal. This amplifier had
a gain of −15 ·103 V/A, a bandwidth of 60 MHz, and was capable of detecting
powers as low as 10 µW. Using this amplifier a ∼1.7 V synchronisation signal
was viewed in the oscilloscope at the receiver (with a load of 1 kΩ), which
corresponded to an optical power of ∼119.3 µW. This level of the synchroni-
sation signal was more than sufficient for the correct operation of the external-
clock input of the timestamp card.
The synchronisation signal was measured in an oscilloscope at the input
and output of the trans-impedance amplifier (represented in Figures 5.10 and
5.11).
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Figure 5.10 – Screen capture of the synchronisation signal measured at
the output of the InGaAs photodetector. The input impedance of the
oscilloscope was set to 50 Ω.
Figure 5.11 – Screen capture of the synchronisation signal measured at
the output of the trans-impedance amplifier. The input impedance of
the oscilloscope was set to 1 MΩ.
The figures show that the signal amplification was obtained at the expense
of an increment of its rise and fall times. The InGaAs photodetector has a
bandwidth of 1.2 GHz and provides an output signal with low rise and fall
times. However, as mentioned above, the voltage of the signal was not high
enough for the TIA to operate. The current at the output of the photodetector
was ∼114 µA (for an optical power input of ∼ 120 µW) which, measured in
the oscilloscope with a load of 50 Ω, resulted in a voltage amplitude of 6 mV.
After the trans-impedance amplifier the signal reached 1.7 V.
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5.8 Filtering and shielding from background light
One of the most critical parts of the QKD system is the filtering of solar
background radiation, as it is essential for the system operation in daylight
conditions. With the aim of reducing the amount of background light that
may be collected by the receiver, and therefore increasing the signal-to-noise
ratio, a combination of spectral and spatial filtering is used.
The spectral filtering is performed by a 1 nm FWHM interference filter
(IF) centred at a wavelength of ∼848 nm. The filter was placed between
the dichroic mirror and the beamsplitter plate in the receiver module (see
Figure 5.2). The spectral transmission band of the filter was characterised by
using a spectrometer. As shown in Figure 5.12, the interference filter has a
maximum transmission of ηfilter ∼ 0.7 at λ ∼848 nm. The figure also shows
the optical power emitted by VCSEL1 at different wavelengths, and how it is
attenuated after passing through the filter by about 1.7 dB (dashed line). This
filter lowered the contribution of the solar background leaked in the receiver
by more than 30 dB. This was a major factor to achieve daylight operation
with low error rates at a distance of 300 m, as it will be discussed in chapter 6.
Figure 5.12 suggests that a narrower filter could be used for a further
reduction of the background radiation (for instance of 0.2 nm FWHM), since
the central mode of the VCSEL has a spectral width of ∼ 0.1 nm. However,
using a very narrow band filter places a demanding requirement upon the
emitting source to stay within the transmission band of the filter. The drivers
of the VCSELs contain an automatic power control that adjusts the laser bias
current to maintain an average optical power output over temperature and
changing laser properties. Moreover, in section 3.3.5 it was shown that the
spectrum of the VCSELs shifts with the bias current by ∼ 76 pm/mA in the
range of bias currents close to the minimum bias. Therefore, if a < 1 nm wide
interference filter was to be used, a monitored temperature control of the kind
of a Peltier cooler would be required at the emitter to ensure the matching of
the filter and the lasers emission wavelength along the time. This option was
considered but later discarded due to the difficulty of attaching such a cooler
to the VCSELs, since these were soldered onto an electronic board. Facing this
situation single-mode VCSELs should have been used to reduce the spectral
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Figure 5.12 – Transmittance of the interference filter (left-hand
axis) and optical power emitted by VCSEL1 (right-hand axis) against
wavelength. The calculated optical power after passing through the filter
is plotted in dashed style.
information leakage to an eavesdropper. Unfortunately the lack of availability
of high-bandwidth single-mode VCSELs with the desired characteristics made
this option were abandoned.
The spatial filtering of background radiation is accomplished by the optical
fibres that are used to convey the signals at λ∼850 nm into the SPADs. A good
compromise for the diameter of these fibres must be found, as small diameters
improve the filtering of background radiation, albeit at the expense of a higher
signal loss. When no automatic tracking is implemented, if the diameter of the
fibres is too small, the system becomes more vulnerable to effects such as the
beam wander caused by turbulences in the transmission channel. The fibres
used in the system discussed in this thesis have a core diameter of 62.5 µm,
giving the receiver a restricted field of view but allowing a good coupling of
the signal.
In addition to the background radiation that is collected by the receiver
telescope, stray background light at the receiver’s location may couple into the
optics and increase the error rate. To prevent this, Bob’s optics module was
covered with light blackout fabric (see Figure 5.13). The isolation of emitter
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and receiver from stray background radiation reduced the amount of stray light
that was coupled into the receiver by several orders of magnitude, which also
greatly contributed to enabling full bright daylight operation.
Figure 5.13 – Picture of the receiver covered with the blackout fabric.
Other systems, as well as spectral and spatial filtering, use temporal filtering
to render the background tractable [Hughes et al., 2002b], [Peloso et al., 2009].
This technique consists in the emission from Alice of a short bright timing pulse
that is launched towards the receiver preceding each single-photon pulse. At
Bob, the timing pulse is detected by a photodiode and sets a timing window in
which a data photon is expected, that is, the bright signal allows Bob to gate his
single-photon detectors so that only photons that occur in that narrow timing
window are detected. The SPADs used in the QKD system investigated in this
thesis cannot be gated at GHz clock frequencies (their maximum gating fre-
quency is ∼ 20 MHz), and therefore this method of temporal filtering was not
implemented. Software filtering on the other hand, can always be implemented
by rejecting events that fall outside selected time windows superimposed over
each bit width. However, although both of the previous techniques are useful
to improve the signal-to-noise ratio, they limit the overall bit rate of the QKD
system, and therefore they were not implemented. In the system discussed in
this thesis the spectral and the spatial filtering, along with the light-shielding
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of the system, were enough to permit daylight operation with high secret key
exchange rates.
5.9 Conclusions
In this chapter the configuration and performance of the experimental QKD
receiver has been presented. Firstly, a full description of the optics module,
where the polarisation analysis of the received photons according to the B92
protocol takes place, has been given. Then the choice of SPADs as the de-
tectors of the system has been discussed and their general features have been
compared to other single-photon detectors. Their high efficiency, low noise,
practicality and commercial availability, made them the most suitable op-
tion. The characterisation of four Si-SPADs devices in terms of their detection
efficiency, dark-count rate and QBER has also been described, highlighting the
two SPADs with the best performance. The timestamp card or Time Interval
Analyser used to record the time of arrival of the detected photons has also
been described.
Moreover the characterisation of the polarisation extinction ratio of the
non-orthogonal quantum states received by Bob has been presented. A half-
wave plate and two quarter-wave plates were utilised in the receiver to correct
the ellipticity of the polarisation states, caused mainly by the birefringence of
the dichroic mirror.
The overall optical loss of the receiver and the detailed contribution of each
component have been measured. The total efficiency of the receiver has been
characterised, so that predictions on the expected count rate at the receiver
for a determined output bit rate at the transmitter can be done.
The InGaAs photodetector used for the detection of the synchronisation
signal and the trans-impedance amplifier required to enhance the voltage level
given by this photodetector have been also described. The trans-impedance
amplifier increased the amplitude of the synchronisation signal so that the
requirement on the voltage level at the EXT CLK input of the time interval
analyser was sufficiently fulfilled.
Finally, the spectral and spatial filtering and the light-tight isolation of
the receiver by means of blackout fabric have been described as the measures
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taken to reduce the background radiation that may couple into the receiver.
The 1 nm FWHM interference filter, centred at the lasers emission wavelength,
reduced the background by 30 dB over what would be experienced by a bare
detector. Moreover, the spatial filtering carried out by optical fibres with a core
diameter of 62.5 µm, gave the receiver a restricted field of view. This provided
several orders of magnitude reduction in the background radiation that was
collected by the receiver over what would be expected with the acceptance
angle of a detector without the fibre. The above mentioned measures taken
for the filtering of the background radiation were sufficient to permit daylight
operation at high transmission rates.
Chapter 6
Experimental results for two
optical links
The final goal of a QKD system is the generation of a secret key
shared by Alice and Bob. In previous chapters the design of sender
and receiver, and a detailed characterisation of each station were
described. The techniques necessary for the correct operation of
the system, such as background filtering and timing synchronisa-
tion were also discussed. In this chapter the characterisation of the
entire free-space quantum key distribution system is presented. In
addition, the calculation of the QBER and secret key rate are also
described. The experimental results presented in this chapter were
obtained for two optical links at different distance: 30 and 300 m.
Firstly, transmitter and receiver were placed 30 meters apart in
two different laboratories of the same institute that held a line of
sight. Then, the transmitter was taken to a different location at a
distance of 300 meters from the receiver. The configuration of the
QKD system and the techniques carried out to align both stations
are discussed for both optical links. Several experiments were per-
formed for these two links with the aim of establishing the system’s
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optimum clock frequency, the optimum mean photon number per
pulse µ, the influence of background radiation, and the system’s
stability and robustness to misalignment. In the following, the
characterisation of the system’s performance and several important
parameters such as the QBER, sifted and secure bit rate, and back-
ground rate, are presented and discussed for the two mentioned
optical links. The results obtained from the measurements carried
out for the characterisation of the QKD system at 300 m have been
deeply discussed in [García-Martínez et al., 2013].
6.1 Setup and location of the QKD links
Several experiments were performed to characterise the QKD system for the
mentioned two links of different distance in downtown Madrid. Firstly, sender
and receiver were located ∼ 30 m apart, specifically in two laboratories with
line of sight at the fourth floor of the Information Security Institute of the
Spanish National Research Council (CSIC). In Figure 6.1 a picture of the view
from the transmitter’s side and an aerial view of the link are shown.
Figure 6.1 – View from the transmitter’s side to the receiver (left) and
aerial view of the 30 meter link (right).
After the experiments at 30 meters were finished, the transmitter was
moved to a different building at a distance of ∼ 300 m from the receiver
—concretely to the sixth floor of the Institute of Agricultural Sciences also
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belonging to CSIC— with the aim of testing the system at a longer distance.
The receiver stayed in the fourth floor of the Information Security Institute,
but was moved to a different laboratory that held line of sight to the new
location of the transmitter. Figure 6.2 shows the view from the transmitter’s
side to the receiver and an aerial view of the link.
Figure 6.2 – View from the transmitter’s side to the receiver (left) and
aerial view of the 300 meter link (right).
The alignment procedure between transmitter and receiver consisted in
both a coarse and a fine alignment technique. For the coarse alignment Bob’s
location was imaged at the focal plane of Alice telescope and a visible laser at
λ∼ 650 nm was connected to one of the λ∼ 850 nm channels to visualise the
focal point. This focal point was then aligned with the image of the receiver’s
approximate position (the image of the receiver’s window) by using the DC
motors at Alice.
Then another λ∼ 650 nm laser was connected to a fibre-optic collimator
that was mounted in parallel with the data and synchronisation channels in
the transmitter. Once the red spot of this laser was seen at the receiver, it
was taken —by moving Alice’s DC motors— to a pre-established position at
the aperture of the receiver telescope to maximise the signal reception. Then,
a fine alignment was performed by fine tweaking Alice’s and Bob’s motors,
as well as the xyz mounts holding the optical fibres of Bob module, through
maximising the detected optical power of the λ ∼ 850 nm and λ ∼ 1550 nm
beams at the output of their respective optical fibres (see subsection 4.2.4).
For the 30 meter link the laser at λ∼650 nm was launched directly through
the synchronisation channel at λ ∼ 1550 nm in Alice, and hence there was
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no need of using a parallel beam, as the λ ∼ 650 nm beam did not diverge
much at such distance. The alignment techniques were similar to those above
explained for the 300 m link, although with a simpler coarse pointing since
the distance was considerably smaller. The QKD system was perfectly aligned
when the detected signals at λ ∼ 850 nm and λ ∼ 1550 nm agreed with the
previously characterised losses of the channel and receiver at both wavelengths
(see subsections 4.1.3 and 5.6).
6.2 The key exchange protocol
As already mentioned in subsection 2.2.3, the QKD system investigated in this
thesis implements the B92 protocol using two non-orthogonal linear polarisation
states of single photons, vertically and diagonally (at 45◦) polarised, associated
with the bit values ‘0’ and ‘1’ respectively.
The protocol starts with Alice sending a random string of photons polarised
in two linear states, which encrypt the two binary values. Bob performs mea-
surements on the received qubits with either of two polarisers (see section 5.2
and Figure 5.2). The polariser of each channel is oriented to block the un-
wanted polarisation state in that channel. Under these measurement scheme
Bob can discriminate unambiguously the two non-orthogonal states at the ex-
pense of some loss [Clarke et al., 2001]. Hence, as opposed to the BB84, there
is no need for reconciliation of basis sets between Alice and Bob, and therefore
the string of bits measured by Bob is directly the sifted key.
A short ‘known sequence’, i.e., a publicly broadcasted sequence, is sent
by Alice at the beginning of every transmission. This sequence is used by
Bob to identify the beginning of his sifted key. Bob then sends Alice the bit
positions where he detected a photon (without revealing the bit values), and
Alice generates her sifted key from this information.
In the next step of the protocol Alice and Bob compute the QBER, which
will be explained in the following subsection. Error correction and privacy
amplification are the two last steps in a QKD protocol to extract the final secret
key (described in subsection 2.2.4). The calculation of the final secret key rate
from the QBER and the sifted bit rate will be discussed in subsection 6.2.2.
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6.2.1 Calculation of the QBER
As already mentioned, to test for eavesdropping Alice randomly chooses a
fraction of bits of her sifted key as test events, and publicly broadcasts their
position and binary value. Bob then compute the QBER of these test events as
the ratio of wrong events (those for which Alice and Bob’s bit values disagree)
to the total number of test events.
The calculation of the QBER is performed in a MATLAB routine as ex-
plained in the following. This routine makes use of the photon arrival times,
which have been previously logged by the timestamp card in Bob. These time-
tags are recorded separately for the photons detected as ‘1’ and those detected
as ‘0’ by using a program in LabVIEW, which provides the number of events
received per second (Rsifted) and the lists of event times at each data input of
the card (one input for the ‘1’s and other input for the ‘0’s). Then, both lists of
time-tags are used by Bob in his MATLAB routine to build his sifted sequence,
since he knows the bit period and the length of the sequence sent by Alice. The
‘known sequence’ that Alice sends at the beginning of her transmission is then
used by Bob to correct the delay between his and Alice’s sequence by using the
cross correlation function. Then Bob calculates the QBER using Eq. 2.3 for
the test events announced by Alice, and a fine correction of the delay is carried
out by finding the time shift that results in the minimum QBER. Finally, Bob
indicates Alice the bit positions where he detected a photon. Alice maintains
the bits corresponding to these positions sent by Bob and discard the rest to
generate her sifted key. Notice that Bob only reveals his bit values of the test
events so that Alice can also compute the QBER, but the rest of bits of his
sequence (his sifted key) remain undisclosed.
6.2.2 Estimation of the secret key rate
To distil a secret key from Alice and Bob’s sifted sequences error correction
and privacy amplification classical protocols need to be performed. The secret
key rate was inferred from a security proof considering the worst case scenario
where Eve performs two types of attacks on the channel simultaneously: the
unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack [Dus˘ek et al., 2006] and the
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photon number splitting (PNS) attack [Huttner et al., 1995], [Brassard et al.,
2000], discussed in subsection 2.4.3.
All information that Eve shares with Alice by performing these attacks,
IAE, needs to be subtracted from Alice and Bob’s sifted sequences to generate
the final secret key. It is known that the B92 protocol is vulnerable to the USD
with a lossless channel attack, whereby Eve can gain 100% of the key if the loss
of the channel is ≥ 71 % [Tamaki et al., 2003]. If the loss of the transmission
channel is lower, Alice and Bob can distil a secret key, albeit at the cost
of discarding the information gained by Eve through privacy amplification.
In the experiments at 300 m the loss of the link is 13.2%, thus allowing an
eavesdropper to intercept and perform a USD attack to 18.7% of the photons
sent by Alice without being detected. If Eve attacks a higher percentage
than this, she will generate a loss that she will not be able to compensate
for. By performing a USD attack to 18.7% of the photons transmitted by
Alice, Eve obtains 29.3% of them unambiguously [Clarke et al., 2001], which
corresponds to 5.5% of the emitted photons, and resends them to Bob. The
remaining attacked photons, 13.2%, are detected ambiguously, and thus Eve
blocks them not to increase the error rate. Eve remains undetected because she
replaces the channel by a lossless one and sends only the photons she detected
deterministically, thus not increasing the error rate in Bob’s measurements. In
the case of the experiments at 30 m, the loss of the quantum channel is 1.4%,
and the percentage of photons that Eve can attack without being detected is
1.98%. Therefore she obtains unambiguously 0.58% of the photons emitted by
Alice.
In addition, it has been considered that Eve simultaneously performs a
PNS attack to all the multi-photon pulses transmitted by Alice. The security
of QKD systems with weak coherent pulses has been studied in [Gottesman
et al., 2004]. Their investigations prove that, even if Alice has an imperfect
source, a secure final key can still be distilled if one knows an upper bound of
the bits received by Bob that may have leaked all of their signal information
to an eavesdropper without introducing any error. The information shared by
Alice and Eve is then given by
IAEtotal = IAE(USD) + IAE(PNS) , (6.1)
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where IAE(USD) is the information shared by Alice and Eve, assuming Eve
performs the above mentioned USD attack, and is given by [Clarke et al.,
2001]
IAE(USD) = pAE(1− cos θ) , (6.2)
θ being the relative angle between the polarisation quantum states (typically
45◦), and pAE the percentage of photons sent by Alice that Eve can attack
without being detected, which depends on the loss of the quantum channel as
above discussed. IAE(PNS) is the information shared by Alice and Eve assuming
a PNS attack is taking place, and is given by
IAE(PNS) =
pmulti
pexp
=
1− (1 + µ)exp(−µ)
1− exp(−τµ) , (6.3)
pmulti being the probability that a multi-photon pulse is emitted by Alice, pexp
the probability for a non-empty pulse being detected by Bob, µ the average
photon number per pulse, and τ the transmittance of the channel and receiver
combined. Therefore the final secret key rate or net bit rate (Rnet) per second
is given by
Rnet=Rsifted
[
(1−IAEtotal)−f(e)H2(e)−(1−IAEtotal)H2
(
e
1−IAEtotal
)]
, (6.4)
where e is the QBER computed by Alice and Bob, f(e) is the efficiency of
the error correction process (which has been assumed to be 1.2 [Martínez-
Mateo et al., 2010]), and H2 is the binary entropy function. Therefore to
guarantee security, the sifted key rate (Rsifted) is reduced by f(e)H2(e) after
error correction and by IAEtotal + (1 − IAEtotal)H2(e/(1 − IAEtotal)) in privacy
amplification.
6.3 Experimental results
The implemented free-space QKD system was characterised for two links of 30
and 300 meters. The measurements were performed to establish the system’s
optimum clock frequency, the system’s optimum mean photon number per
pulse, the influence of solar radiation, and the system’s stability and robustness
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to misalignment. The different experiments and the results obtained will be
described in detail in the following subsections.
6.3.1 Optimum clock frequency
For the characterisation of the system’s optimum clock frequency, measure-
ments of Rsifted and the QBER at different clock frequencies were performed.
From these measurements Rnet was estimated following Eq. 6.4. Since the
solar background radiation varies depending on the time of the day, weather
conditions etc., i.e., it is not a fixed contribution and cannot be easily sub-
tracted, the measurements were taken at night to eliminate this influence on
the QBER.
Figure 6.3 shows the QBER, Rsifted and Rnet for the 30 m link. Rsifted is
directly proportional to the clock frequency as more pulses containing photons
are emitted per second.
Figure 6.3 – Quantum bit error rate (left-hand axis), sifted bit rate,
Rsifted, and secure key rate, Rnet, (right-hand axis) against clock
frequency for a 30 meter optical link.
However, the QBER increases with clock frequency due to intersymbol
interference, which is caused by the timing jitter of the system, resulting in
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photon events being detected in contiguous bit periods. The maximum contri-
bution to this source of error is caused by the detectors —typically the timing
jitter of the detectors ranges between 600 and 900 ps [Gordon et al., 2005],
whereas the timing jitter of the emitter and the timestamp card combined was
less than 200 ps.
The general behaviour of Rnet is affected by both the QBER and Rsifted.
Obviously the larger the bit rate received by Bob the more secure bits that
will be generated. However this is not true above a certain value of the QBER.
Looking at Figure 6.3, for low values of the QBER (less than 3%) Rnet increases
with the clock frequency, since the effect of a higher Rsifted is dominant. How-
ever, for higher error rates Rnet starts to decrease as more bits need to be
discarded than those gained from Rsifted. From Figure 6.3 it can also be seen
that the optimum clock frequency that provides the highest Rnet is 1.5 GHz,
with a QBER of 2.06% and an Rnet of 0.85 Mbps.
The system’s characterisation against repetition rate was also performed for
a distance of 300 m, and the sifted bit rate and the QBER were again measured
at different clock frequencies. The secret or net bit rate was estimated following
Eq. 6.4 from the measured values of Rsifted and QBER. The experiment was
anew carried out at night to operate in absence of solar background radiation,
so that background rate was negligible and above all, constant. The experiment
yielded very similar results to those achieved in the 30 m experiment, as shown
in Figure 6.4. It must be stressed that the loss of the system had a deviation of
approximately ±0.5 dB, what was thought to be due to factors such as slight
errors in the alignment, the temperature dependence of the narrowband filter’s
transmission in Bob, the degree of beam wander —which also depends on the
temperature and weather conditions—, etc. This would explain the slightly
higher sifted bit rate at 300 m than that at 30 m in some cases, and hence a
certain improvement in the maximum net bit rate at 1.5 GHz (from 0.85 Mbps
at 30 m to 0.93 Mbps at 300 m). However comparable results were observed
in general for both 30 m and 300 m links regarding the QBER, Rsifted, and
Rnet.
For high values of the QBER (>5%) the difference in IAE(USD) between
both links (Eve eavesdrops less photons for shorter distances since the loss of
the channel that she can compensate is lower) has a higher impact on Rnet,
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and the fraction of bits from the sifted key that need to be discarded in the
privacy amplification process is much higher for the 300 m link than for the
30 m link. Hence the higher Rnet values for the 30 m link at clock frequencies
≥ 2.5 GHz.
Figure 6.4 – Comparison between both optical links in terms of
quantum bit error rate (left-hand axis), sifted bit rate, Rsifted, and secure
key rate, Rnet, (right-hand axis) as a function of the clock frequency.
Since no relevant parameters were changed from the 30 m link to the longer
link, except for a higher attenuation in the transmission channel, at 300 m the
optimum clock frequency which provided the highest Rnet was also 1.5 GHz.
All the experiments discussed in the following subsections were clocked at this
frequency (except for the characterisation of the influence of solar radiation at
30 m, which will be later explained).
From Figures 6.3 and 6.4 it can also be inferred that if the computed error
rate is above a certain value, which for our system is ∼ 8%, no secure key
can be extracted from the sifted key after the error correction and privacy
amplification processes (Rnet ≤ 0).
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6.3.2 Optimum mean photon number per pulse
The choice of µ is the subject of considerable work [Lütkenhaus, 2000], and
is determined by the characteristics of the system, the QKD protocol imple-
mented, etc. Therefore, an experiment was performed to find out the value
of µ that provided the highest Rnet. Concretely, measurements were made to
establish the QBER and Rnet for different values of µ at a fixed clock frequency
of 1.5 GHz.
Decreasing µ decreases the probability (given by Poisson distribution) of
finding more than one photon in a nonempty pulse, and therefore, the infor-
mation gained by Eve in the case of a PNS attack taking place (IAE(PNS)).
This means that less photons need to be discarded in the privacy amplifica-
tion process, what can be clearly seen in Figure 6.5 for µ ∼ 0.01 photons per
pulse (the lowest characterised value of µ), where Rsifted and Rnet are almost
identical since the multiphoton fraction is so small that Eve can gain almost
no information from a PNS attack.
Figure 6.5 – Quantum bit error rate (left-hand axis), sifted bit rate
Rsifted and secure key rate Rnet (right-hand axis) against the mean
photon number per pulse µ for a 300 meter optical link.
However, decreasing µ also decreases the number of photons per pulse that
Alice emits, and therefore the detected photon rate at Bob, i.e., Rsifted. Hence
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there is a trade-off between security and sifted bit rate. The optimum compro-
mise is achieved for µ ∼0.1 since it enables the highest value of secret key rate
Rnet. It must be said that higher values of µ, without jeopardising the secu-
rity and therefore enabling higher secure key rates, are possible if a decoy-state
protocol were implemented, as reported in [Lucamarini et al., 2009]. Figure 6.5
shows the QBER, Rsifted and Rnet for the 300 m link. The results for the 30 m
link are not shown since no significant differences between both links were
found.
6.3.3 Influence of background radiation
The influence of the solar background radiation on the performance of the
system was characterised by measuring the QBER, Rsifted and the background
rate at different times of the day. Rnet was calculated following Eq. 6.4 from
the measured values of Rsifted and QBER. Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show the QBER,
Rnet and the background rate for the 30 m and the 300 m links respectively.
Figure 6.6 – Quantum bit error rate (left-hand axis), background rate
and secure key rate Rnet (right-hand axis) measured the 22nd of May
2012 for a 30 meter optical link at a clock frequency of 1 GHz.
The experiment was performed firstly for the 30 m link under bright sunny
conditions on May 22nd 2012, when sunset started at 21:29. The clock fre-
quency was set to 1 GHz, since this experiment was performed prior to the
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experiment that established the optimum clock frequency of the system
(1.5 GHz). The same experiment for the 300 m link was carried out on July
31st 2012 (sunset starting at 21:32), but this time at 1.5 GHz.
Figure 6.7 – Quantum bit error rate (left-hand axis), background rate
and secure key rate Rnet (right-hand axis) measured the 31st of July 2012
for a 300 meter optical link at the optimum clock frequency (1.5 GHz).
There is a different trend in both the background rate and QBER for the
300 m link compared to the 30 m, consisting mainly in a sharper decrease
in both variables with a slight increase just before falling. This was due to
the sun rays hitting directly the emitter from 19:00 to 21:00, which coupled
directly into the emitter causing the background rate and QBER to increase.
The background rate and QBER then decrease significantly coinciding with
the sunset, and the secret key rate Rnet then reaches its maximum, 0.63 Mbps
for the 30 m link and 1.04 Mbps for the 300 m link. Before sunset, a mean
secure key rate of 0.4 Mbps and 0.6 Mbps respectively, in full bright solar
conditions was demonstrated.
6.3.4 Stability of the system
The stability of the link was tested to characterise the maximum time the
system stayed aligned and operating without human intervention. For that
purpose the alignment of the link was optimised before the experiment started
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and not touched after that for a period of 24 hours. The QBER and Rsifted
were then measured every 30 minutes during this period. It should be stressed
that daylight measurements were taken under bright sunny conditions and
hence a high background radiation was present (June 14th and July 24th for
the 30 m and the 300 m links respectively).
Figure 6.8 represents the QBER, Rnet, Rsifted and background rate for the
30 m optical link. It shows that once aligned, the system remained operational
for 24 hours without any adjustment, with a QBER between 2.3% and 8.4%.
The maximum measured secure key rate was 1.13 Mbps, the minimum was 2.3
kbps and the average value throughout the whole day 0.7 Mbps. A period of
approximately 5 hours can be identified, in which the secret key rate is below
its average value. This drop in Rnet was due to a straight incidence of the
sun rays on the receiver telescope from 2 hours after the sunrise until close to
zenith time, which caused a higher background rate and hence higher QBER.
Figure 6.8 – Quantum bit error rate (left-hand axis), sifted bit rate
Rsifted, secure key rate Rnet, and background count rate (right-hand
axis) during a 24-hours experiment for a 30 meter optical link. The
experiment was performed under bright summer conditions from the 13th
to the 14th of June 2012.
A more detailed analysis of the measurements shows that the sifted bit rate
varied with temperature. Figure 6.9 shows how the rate of detected photons
in Bob, i.e., Rsifted, decreased coinciding with a drop in temperature along the
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24-hours experiment carried out on June 14th. This could be explained by the
temperature dependence of the narrowband filter’s transmission in the receiver,
and by the thermal expansion of the system’s components and the buildings,
which could cause a temporal misalignment between both telescopes.
Figure 6.9 – Sifted bit rate (left-hand axis) and temperature data from
Madrid-Barajas meteorological station (right-hand axis) along a 24-hours
experiment run from the 13th to the 14th of June 2012.
The stability of the system was also tested for the 300 m link. The QBER,
Rsifted and background rate were again acquired every 30 minutes for an
uninterrupted period of 24 hours (the 24th of July). These magnitudes and the
calculated Rnet are represented in Figure 6.10. The QBER ranged between a
minimum of 2% in nighttime conditions and a maximum of 7.8% during the
day. The period with a high QBER (between 7% and 8%) for the 300 m link
was longer compared to such period for the shorter link. This was due to the
different orientations of the facades of the receiver locations. The receiver’s
window for the 300 m link was oriented to the south, in contrast to the 30 m
link where the receiver’s window had an east orientation. This meant that for
the shorter link the sun did not directly hit the receiver after midday, whereas
for the 300 m link the receiver was exposed to the sun rays during almost the
whole day.
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The maximum measured secure key rate at 300 m was 1 Mbps, whereas
the minimum was 4.5 kbps, being the average value throughout the whole day
0.5 Mbps. The system’s performance proved very stable, with the capability
of running continuously for 24 hours without human interaction since after
this period Rsifted and Rnet took values of 87% and 80%, respectively, of their
initial values.
The maximum secret key rate Rnet (1 Mbps) is more than one order of
magnitude higher than those of other systems operating at the same range of
distances [Hughes et al., 2002b], [Weier et al., 2006], and the corresponding
Rsifted (1.8 Mbps) more than 4 times the highest value reported to date for
field experiments [Bienfang et al., 2004].
Figure 6.10 – Quantum bit error rate (left-hand axis), sifted bit rate
Rsifted, secure key rate Rnet, and background count rate (right-hand
axis) during a 24-hours experiment for a 300 meter optical link. The
experiment was performed under bright summer conditions from the 23rd
to the 24th of July 2012.
6.3.5 System robustness to misalignment
The robustness of the system to vibrations and other sources of misalignment
was tested by purposely misaligning the emitter from the receiver from an
optimised alignment of the 300 m link with an established transmission at
the optimum frequency (1.5 GHz). The misalignment was calculated from the
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decrease in the sifted bit rate at the receiver as a percentage from its highest
value, which corresponds to the system being perfectly aligned. Figure 6.11
shows that it was only after 90% of misalignment (this means that Bob has
lost 90% of the initial Rsifted when the system was perfectly aligned) that the
QBER reached values higher than 6%. Still secret key rates of 18 kbps with
this degree of misalignment were measured.
The decrease in the sifted bit rate of 13.4% after the 24-hours period dis-
cussed in the previous section was likely caused by relative pointing deviations,
mainly due to building sway and thermal fluctuations. Figure 6.11 shows that
it is only after a misalignment of at least 60% that the QBER increases slightly
(0.3%) and after 70% that this increase in the error is more noticeable. This
tendency shows that the system could potentially be aligned for 4 or 5 days
without external intervention at 300 meters.
Figure 6.11 – Quantum bit error rate (left-hand axis) and secure key
rate Rnet (right-hand axis) against an intentionally-caused misalignment
at the emitter.
6.4 Characterisation of the contributions to the QBER
The calculation of the QBER has been described in section 6.2.1 and, as
mentioned in section 2.4.1, it can also be expressed as the addition of three
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contributions:
QBER = QBERPL +QBERISI +QBERBCK , (6.5)
whereQBERPL is a base error rate resulting from imperfections in the optics of
the system, which causes polarisation leakage, i.e., photons that are detected
in the wrong channel due to the ellipticity of the non-orthogonal polarisa-
tion states —as opposed to perfect linearly polarised states. This contribu-
tion to the QBER is originated mainly by the different effects that degrade
the polarisation of the quantum states, such as the intrinsic birefringence of
some optical components or by the reflection in Alice’s beamsplitter cube and
mirrors, as discussed in section 3.4. QBERISI is the error rate due to inter-
symbol interference, which is caused by the timing jitter of the single-photon
detectors in the most part, as discussed in section 6.3.1. Finally, QBERBCK
is the error rate contribution due to background radiation and dark counts of
the detectors.
QBERPL keeps invariable once the system has been implemented, since
this term depends on the optical components used. QBERISI varies with the
clock frequency, and it arises at clock rates in excess of ∼1 GHz for the timing
jitter of our system. QBERBCK depends on the background conditions of
each key exchange, which in turn depend on the time of the day, the location
and orientation of the optical link, the weather conditions, etc., as discussed
in section 6.3.3.
To estimate QBERPL the polarisation extinction ratio of both quantum
states was measured at the end of both channels in Bob (see section 5.5). The
PER values were then used to calculate the ratio of the percentage of photons
with the ‘unwanted’ polarisation to the percentage of photons with the right
polarisation that are detected in each channel. Also the background count
rate was measured for each key exchange in order to determine QBERBCK ,
which was calculated as the ratio of background events per second to twice the
total number of detected events per second. The factor 2 in the denominator is
due to the fact that only half of the background counts really contribute to the
error, as the other half fall into the right bit windows simply by chance. Finally,
QBERISI was measured at different clock frequencies by directly connecting
the source of single photons, i.e., the attenuated VCSELs, to the SPADs,
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thus eliminating the remaining contributions: QBERPL, since no B92 scheme
was implemented, i.e., photon detection did not depend on the polarisation
of the photons, indeed the photons were not polarised as no optical elements
were placed in the setup; and QBERBCK , since no background photons could
be leaked into the detectors as it was all connected by optical fibre and the
experiment was run in darkness. The obtained values of QBERISI can be seen
on Table 6.1, which clearly shows that the error rate increases with the clock
frequency since more photons are detected in adjacent time windows.
Table 6.1 – Quantum bit error rate due to intersymbol interference at
different clock frequencies.
Frequency (GHz) 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
QBERISI (%) 0.47 1.51 3.46 6.08 8.80
The ‘standard’ QBER computed from a key exchange was compared to
that calculated measuring each contribution separately as discussed above. In
the experiment carried out to establish the optimum clock frequency for the
operation of the system, the error component due to background radiation
was almost negligible (< 0.02%) since the experiment was performed at night,
when the background rate was around 550 counts/s in total ( ∼225 counts/s
per detector). The error due to polarisation leakage was calculated to be
0.23%. Finally, the values of the error caused by intersymbol interference were
those shown in Table 6.1, being the most significant contribution to the error.
The addition of these three components is represented in Figure 6.12 (which
we shall call estimated QBER to distinguish it from the standard computed
QBER), and it can be seen that both values are very similar.
Figure 6.13 shows a comparison between the estimated and computed
QBER values taken in the study of the influence of the solar background
radiation on the system at a distance of 30 m. The error component due to
background, QBERBCK , is the most significant error source until sunset, and
it is also represented in the graph. The error due to polarisation leakage was
0.23%, and the error caused by intersymbol interference was that corresponding
to a clock frequency of 1 GHz (0.47% from Table 6.1). The addition of these
three sources of error yields the expected values for the QBER, which agree
with the actual computed QBER values from the test events disclosed by Alice.
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Figure 6.12 – Comparison of computed QBER with estimated QBER
at different clock frequencies for the 30 meter optical link.
Figure 6.13 – Comparison of computed QBER with estimated QBER
and the QBER component due to background radiation measured the
22nd of May 2012 for a 30 meter optical link operating at a clock
frequency of 1 GHz.
This analysis of the different contributions to the QBER reveals that the
main component of the error rate in daytime is caused by the background
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radiation, while at night the main contribution is due to intersymbol
interference.
6.5 Maximum achievable distance and turbulence
Although the QKD system presented in this thesis has only been experimentally
tested for distances up to 300 m, it has been designed to withstand longer dis-
tances. To simulate the maximum transmission distance the system could
operate at, it is essential to take into account the effect of turbulence.
The effects of atmospheric turbulence that most influence a QKD link are
beam spreading and beam wander . As discussed in section 4.1.3, the former
is caused by turbulent eddies that are small compared to the beam diameter,
and its overall effect is an increase in the ‘natural’ beam divergence of the
beam. Beam wander, on the other hand, is due to turbulent eddies that are
large compared to the beam diameter, and it causes random deflections of the
beam. Both effects can be modelled by a long term beam radius (wLT ) at the
receiver [Andrews et al., 2005]. This radius depends on the turbulent regime,
which is characterised by the refractive index structure constant C2n. Different
regimes of turbulence have been considered and the corresponding beam radii
wLT have been calculated. Then the geometrical loss for each Gaussian beam
of radius wLT at the receiver has also been calculated, and with this loss the
maximum transmission distance of the system has been approximated.
In the absence of turbulence, the maximum transmission distance the
system could operate at, can be estimated by using the sifted bit rate measured
for the characterisation of the system robustness to misalignment discussed in
section 6.3.5. A reduction of 90% in Rsifted, which would leave a secret key rate
of only 18 kbps, corresponds to a loss of 10.71 dB. Considering the attenuation
of the atmospheric channel with the same urban aerosol conditions of previous
experiments (2.04 dB/km), and no turbulence, such loss allows links of up
to 5.2 km. If the turbulence is now taken into account, this distance is re-
duced depending on the strength of the turbulence to the values presented on
Table 6.2. For a regime of weak turbulence (C2n ≈ 10−16) or a regime of inter-
mediate turbulence (C2n ≈ 10−15), our calculations show that the system could
potentially operate up to a distance of 4.4 km, with a secret key rate at night
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of 18 kbps. For a stronger turbulence regime (C2n ≈ 10−14) the distance drops
to 3.4 km. Refractive index structure constants of C2n ≈ 10−13 are considered
a very extreme and unlikely regime, and in that case the link could only work
up to 1 km.
Table 6.2 – Maximum transmission distance the QKD system can
withstand considering several regimes of turbulence, which lead to
different geometrical losses of the beam at the receiver.
Very weak Weak Intermediate Strong Very strong
turbulence turbulence turbulence turbulence turbulence
C2n = 10
−17 C2n = 10
−16 C2n = 10
−15 C2n = 10
−14 C2n = 10
−13
Loss caused by
turbulence 1.21 1.22 1.51 3.67 8.49
(dB)
Maximum
achievable 4.58 4.57 4.43 3.39 1.07
distance (km)
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter the characterisation of the free-space QKD system for two
optical links of different distance (30 and 300 meters) in downtown Madrid
has been described. The alignment techniques, coarse and fine, implemented
to optimise the signal acquisition in Bob have been also presented. For the
coarse alignment a visible laser at a wavelength of 650 nm was sent in parallel
with the beams at λ ∼ 850 nm and λ ∼ 1550 nm, and Alice’s DC motors
were tweaked until the visible laser was spotted in the receiver. Then the fine
pointing was performed by alternatively slightly modifying Alice’s and Bob’s
positions by using their motors, as well as by adjusting the xyz mounts of
each channel in Bob, until the detected signals at λ∼850 nm and λ∼1550 nm
agreed with the expected loss for each wavelength.
Later on the steps of the key exchange protocol have been commented. The
calculation of the QBER in a MATLAB routine as the ratio of wrong detected
events to the total number of events has been explained. Subsequently the
estimation of the final secret key rate from the QBER and the sifted bit rate,
considering that the transmission has been eavesdropped by implementing both
a PNS and a USD attack has been discussed.
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In addition, the experiments performed to characterise the QKD system
have been described for the two mentioned optical links. First, the results
obtained from the measurements carried out to establish the optimum clock
frequency have been presented. The experiments yielded a system’s optimum
operation clock rate of 1.5 GHz. Both optical links exhibited similar behaviour
in terms of the QBER, sifted bit rate and secret key rate. The maximum
frequency the system could operate at was 2.75 GHz with a QBER of almost
8%, which was in turn established as the maximum value of QBER supported
by the system presented in this thesis, since for higher error rates no secure
key can be extracted from the sifted key after the error correction and privacy
amplification processes.
The optimum mean photon number for the system was also characterised.
The best Rnet was obtained for µ ∼ 0.1 photons per pulse, achieving an
optimum compromise between security and sifted bit rate.
The operation of the system in daytime under bright sunny conditions
has been also demonstrated. Spatial and spectral filtering of the background
radiation, together with light-tight shielding of emitter and receiver, enabled
full-bright daylight operation with average secret key rates reaching 0.7 Mbps
for a link of 30 m and 0.5 Mbps at 300 m. At nighttime conditions secure
key rates of up to 1 Mbps were achieved. This secret key rate is one order of
magnitude higher than those previously reported.
The stability of the system has been tested during a 24-hours experiment
without human interaction. The system proved very stable since after this
period the sifted and secret key rates obtained were 87% and 80% respectively,
of the initial values for the 300 m link. In addition, it has been also confirmed
that the orientation and location of the optical link has an influence on the
amount of background radiation that is coupled into the system. Straight
incidence of solar rays increases significantly the background rate and hence
the QBER.
The system’s robustness to misalignment has been also characterised, and
it has been shown that it was only after a reduction of 90% in the sifted bit
rate at Bob that the QBER reached values higher than 6%. Additionally, the
maximum distance the system could withstand has been estimated considering
different turbulence regimes. The simulations revealed that for a regime of
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intermediate turbulence (C2n ≈ 10−15) the system could potentially operate up
to a distance of 4.4 km.
Finally, the different contributions to the QBER have been analysed. It
has been showed that the QBER can be separated into three components:
QBERPL due to the ellipticity of the non-orthogonal polarisation states, which
causes polarisation leakage; QBERISI caused by the timing jitter of the system,
which generates intersymbol interference; and QBERBCK due to the back-
ground radiation and dark counts of the detectors. These three components of
the QBER have been characterised and their addition has been compared to
the computed QBER from the test events disclosed by Alice for two different
key exchanges. The comparison shows an agreement between the QBER cal-
culated adding the mentioned contributions and the QBER computed from
the test events.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
This chapter is intended to summarise the results and conclusions
obtained in the course of the implementation and characterisation
of the QKD system presented in this thesis. The contributions of
this work to the field of quantum cryptography are also remarked.
Finally, several indications about possible upgrades and modifica-
tions to the presented QKD system that could increase its secret
key rate and transmission distance are proposed.
7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis a detailed description of a free-space quantum key distribution
system that implements the B92 protocol at high key transmission rates in an
urban scenario has been provided. The most relevant conclusions drawn from
the study of the subject and the design and characterisation of the system are
summarised in the following.
1. Theoretically, QKD in tandem with the one-time pad offers the highest
level of security out of any encryption technique developed so far and
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a secure prospect in a future with quantum computers taking part of
every day’s life. However, it still faces some challenges to become truly
competitive, such as better robustness against side channel attacks and
the achievement of higher distances and higher secret key rates.
2. When dealing with experimental implementations of QKD systems, eaves-
droppers can obtain information from the ‘fingerprints’ left by the phy-
sical devices used in them. A QKD system must carefully be designed to
take into account all possible experimental loopholes and to bound the
leakage of information they may cause in order to establish the appro-
priate security proofs. However, the debate about the right strategies
to follow in order to achieve secure QKD in the presence of loopholes
is intense and very open [Yuan et al., 2011b]. No satisfactory solution
has yet been devised, which emphasises that a more general security
proof incorporating imperfect devices is needed [Lydersen, 2011]. An
approach to eliminate all loopholes has been proposed by Acín et al.
through device independent quantum cryptography [Acín et al., 2007], al-
though the real implementation of these new protocols is technologically
challenging. After almost three decades from its birth quantum cryp-
tography has reached its maturity and faces probably its most difficult
challenge: unconditional security in an ‘imperfect’ world.
3. To achieve high transmission rates the transmitter implemented in the
discussed QKD system uses two high-bandwidth VCSELs driven by a
fast GHz pulse pattern generator. The single-photon emission regime
is achieved by attenuating the laser diodes to a mean photon number
of approximately 0.1 photons per pulse. The VCSELs were optimised
in terms of their driving conditions (bias and modulation currents) to
minimise their contribution to the error rate caused by intersymbol inter-
ference. The optimal bias current was 2 mA and the optimal modulation
current ∼6 mA, with a contribution to the QBER of less than 0.5% at a
clock frequency of 1 GHz. The study of the spectra of the lasers revealed
that they hardly shifted with modulation current, clock frequency and
time. The spectral shift with bias current was of ∼0.15 nm/mA for high
values of the bias current, and of around half for low bias currents.
7.1. Conclusions 167
4. The receiver of the QKD system analyses the polarisation of the arriving
photons according to the B92 protocol. Two SPADs have been chosen as
the detectors of the system due to their high efficiency, low noise, practi-
cality and commercial availability. The characterisation of four Si-SPADs
in terms of their detection efficiency, dark-count rate and contribution to
the QBER was carried out. The two SPADs with the best performance
showed detection efficiencies of 29% and 35%, and dark-count rates of 170
and 250 counts/s, respectively. The timestamp card used to record the
times of arrival of the detected photons was a GT658PCI Time Interval
Analyser from GuideTech. The LabVIEW user interface supplied with
the card was modified to monitor the count rate at each input channel
and to provide the lists of arrival times for each polarisation state.
5. Two telescopes were used at each end of the QKD system to enhance
the collection of photons emitted by Alice. In Bob, in addition to
the Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope, two imaging lenses with 30 mm focal
length have been mounted to improve the beam coupling into the fibres.
6. For the alignment between both stations, Alice was mounted on a high-
precision gimbal system with two rotation motors, which provided the
azimuth and elevation movements needed for the correct aiming of Alice
towards Bob. The receiver optical module was directly attached to the
Schmidt-Cassegrain telescope, and its motors allowed the alignment with
the transmitter station. Also a visible laser at a wavelength of 650 nm
was sent in parallel with the data and synchronisation beams to facilitate
the coarse alignment.
7. The non-orthogonal polarisation quantum states encoding the binary
data are transmitted through free space from Alice to Bob. The atmos-
phere is an excellent transmission channel due to its non-birefringence,
which preserves the polarisation states of the photons. Moreover, in
the proximity to λ ∼ 850 nm there is a low absorption window, where
efficient single-photon detectors are available. However, factors such as
atmospheric attenuation, weather conditions and turbulence limit the
maximum achievable transmission distance. The experiments presented
in this thesis were carried out for two optical links in downtown Madrid.
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The attenuation of the links calculated with MODTRAN, considering ur-
ban extinction with a visibility of 5 km, was ∼2 dB/km for the beam at
λ∼850 nm. In addition, calculations were done to estimate the geome-
trical loss of the beam at the receiver under several turbulence regimes.
The simulations revealed that for a regime of intermediate turbulence
(C2n ≈ 10−15) the system could potentially operate up to a distance of
4.4 km.
8. Free-space QKD systems are also affected by the solar background radia-
tion and other sources of ambient light, which may couple into the system
and increase the error rate. Spectral and spatial filtering have been
implemented, as well as the isolation of Alice and Bob by means of light
blackout fabric and a long antireflective tube around the main lens of
Alice telescope. The 1 nm FWHM interference filter reduced the back-
ground by 30 dB, and the spatial filtering carried out by optical fibres
with a core diameter of 62.5 µm gave the receiver a restricted field of
view. These filtering and isolation measures allowed daylight operation
at high transmission rates.
9. The polarisation extinction ratio of both non-orthogonal quantum states
at λ ∼ 850 nm was characterised throughout the whole QKD system.
In general, the absorption inherent to the materials of certain optical
components degraded the linearity of the polarisation states, being dra-
matically more noticeable for the diagonal state. A quarter-wave plate
in Alice and two quarter-wave plates in conjunction with a half-wave
plate in Bob were used to counteract such effect, obtaining polarisa-
tion extinction ratios that contributed to the total QBER with less than
0.25% due to polarisation leakage.
10. An optical synchronisation between Alice and Bob at a different wave-
length from that used for the data was implemented. It consisted in Alice
sending a periodic bright pulse at a wavelength of 1550 nm and at a repe-
tition rate of 10 MHz. The electrical synchronisation signal was obtained
from the trigger output of the generator in the transmitter, which modu-
lated a λ∼1550 nm VCSEL. In Bob an InGaAs photodetector was used
for the detection of the synchronisation signal, and a trans-impedance
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amplifier enhanced its voltage level to satisfy the voltage requirement at
the external-clock input of the timestamp card.
11. The transmission efficiency of the channel (0.87 at 300 m), the overall
efficiency of the receiver optics (0.14), the detection efficiency of the
SPADs (0.32), and the efficiency of the B92 protocol (0.25), yielded a
total efficiency of 0.01 for an optical link of 300 m.
12. The free-space QKD system was characterised for two optical links of
different distance, 30 m and 300 m, in an urban area. The secret key
rate was calculated from the measurements of the QBER and sifted bit
rate assuming a worst case scenario with two simultaneous eavesdropping
attacks taking place: the USD and the PNS attack. The following results
were obtained from the characterisation of the system:
• The system’s optimum operation clock frequency, i.e., that one
providing the highest secret key rate, is 1.5 GHz. The maximum
frequency the system can operate at is 2.75 GHz with a QBER
under 8% in nighttime conditions.
• The optimum mean photon number is µ ∼ 0.1 photons per pulse,
for which an optimum compromise between security and sifted bit
rate is achieved.
• The operation of the system in daytime under full bright sunny
conditions has been demonstrated, with average secret key rates
reaching 0.7 Mbps for a link of 30 m, and 0.5 Mbps for the 300 m
link.
• At nighttime conditions secure key rates of up to 1 Mbps at a dis-
tance of 300 m were achieved. This secret key rate is one order of
magnitude higher than those previously achieved by similar systems
in comparable conditions.
• The system proved very stable since for an experiment run over
a 300 m optical link, after a period of 24 hours and no human
intervention, the sifted and secret key rates obtained were 87% and
80% of their initial values (at the beginning of the experiment)
respectively.
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• The system’s robustness to misalignment showed that it was only
after a reduction of 90% in the sifted bit rate at Bob that the QBER
reached values higher than 6%. This tendency indicated that the
system could potentially remain aligned at 300 meters for 4 or 5
days without external intervention.
7.2 Future work
As mentioned in the first conclusion, there are some aspects like unconditional
security, transmission distance or secret key rates, where a special effort should
be made for experimental realisations of QKD to become truly competitive.
Regarding security, the future plan of research involves the upgrade of the
QKD system presented in this thesis to implement the more secure BB84 with
decoy-state protocol. This will make the system invulnerable to PNS and USD
eavesdropping attacks, and will also increase the secure key rate by at least one
order of magnitude. For this, some additional optics to include the additional
polarisation states, two more VCSELs in Alice, two more detectors in Bob, as
well as intensity modulators to generate the different intensities of the decoy
states, should be employed.
To make the system more robust against possible eavesdropping attacks,
it is essential to ensure that the laser sources are totally indistinguishable so
that no extra information is provided to the eavesdropper. The VCSELs are
power stable since the drivers of the lasers contain an automatic power control
circuitry, which maintains an average optical power output over changes in
temperature and laser properties. This control may slightly vary the bias
current of the laser, what could shift its emission spectrum. In order to ensure
a stable emission wavelength it is foreseen to control the temperature of the
lasers. This would allow fine tuning the emission wavelength of the VCSELs
to a precise desired wavelength, identical for both lasers. Moreover, since both
VCSELs are multimode, a narrow bandpass filter would be used to ensure that
only one spectral mode propagates.
In regard to secure key rates, they could be improved by reducing the QBER
of the key transmissions. In daylight, the main contribution to the QBER is the
background radiation. To reduce the background light collected by the system
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a new configuration of Alice where the mirrors become dispensable has been
designed. The implementation of the new Alice will require a rearrangement
of the optics, which involves modifying the set of lenses of the telescope and
the optical breadboard.
The background could also be reduced by using a narrower spatial filtering,
for instance with optical fibres of a smaller diameter in Bob. However, this
would also reduce the angle of acceptance of the receiver, making the system
more vulnerable to turbulence effects. Therefore, a further optimisation of
the system would consist in the implementation of active pointing and fast
tracking techniques —currently under development— to permit continuous
operation under turbulent fluctuations in the atmosphere. This would also
allow increasing the distance of the optical link.
Finally, the system is currently been upgraded to perform real-time error
correction and privacy amplification processes in order to distil the final secret
key shared by Alice and Bob.
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Term Meaning
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
APC Automatic Power Control
APD Avalanche Photo Diode
AQC Active Quenching Circuit
B92 Bennet, 1992
BB84 Bennet and Brassard, 1984
BBM Bennett, Brassard, Mermin, 1992
BS Beam-Splitting
BSC BeamSplitter Cube
CA Certificate Authority
COW Coherent One Way
DBR Distributed Bragg Reflector
DEA Data Encryption Algorithm
DES Data Encryption Standard
DH Diffie-Hellman
DIQKD Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution
DPS Differential Phase Shift
E91 Ekert, 1991
EV Evaluation Kit
FM Faraday Mirror
FWHM Full Width at Half Maximum
FW10%M Full Width at 10th Maximum
FW1%M Full Width at 100th Maximum
GIS Geographic Information System
GSM Global System for Mobile communications
IF Interference Filter
LOS Line Of Sight
MPD Micro Photon Devices
NbN Niobium Nitride
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NEP Noise Equivalent Power
NRZ Non-Return-to-Zero
QBER Quantum Bit Error Rate
QC Quantum Cryptography
QDS Quantum Digital Signatures
QKD Quantum Key Distribution
OSA Optical Spectral Analyser
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PD Photodetector
PDJ Pattern Dependent Jitter
PER Polarisation Extinction Ratio
PMT PhotoMultiplier Tubes
PNS Photon-Number Splitting
PPG Pulse Pattern Generator
PRBS Pseudo-Random Bit Sequence
QDS Quantum Digital Signatures
RNG Random Number Generator
SAM APD Separate-Absorption-Multiplication APD
SARG04 Scarani, Acin, Ribordy, Gisin, 2004
Si-SPAD Silicon Single-Photon Avalanche Diode
SPAD Single-Photon Avalanche Diode
SPCM Single-Photon Counting Module
SPD Single-Photon Detector
SSPD Superconducting Single-Photon Detectors
TDEA Triple DEA
TIA Time Interval Analyser
USD Unambiguous State Discrimination
VCSEL Vertical-Cavity Surface-Emitting Laser
WCP Weak Coherent Pulses
XOR eXclusive-OR
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Absorption, 97
Afterpulsing probability, 67
Alberti’s disc, 22
Alignment, 111
Atmospheric extinction, 91
Attack
after-gate, 53
blinding, 51
bright illumination, 51
channel calibration, 48
collective, 54
dead time, 52
faked states, 50
fixed apparatus, 53
intercept-resend, 46, 53
large pulse, 48
memory, 55
optimal eavesdropping, 47
passive faraday mirror, 53
phase-remapping, 48
photon-number splitting, 48
quantum cloning, 47
reversed-space, 53
thermal blinding, 52
time-shift, 50
Trojan-horse, 49
USD, 46
Attenuation, 101
Avalanche breakdown voltage, 124
Background radiation, 44, 136
Background rate, 154
Beam divergence, 104
Beam spreading, 99, 100, 161
Beam wander, 99, 137, 149, 161
Beer’s Law, 95
Bias current, 67
Binary entropy function, 147
Bit-mapped gating, 50
Block ciphers
AES, 26
DEA, 26
DES, 26
TDEA, 26
Bragg reflector, 65
Cascade, 37
Cipher, 20
block, 26
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homophonic, 24
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one-time pad, 24
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substitution, 21
transposition, 21
Vernam, 24
Vigenère, 22
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Ciphertext, 20
Collimation, 103
Cryptogram, 20
Cryptography, 20
asymmetric, 27
public key, 27
secret key, 25
symmetric, 25
Cryptosystem, 20
Dark counts, 44
Dark-count rate, 50
Decoy states, 49
Decryption, 20
Detection loophole, 55
Device-independent QKD, 54
Distributed Bragg Reflector, 65
Eavesdropping, 33
Edge-emitting laser, 65
Encryption, 20
Error correction, 33, 150
Extinction ratio, 69
Faraday mirror, 49, 53
Frequency analysis, 21
Gating frequency, 138
Gaussian beam, 103
Geiger mode, 124
Geometrical loss, 94
Impact ionisation, 124
Interference filter, 136
Intersymbol interference, 43
Jitter, 64, 149
Kerckhoff’s principle, 29
Key, 25
raw key, 33
Line of sight, 92
Loophole, 47, 166
Mie scattering, 96
Misalignment, 94, 156
MODTRAN, 98
Modulation current, 67
Multimode fibre, 69
Net bit rate, 149
No-cloning theorem, 30
Noise equivalent power, 119
Optical loss, 94
Optical path, 106
Parametric downconversion, 39
Pattern dependent jitter, 71
Photodetector, 139
Plaintext, 20
Pointing loss, 94
Polarisation extinction ratio, 78, 158
Polarisation leakage, 78, 131, 158
Polarisation state, 32
Privacy amplification, 33, 37, 147, 150
Public key cryptography
DH, 27
RSA, 27
Pulse pattern generator, 73
QBER, 53, 73, 154
contributions, 157
QKD, 19
plug and play, 40, 48
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protocols
B92, 31
BB84, 31
BBM, 31
continuous-variable, 31
COW, 31
differential phase shift, 49
discrete-variable, 31
distributed-phase-reference, 31
DPS, 31
E91, 31
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